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INTRODUCTION 
Background  to  the  STOA  Investigation 
On  26  March  1987  the  STOA  Project  (Scientific ard Technological  Opticns  Assessment) 
was  formally  launched  at  a  meeting  of  the  European  Parliament's  Committee  on 
Energy,  Research  and  Technology  in Brussels. 
One  of  the  three  subjects  chosen  for  investigation during this 
pilot  phase  of  the  project  was  entitled:  'Criteria for  the  Assessment  of 
European  Fusion  Research'.  The  reasons  for  this  choice,and  the major  lines 
of  inquiry  to be  developed,  were  outlined  in  the  STOA  Monthly  Newsletter 
Launch  Issue  of  March  1987: 
"Background  and  objective 
The  importance  of  fusion  research  within  the overall  European 
Community  energy  research  effort  is  indicated by  the  fact  that  JET 
and  the  General  Programme  together  consume  about  SO  per  cent  of  the 
total  EC  energy  research  budget.  If  NET  (the  Next  European  Torus> 
is approved  this  figure  will  surely  rise.  Clearly  the  NET  decision, 
when  it  comes,  will  be  a  major  one  in  budgetary  and  political  terms. 
It  is  an  issue  on  which  the  European  Parliament  will  undoubtedly  be 
asked  to  give  its opinion within  the  next  few  years.  Therefore  there 
is  a  need  now  to  start  preparing  for  this debate  by  attempting  to 
identify  salient  criteria  for  the  assessment  of  European  research  into 
controlled  thermonuclear  fusion." 
It  was  noted  that  reviews  of  the  European  Fusion  Programme  had  tended  to 
concentrate  on  the  scientific  success  or  otherwise of  the  programme  - "not 
surprisingly,  given  that  the  current  phase  is  designed  to  establish  the 
scientific feasibility  of  controlled  thermonuclear  fusion".  It  was  decided 
to  broaden  the  STOA  Fusion  Project  to  include  other  important  features: 
"Of  equal  importance,  however,  will  be  a  call  for  evidence  on  the 
technological  and  commercial  parameters  of  the  programme,  with  parti-
cular  reference  to  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  research  programme  in 
terms  of  other  possible energy  research  investment.  It  is  not  too 
early  to  ask  for  expert  opinions  on  the  technological,  commercial 
and  environmental  safety  aspects  of  thermonuclear  fusion:  it  is  a 
characteristic of  modern  complex  technologies  that  effective Parlia-
mentary  control  is often  rendered  extremely difficult  because  it 
comes  too  Late  in  the  day.  Commitments  of  time,  money,  infrastruc-
ture  and  expertise  can  build  up  an  irresistible momentum.  The  most 1 
Cvi) 
fundamental  question to be  explored  by  the  STOA  study will  be: 
"What  criteria shall  be  used  to  judge  the  success  of  the  European 
fusion  research  programme?"  " 
The  Sweet  Study 
STOA,  recognising  that  it did  not  have  the  resources  to  conduct  a  full 
appraisal  of  the  European  Fusion  Research  Programme,  commissioned  a  study  aimed 
at  identifying  the  "salient  criteria"  for  the  future  assessment  of  the  Programme. 
This  study  has  been  carried out  by  Mr  Colin  SWEET  <et  al>  acting as  Consultant 
to  the  Centre  for  Energy  Studies,  Southbank  Polytechnic,  London.  During  the 
course  of  this  study,  the  STOA  Fusion  Project  organised  the  STOA  Fusion  Workshop 
on  12/13  November  1987  at  the  JET  Joint  Undertaking  in Oxfordshire  in the  UK, 
so  that  the  actors  involved  in  promoting  the  Fusion  Programme  could exchange 
ideas  with  independent  experts  and  critics  in  the  presence  of  Members  of  the 
European  Parliament.  Chapter  Five  of  the  Sweet  Study  was  commissioned  by  STOA 
from  Earth  Resources  Research. 
At  the  Workshop  Mr  SWEET  presented  an  interim version  of  his  study.  This 
has  now  been  extensively  revised  in  the  Light  of  the  Workshop  discussions.  The 
study  is  therefore  now  in  its final  form.  It  must  be  made  clear  that  the  study 
does  not  represent  the  opinion  of  the  European  Parliament  or  of  its  STOA  Project. 
The  study  has  been  commissioned  and  drafted  as  a  contribution  to  public  reflection 
and  debate  on  this  important  matter,  and  comments  upon  it will  be  welcomed. 
Part  of  the  purpose  of  the  STOA  investigation  into  fusion  res~arch was  to 
experiment  in  the  methodology  of  parliamentary  technology  assessment. 
Methodological  Considerations 
In  an  article written  in  19701,  before  the  establishment  of  the  US  Conqress 
Office  of  Technology  Assessment,  Harold  P.  Green  noted  that: 
"Most  public  discussion  upon  technology  assessment  to date  has 
ignored  a  fundamental  point.  There  is  never  any  Lack  of  articulation 
of  the  benefits  of  a  technology.  Every  technology  has  powerful  vested 
interests -private and  frequently  governmental  and  political- ~ho 
can  be  relied  upon  to  press  the  benefits  to  the  technology  assessors. 
The  problem  is  that  the  negative  factors  and  the  risks  are  never  fully 
or  even  adequately  articulated.  ( ..••  ) 
Harold  P.  Green:  "The  Adversary  Process  in  Technology  Assessment", 
Technology  and  Society  March  1970. <vii) 
These  consideration  lead  me  to  the  conclusion  that  what  is  needed 
tor  the  technology  assessment  function  is  an  agency  which  would  act  as 
a  responsible devil's  advocate  or  technological  ombudsman  and  play  for 
the  role  of  adversary  in  the  Congressional  and  public  forums ••.  " 
Green  believed  that  this  kind  of  perspective  was  particularly  important 
when  dealing  with  government  funded  or  sponsored  technological  developments: 
"These  technologies  develop  with  government  investment  which  is  in 
no  way  related  to  the  forces  of  the  market  place  <  ....  >  government 
supports  technology  development  merely  because  desirable benefits are 
foreseen  even  though  there  are  no  market  incentives  •.•  none  of  the 
restraints  and  deterrents  which  are  present  with  respect  to privately 
developed  technologies  are  operative  in  this  case.'' 
whilst  not  necessarily  endorsing  such  an  adversarial  perspective,  STOA  does 
support  the  idea  of  critical, open  debate  on  such  issues. 
Format  of  the  Present  Document  (Vols.  1  and  2> 
The  present  document  is  in  two  volumes.  Volume  1  is  the  Sweet  study.  In 
Volume  2  readers  will  find  the  European  Parliament's  Resolution  of  10  March 
1988  on  the  1987-91  fusion  research  programme2  and  the  report  for  the  Committee  on  • 
Energy,  Research  and  Technology  by Alman  Metten,  MEP,  on  which  the  resolution 
3  was  based.  .  lhis  isfollowed  by  a  revised  version  of  the  Background  Briefing 
f1rst  compiled  in  ~arch  1988  and  circulated  to  Members  of  the  European  Parliament 
at  lhc  time  of  the  debate  on  the  Metten  Report  in  Strasbourg.  This  contains 
dUdltional  material  arising  mainly  from  the  Workshop  proceedings  and  studies 
requested  by,  or  submitted  to  the  STOA  Project. 
It  is  intended  to publish  at  a  later date  a  summary  volume  of  the  STOA 
Fusion  Project  in  the  nine  official  Languages  of  the  European  Community. 
2 
() J  tJG.  (  94,  11.4.88 
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EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY. 
1.  Introduction. 
Thermonuclear  tusion is  a  technolo~~ that otters the  prospect  ol 
makinc  an  important  contribution to tuture  enerc~ supplies either 
directl~.  or throuch  suppl~inc plutonium  to. a  fast  reactor  · 
procramme.  Since  the earlv 1950's,  tusion  researc~ has  sousht  to 
secure  an  ener~~ 'breakeven'  (strictlv speakinc.  'breakeven: 
equivalent')  from  tusion reactions  in Deuterium.  The  procress 
made  in  the  JET  atace  has  been  such that this is expected  to  be 
achieved  in 1991.  Achievinc reactor conditions  in  a  tusion: 
reactor means  improvinc  the decisive parameters  b~ a  turther 
factor ot  5  and  that will require  the buildinc of another larcer 
reactor  - the  NET  stace.  which will  become  operational around  the 
turn ot  the  centur~. 
Fusion  is therefore  a  science research  prosramme,  wholl~ funded 
from  the  public  sector.  We  have  soucht  to  assess it as  such  - a 
task  not  helped  by  its institutional separation  from  other 
Community  Ener~y R&D  procammes  with which,  in  a  full  benefit  cost 
study,  it has  to  be  compared.  Market  related tests are  closely 
linked  to  technical  feasibility,  and  both  share  the  ~roblem of 
uncertainty. 
Within  the  EEC,  fusion  is  the  only  tully  integrated  ~ro~ramme, 
en~agin~ all of  the  member  states of  the  Community  (and  two 
non-member  states).  Internationall~ it has  achieved  a  hi~h level 
of  co-operation  and  a  desicn  study  tor  an  internationally  funded 
R&D  pro~~amme involving  the  USA,  Japan,  the  USSR  and  the  E!C  is 
currently  takinc  place. 
A  consensus  of  current  thinking  is that  fusion  power  is not 
likel~ to  enter  the  commercial  phase  before  the  middle  of  the 
next  century.  Brin~in~ it to  the  ma~ket involves  institutional 
and  political  problems  which  it would  premature  to  speculate 
upon.  However.  the  STOA  project  has  commissioned  this  research 
study with  a  view  to clarifying the criteria that  are  appropriate 
for  appraisin~ the  fusion  project.  We  have  accordingly  used 
analytical methods  which  are generallY applied  to  public  sector 
fundin~.  and  which  are consistent with  Community  policies  of 
deepening  the  internal market,  transparent  p~icinc,  etc  (set out 
in  "The  European  enersr:Y  policy,  Jan  1987"). 
Specitically we  have  addressed  ourselves  to  the  Commissions  own 
appraisal of  the  fusion  programme  and  the  Proposals  it has  made 
to  the  Council  of Ministers  and  the  European  Parliament  embodied 
in  the articles  and  documentation  in  COM(87)  302. 
2.  Fusion  as  a  Resource. 
While  fusion  is  frequently  described  as  a  large  resource  in 
quantitative  terms,  the  resource  requirements  for  the  fusion 
technolo~y itself do  not  appear  to  have  been  researched 
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adequately.  Reterences  to  the estimated  reserves  tor Deuterium 
and  Lithium,  are  seen  to  be  quantitatively  impressive.  However, 
the  data is  subject  to  lar~e mar~ins ot error,  and  not  enou~h 
research  has  been  done  on  the  lo~istics or  the  cost ot potential 
reserves.  Similarly,  expressions  that state that one  cram ot  D-T 
mixture  equals  10,000 litres of oil  (CEC  1987C)  mav  be 
arithmetically correct but  they  bear no  relation to delivered 
ener~v values.  As  such  they  are  inaccurate and misleadinc. 
THESE  QUANTITATIVE  EXPRESSIONS  MAY  BE  INTENDED  AS  A  RATIONALE  FOR 
FUSION  POWER,  BUT  THEY  ARE  NOT. 
It tusion  is to  be  placed in  an  enercv policy context,  two  aeta 
ot qualitative statements are required.  Firstly,  in  terma  of  the 
benefits  and  costs ot alternative enercY  technolociea  how  doea 
fusion  rank,  ie.  what  ia the opportunity cost of proceedinc with 
tusion  research~  Secondly,  what  are the constraints on  a  fusion 
procramme  a),  in material  terms  (minerals,  metals,  etc)  b), 
social  terms  (environmental  reculations,  sitinc,  safety,  risk, 
etc)  c),  systems  requirements  d),  capital requirements  and  e), 
technolocv  transfer~  In  this short  report  we  can  do  L  i.tt le 11ore  than 
explore  such matters,  but  what  we  say points  to  the  need  for  a 
full  feasibility study. 
3.  Facin~ the  Future. 
Fi~ures S.l  & S.2  cive  an  illustrative view  of  the  possible 
time/cost  requirements,  assuming  that  the results ot the 
scientific research  phase  justify  movin~ to  the  Development 
phase.  The  transition  between  these  phases  is sicnified in 
ficures  S.l  & S.2.  The  realisation of  a  breakeven  in  the  plasma 
will  be  to initiate further  work  aiminc  at  system  breakeven. 
This  would  be  the  transition  phase  when  it would  be  approp~iate 
make  decisions  about  the  development  stage. 
a.  Framework  for  Evaluation. 
The  perceptions  that  have  characterised  the  science  research 
phase  are  ceasin~ to provide  an  adequate  context  tor  the 
appraisal  or  fusion  power.  The  expression  that  fusion  should  be 
proceeded with  because it "opens  a  new  wav  to  power  generation, 
havin~ a  moderate  impact  on  the environment  and  usin~ a 
practically inexhaustible  fuel  justifies  ... its development"  (CEC 
1987b)  is  a  normative  statement  that expresses  institutional 
interests rather  than  reality.  IT  IS  DESIRABLE  TO  CREATE  A 
FRAMEWORK  WHICH  ALLOWS  FOR  A  MORE  OBJECTIVE  EVALUATION  OF  FUSION 
POWER  AND  WHICH  IS  CONSISTENT  WITH  MARKET  RELATED  ECONOMIC 
ASSESSMENT  AND  CHANGING  PERCEPTIONS  ON  ENVIRONMENTAL  CRITERIA. 
S-2 
'" ' 
r 
..I· 
' 
I 
r 
I 
.. / 
biO ECU 
3 
2 
1 
-2 
-3 
2·4 beo  ECU 
lspe..T) 
CAPITAL 
C.OSTS 
Executive  Summary 
IZ"I.ooECOfl·~\.1.~ 10 fo;e  £CU 
I  (~p4"1) 1~41  (,.~.ctcJ) 
1  1  I 
I  I  I 
I  1 
I  I 
I 
I 
'  1 
I 
I 
NET 
REV&:NtlE 
S-3 
D£MO 
As  sw~  P.. 1i on.s. 
20 t.•o  Ecu......---
(u"t  ... ;r..J) 
E~,\., reQc.'tor c.os't.s 5  b•o ECU 
Co..,st~~c:fton fake~ 10  l::)C. ..  r:S 
B.;  ld;..,~  sfa,..t.s.  e~  2. .!l~~ 
Eac~  r~aGto,. lu1'  30 ~C.C.~.S Executive  Summar~ 
5.  Economic  Assessment. 
While  it is recosnised  that  no  certaint~ can  be  attached  to  an~ 
evaluation of  fusion  power within  competi.tive  electricit~ auppl~ 
markets  ot  the  future,  there ia neverthless  a  need  to  aaaeaa 
fusion  in  terms  of mainatrean  economics.  The  expert  report  on 
fusion  economics  ot  (COM(87)  302.  Annex)  has  concentrated on 
makinc  judcments  on  the commercial  viabilit~ ot fusion  in the 
mid-21st  centur~.  We  have  found  this defective tor two  reasons. 
(a)  It focusses  on  the  lone  term but  neclects  the  present.  In 
particular,  it does  not  seek  to assess  fusion  in  terms  ot the 
Communit~•s R&D  priorities.  (b)  The  methods  used  to arrive at 
the  conclusions  are not  consistent with  those  used  in public 
sector an&l¥sis.  The~ do  not  use statistical techniques 
necesaar~ in handline data characterised  b~ a  hich  decree ot 
uncertainty,  and  their use ot theory  and  method  can  onl~ be 
described  as  idiosy~cratic.  WE  BELIEVE  THAT  THE  STUDY  OF  THE 
EXPERT  GROUP  ON  THE  ECONOMICS  OF  FUSION  SHOULD  BE  PUT  TO  ONE 
SIDE,  OR  SUBMITTED  FOR  A  SECOND  OPINION. 
WE  DECIDED,  DESPITE  OUR  RESRVATIONS,  AS  THE  ONLY  SOURCE  OF  DATA 
WAS  FROM  THOSE  WORKING  IN  FUSION  RESEARCH,  THAT  WE  SHOULD  TEST 
THE  DATA  IN  A  SENSITIVITY  TEST.  WE  CONCLUDED  THAT  FUSION 
COMPARES  POORLY  WITH  OTHER  FORMS  OF  ELECTRICITY  GENERATION.  ON 
PRESENT  EVIDENCE  FUSION  HAS  LITTLE  PROSPECT  OF  BEING  COMPETITIVE. 
WE  DO  HOWEVER  EMPHASISE  THAT  SUCH  JUDGEMENTS  CAN  BE  NO  BETTER 
THAN  THE  DATA  THEY  USE  AND  THE  SOUNDNESS  OF  THE  ASSUMPTIONS  THAT 
ARE  MADE.  A  FULL  AND  PROPER  ECONOMIC  EVALUATION  IS  OVERDUE.  WE 
RECOMMEND  THAT  THE  REQUIREMENT  TO  DO  THIS  IS  ATTACHED  TO  THE  NEXT 
FUNDING  PROVISION. 
6.  Is  Fusion  Feasible? 
We  have  sought  to  understand  the  present  stage  of  technical 
pro~ress.  The  use  of  the  term  'Break-even'  as  defining  the 
present  pro~ramme to  achieve  an  ener~y balance  in  the 
Hydro~en-Deuterium plasma  reaction is open  to  misunderstandin~. 
IN  OUR  VIEW  'BREAK-EVEN'  SHOULD  BE  USED  AS  DESCRIPTIVE  OF  THE 
STAGE  WHEN  THERE  IS  AN  ENERGY  BREAKEVEN  IN  THE  SYSTEM  AS  A  WHOLE. 
IT  IS  THIS  ACHIEVEMENT  WHICH  WILL  OPEN  THE  WAY  FOR  FUSION  POWER 
TO  BE  USED  FOR  ELECTRICITY  GENERATION.  Scientific feasibility, 
as  that  term  is  currentl~ used  falls substantially short  of 
'break-even'  in  the  sense  that  we  have  used it. 
1.  Engineerin~. 
The  developmental  stage  that  lies  ahead  involves  engineering 
problems  of  ~reat complexity.  We  seek  to  understand  what  are  the 
likely  costs,  trade-offs  and  time  scales.  We  do  not  share  the 
view  that  is  to  be  found  in  COM{87}  302,  that  there will  be 
massive  fall  in  costs  with  the  first  series  in  the  post 
demonstration  pro~ramme.  The  evidence,  if anything,  points  the 
other  way.  We  look  at  the experience  of  other industries 
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includin~ nuclear fission.  It  an~thins.  the  fusion  reactor is 
less well  placed.  Its  ~reat mass,  its low  power  densit~.  and  the 
difficult¥ of  achievin~ a  hi~h  availabilit~ are  serious 
disadva.ntaa;es. 
8.  The  Environment. 
The  stud~ ot  the  environmental  aspects  sus~asts that  the 
uncertainties here  are  ~reater than  have  been  reco~nised.  The 
recent  research oe  the  UK  National Radiolocical  Protection  Board 
has  thrown  serious  doubt  on  the wisdom ot shallow burial  ~or the 
l&rKe  amounts  ot radioactive waste  from  a  tusion  procramm•·  The 
economic,  lesal and  social  problems  involved  in deep  disposal 
are,  from  present  standpoints,  problematical.  We  a~ree that  the 
hazards  ot fusion  are  not  be  measured  in  the  same  terms  as  those 
ot fission  reactors.  However,  there are considerable  concerns 
about  satet~ and  health,  and  in  the  licht of  the  chancinc 
criteria beinc  used  (which  are  complicated  because  the~ var~ 
between  states),  and  the  lecal  aspects ot plant sitinc,  we 
believe that  there is  undue  complacen~ about  the  environmental 
aspects  of  fusion.  Experience  has  shown  waste  disposal  to  be  one 
of  the  most  intractable  problems  ot the  nuclear fuel  cycle.  WE 
BELIEVE  THAT  THE  ENVIRONMENTAL  ASPECTS  SHOULD  RECEIVE  MORE 
ATTENTION.  AND  THAT  AN  INDEPENDENTLTY  BASED  STUDY  IS  REQUIRED. 
WE  SUGGEST  THAT  THIS  SHOULD  BE  UNDERTAKEN  IN  TIME  FOR  THE  NEXT 
PROGRESS  REVIEW. 
9.  Management. 
We  suggest  that  the  time  has  come  to  look  at  the  mana~ement 
strategy  and  structure.  We  are  ~rincipallY concerned  with  the 
need  to  take  a  look  at  the  broad  concepts  which  drive  the 
mana~ement  ~rocess.  We  make  two  proposals.  One  is  a  conceptual 
matter,  the  other  a  strate~ic one.  They  are  intended  to  be  seen 
as  closely connected.  ~irstly,  the  use  of  what  has  been 
described  as  the  sequential  approach  should  be  subjected  to 
thorough  discussion  and  questionin~ as  a  basis  for  mana~ement 
control  and  pro~rammin~.  The  Commission,  under  the  headin~ 
"Objectives  of  the  1987-91  Fusion  Pro~ra.mme",  say: 
"The  way  towards  .tusion  reactors  tor  ener~y 
~eneration  can  be  schematically  and  somewhat 
arbitrarily  divided  into  three  sta~es: 
demonstration  o~  scientific  teasibilit~.  of 
technica~  feasibility  and  eventually of  economic 
feasibility."  (CEC  1987) 
This  expresses  the sequential  approach  as  a  mana~ement concept 
(see  figure  S.3  below}.  First.  solve  the  science,  then  the 
en~ineering and  then  the  economics  will  come  right.  Schmitter 
and  Carruthers.  two  senior engineers  in  the  fusion  programmes 
disputed  this  logic  in  1976.  They  described  it as  too  simplified: 
"It  neglects  the  inevitable  interaction of  the 
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three  components  and  the historical  tact that  the 
widespread  application  ot  new  technolocies  haa 
usuall~  preceded  a  complete  acientitic 
understandinc.  A  second  approach  is to consider  a 
more  interactive approach  but still somewhat  open 
ended •••  A  third approach  considers  the  possible 
role  ot  tusion  power  in  a  lone  term  enercv 
stratecv." 
(Carruthers et al  1976) 
WE  ENDORSE  THE  VIEW  THAT  THE  PROJECT  MANAGEMENT  SHOULD  Bl  BASED 
ON  AN  INTEGRATED  ASSESSMENT,  AND  NOT  BE  OVER-DEPENDENT  ON  ANY  ONE 
DISCIPLINE. 
Figure 5.3  European Fusion Programme Strategy 
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pr~~ented to  the  STOA  Fusion  Workshop  by  C Maisonnier,  Director,  Fusion  Programme. 
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The  central  problem  we  su&&est  ~or project  mana~ement is that ot 
uncertaint¥.  The  seQuential  approach  is not  useful  in  this 
respect.  It has  no  W&¥  o~  dealin~ with  uncertaint~.  Modern 
mana~ement methods  require  an  inte~rated approach  which  subject 
all areas  of  work  to critical appraisal,  makinc  use  ot risk 
anal~sis,  probability assessment,  and  relatinc each  aspect  to the 
central objective  - ie.  in this case  to  the production of  a 
aociall~ useful  product  (elactricit¥)  consistent with  the  best 
use  of resources.  AS  FUSION  RESEARCH  WILL  BE  SEEKING  FUNDING  FOR 
THE  DEVELOPMENTAL  STAGE  IN  THE  EARLY  1990's  RE-APPRAISAL  OF 
MANAGEMENT  SHOULD  BE  A  CENTRAL  OBJECTIVE. 
Before  the  next  stace is embarked  upon it has  bean  said that 
there will  be  a  full  review.  We  discuss  the method  ot monitorinc 
the  fusion  procramma  as  we  understand it to  have  operated in  the 
last decade.  'It has  been  mostlY  concerned with  technical 
matters,  and  has  been  characterised  b¥  the  narrowness ot approach 
that  we  have  referred  to  in  the previous  paraaraph.  While  ~hat 
may  have  served  a  useful  purpose  in  the earlier stace,  WE  ARE 
STRONGLY  OF  THE  OPINION  THAT  THE  NEXT  REVIEW  SHOULD  TAKE  THE  FORM 
OF  A  FULL  FEASIBILITY  STUDY,  USING  INDEPENDENT  EXPERTISE. 
With  respect  to  project manacement,  we  note  that  the 
Commission's  Proposals  to  the Council  and  the  Parliament  appear 
to  arise  from  the  Fusion  Directorate.  On  this  we  have  two 
comments.  Firstly,  we  Question whether  the  problems  ~undamental 
to  settin~ a  framework  tor  lon~-term appraisal  can  be  properly 
formulated,  still less resolved,  by  a  Directorate that  is 
responsible  for  the  day  to  day  admnistration  of  the  fusion 
pro~ramme.  Secondly,  we  ask  the  question,  should  the  Proposals 
in  COM(87)  302  have  been  more  widely  discussed?  It is  ar~uable 
both  in  terms  of  the  verv  larse funding  requirements,  and  the 
len~th of  time  that it is  now  becomins  apparent  before  technical 
feasibility can  be  established,  that  the  implications of  the 
~usion programme  are  of major  importance  for  the  future  of  the 
Communit¥.  These  implications  we  discuss  later,  but  the  point  we 
wish  to  emphasise  here,  is that  the  scope  of  the  discussion  does 
not  appear  to  have  matched  the  importance of  the  topic.  At  the 
organisational  level it does  not  appear  that  any  other 
Directorates  have  been  involved  in  the  processes  that  led  to  the 
writin~ of  COM(87)  302.  If we  are mis-informed  on  this  point  we 
reQuest  that  the  documentation  is made  available.  At  the 
political level  we  are  not  aware  ot  any  si~nificant public 
debate.  To  be  meanin~ful,  such  a  debate would  have  to  be 
open-ended.  The  rapporteur tor the  1985  Parliamentar~ debate,  Mr 
B Siltzer,  confirmed  this when  he  said  "The possibility ot 
abandonin~ the  fusion  research  should  not  be  precluded."  (Saltzer 
1985). 
For  an  RD&D  pro~ramme,  that  of  course  must  be  ri~ht.  Fusion, 
however  does  not  appear  to  be  an  ordinar~ RD&D  pro~ramme.  Were 
it so,  we  would  have  not  laboured  so  hard  in  this  stud¥  to  brin~ 
it into  line with  assessment  o(  RD&D  &enerally. 
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10.  Public  Acceptability, 
Public  acceptability we  address  last.  althouch  in political  terms 
it is possible  to  take  the  view  that it is  the  most  important 
teat  tor any  technolocv to paas.  At  present  the  public  know  very 
little about  fusion,  and  what  they  do  know  is often misleadins. 
Such  a  situation will  chance.  not  least because  the  hich  cost ot 
takinc tusion  to  the  Demonstration stace will  demand  increaainc 
attention.  It is possible,  partly tor this  reason,  that  the 
tirst fusion  demonstration  plant will  be  internationally owned 
and  operated.  In which  case it will be all  the more  important  to  1 · 
create  a  tramework  in which  accountabilit¥ can  be  seen  to be  ( 
operatinc,  within which  dialocue can  take  place.  and  in which 
public contidence  can  crow. 
In  seekinc to  aub~ect the  tueion  procramme  to critical appraisal 
we  recocnise  the procreaa  that has  been  made  in  tusion  research. 
Our  comments  are not  intended  in anv  wav  to undervalue  or 
undermine  the work  that has  been  done,  and  is beinc done.  We  do 
however  believe that  there is  a  need  to  embrace  more  broadl~. 
what  must  be  the central  problem tor  anv  new  advanced 
technolo~ - namelv  public acceptablity.  A  commit~ent.  today  to 
a  technolocv  tor the mid-21st  centurv,  is an  extremelv diffic-ult 
matter  for  decision-makers.  Thev  have  to  be  sure  that  what  they 
decide  today will accord with  the  perceptions  of  society  two 
~enerations ahead.  Perhaps  this means  that  the  commitmenc  ·  to 
the  pro~ramme should  not  run  ahead  of what  the  present  ~eneration 
teels it is able  to  support.  That  is  whv  we  have  endeavoured  to 
search  for options  rather than  commit~ent  to  one  solution.  AS  A 
MINIMUM  WE  AGREE  THAT  RESEARCH  IN  PLASMA  PHYSICS  SHOULD  BE 
SUSTAINED  AND  THAT  THE  CO-ORDINATED  INTERNATIONAL  EFFORT  WHICH 
HAS  BEEN  SO  SUCCESSFUL  IS  THE  RIGHT  APPROACH  FOR  THE  FUTURE. 
WE  ALSO  RECOMMEND  THAT  A  FULL  FEASIBILITY  STUDY  SHOULD  BE  SET  IN 
MOTION  AS  SOON  AS  POSSIBLE;  THAT  IT  SHOULD  BE  THOROUGH. 
INDEPENDENT,  AND  TREAT  ALL  ASPECTS  OF  THE  FUSION  PROGRAMME  WITH 
EQUAL  SERIOUSNESS. 
WE  SUGGEST  THAT  THIS  SHOULD  BE  UNDERTAKEN  BEFORE  ACCEPTANCE  OF  A 
DEVELOPMENTAL  PROGRAMME  IS  RECOMMENDED  TO  THE  COMMUNITY. 
A  third option which  has  been  canvassed  is  that  the  fusion 
pro~ramme should  ONLY  ~o ahead  on  an  inte~rated international 
basis.  The  attractions of  this are not  di~ficult to  see.  Such  a 
course ot action would  keep  the  pro~ramme alive but  at  a  reduced 
cost  to  the  supportin~ states.  As  so  often with  compromises 
there  are  hidden  problems,  and  we  believe  that  the first 
importance  should  be  ~iven to decidinc  on  the criteria  b~ which 
tusion is to  be  evaluated  in  the  future,  and  the  reasons  tor 
which  tuaion,  as  a  potential  contributor to  ener~v supply,  should 
be  proceeded with.  If the  member  states are  not  acreed  about 
that.  an  international  procramme  which  diffuses  responsibility is 
unlikely  to  succeed. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS. 
The  followin~ recommendations  cover  the  broad  areas  and 
correspond  to  the structure ot the report.  Each  recommendation 
is  ~iven in block capitals,  followed  b~  supportin~ statements 
from  the relevant  chapter,  which  ~ive terce to  the 
recommendation.  (For reasons  of  brevit~.  these statements are 
not  alwava  the  same  as  those referenced in  the  text.  The  reader 
should refer to  the relevant  chapter  to place these  statements  in 
their tull context).  Followin~ the main  recommendations  are 
su~seated amendments  to  the draft resulation  oi'  the Commission 
which  went  before  the  Council  of Ministers  and  the Parliament. 
Chapter One.  Introduction. 
THE  POLICY  WHICH  GUIDES  FUSION  RESEARCH  OUGHT  TO  BE  SEEN  AS 
CONSISTENT  WITH  ENERGY  POLICY  AND  RESEARCH  POLICY  AS  SET  OUT  IN 
THE  COMMUNITY'S  DOCUMENTS.  ITS  RANKING  IN  TERMS  OF  RD&D  FUNDING 
OUGHT  TO  BE  CONSISTENT  WITH  THE  COMMUNITY'S  ENERGY  AND  RESEARCH 
PRIORITIES,  AND  CONSISTENT  WITH  THE  EXPECTED  REAL  RATE  OF  RETURN 
THAT  INVESTMENT  IN  AN  RO&D  PROGRAMME  IS  EXPECTED  TO  REALISE. 
"Given  that  fusion  research  takes  nearl~ one  hali' 
of  the  Community's  ener~y research  budget,  we  find 
this  separation  of  expenditure  from  polic~ 
surprising.  We  believe  that if a  proper level  of 
accountability  is  to  be  realised  that  this 
separation  ou~ht  to  be  rectified." 
Chapter  Two.  The  Framework  tor  Appraisin~ Fusion  Power. 
(1-1) 
A  FRAMEWWORK  FOR  THE  EVALUATION  OF  FUSION  POWER  IS  NECESSARY.  IT 
OUGHT  TO  REPLACE  THE  GENERALISED  STATEMENTS  ABOUT  THE  INHERENT 
ADVANTAGES  OF  FUSION  AS  A  POTENTIAL  ENERGY  SOURCE  WITH  A  SET  OF 
CRITERIA  WHICH  ARE  CONSISTENT  WITH  MARKET  RELATED  ECONOMIC 
ASSESSMENTS  AND  THE  CHANGING  PERCEPTIONS  ON  ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION.  UNTIL  A  FULL  APPRAISAL  IS  MADE.  BASED  ON 
RECOGNISABLE  (ie.  Opportunity  Cost)  PRINCIPLES  NO  LONG-TERM 
DECISION  SHOULD  BE  TAKEN. 
"Correcting  thia  lack  oi'  a  recocnisable  framework. 
is we  believe more  important  as  an  objective.  than 
any  other matter at  this  juncture." 
"The  central problem is  dealing  with  uncertainty 
in  the  future.  This  means  that  there  ou~ht always 
to  be  a  number ot  answers  to  anv  ~iven question 
about  technical  options.  time  or cost ...  Because 
decision-makin~ on  matters  which  affect  future 
~enerations  can  only  be  taken  at  the political 
level.  then  decision-make~s  ou~ht to  be  presented 
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with options." 
"We  proceed  from  the  view  that  there  are  no 
imperatives  and  that  at  an~ siven  time  there are  a 
variet~ of  scenarios available,  all  of  which  mav 
be  plausible.  Therefore,  as  with  other enercv 
avstema,  the  merits  ot  fusion  can  onlv  be 
presented  to  the  public  in  te~ms~  of  the  ot  the 
benefits  toresone  as  a  result ot not  choosinc one 
ot the al.ter'natives." 
"The  decision-maker  is siven only  one  choice  - to 
accept  the  procramme  (with  perhaps  some  minor 
modifications  in  the distribution of  funds  between 
centres,  etc),  or to  reject it.  This  is  precisel~ 
the opposite  of  what  we  would  have 
expected  in  a  major  fundinc  prosramme  for  a 
lone-term technology." 
"There  are  eug:gestions  in  the  Commission's 
documentation  that  fusion  is more  attractive  than· 
nuclear  fission  because  it is less  of  a  safety or 
an  environmental  hazard.  We  understand  this  to 
mean  that  the  environmental  benefits  are 
sufficient  in  themselves  to  make  fusion  attractive 
as  compared  with  fusion.  If this  is so,  we  would 
have  liked  to  have  understood  the  force  of  this 
argument  more  fully,  ~iven the  public's  concern 
for  nuclear  hazards.  This  is  an  important 
consideration.  Unfortunately  no  such  stud~ appears 
to  have  been  made  for  the  European  pro~ra.mme  •.•.  " 
"By  an~  comparable  standards,  the  total  cost 
before  the  commercial  stage  is  ~oing to  be  far 
~reater  than  for  anv  previous  technology, 
includinc nuclear  fission." 
"If  an  assessment  in  the  context  of  an  RD&D 
procramme  (and  based  on  opportunity  cost 
principles)  is  not  available,  then  procress  from 
the research  stage  to  the  development  stage  ought 
not  to  go  ahead." 
"(1)  Rankine  technolo~ies  in  terms  of  the 
conventional  criteria.  fusion  is  speculative 
rather  than  technicall~  feasible  and  therefore 
options  ran~in~ between  a  minimum  and  a  high  leve1 
of  fundin~ wil1  have  to  be  set out,  as  in  the  OTA 
report. 
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"(2)  Tr~inc to  ~uess the  future  we  recocnise  that 
a  larce rise  in electricitv demand  (and  implicitlv 
the  rea1  coat  of  ener~v)  could  brin~ fusion  from  a 
backstop  technolo~~  status  to  that ot  a  marsinal 
coat  producer.  We  think  however  that  forecasts  ot 
a  larce rise in  electricit~  demand  need  to  be 
documented  better than  thev  have  been. 
"(3)  Because ot ita exceptionallv lone period of· 
deve1opment  and  demonstration,  and  the lone 1ead 
timea  tor conatruction ot  fusion  power  atationa, 
in  market  terma  this  will  prove  to  be  an 
inflexible  technoloc~.  especia11~  it  demand 
manacament  becomes  more  sensitive  to  consumer 
choice  and  market  prices.  Puaion will  be  favoured 
bv  an  economic  environment  in which  lone-term  RD&D 
prosrammea  can  be  funded  asainat  the  prospect ot  a 
predictable  rise  in  enerc~  demand  and  planned 
enerSY  crowth  in  the  public sector." 
Chapter  Three.  Scientific Feasibilit¥. 
(2-13) 
THE  TERM  'BREAK-EVEN'  AS  A  MEASURE  OF  PROGRESS  IN  FUSION  RESEARCH 
IS  OPEN  TO  DIFFERENT  INTERPRETATIONS.  WE  RECOMMEND  THE  USE  OF 
THE  TERM  'SYSTEM  BREAKEVEN',  AS  THIS  IS  THE  CONDITION  MOST 
RELEVENT  TO  THE  AIMS  OF  THE  RESEARCH  PROGRAM  (NAMELY.  TO  PROVIDE 
A  POWER  PRODUCING  REACTOR).  WE  SUGGEST  THAT  PROGRESS  TOWARDS 
SCIENTIFIC  FEASIBILITY  BE  ASSESSED  IN  RELATION  TO  A  SYSTEM 
BREAK-EVEN  CONDITION. 
"In  our view it is essential  that  the  power  of 
socio-economic  criteria as  the  final  arbiters must 
be  acknowled~ed  by  a  continuous  assessment  of 
scientific  and  en~ineerin~  pro~ress  in social, 
environmental  and  economic  terms." 
"An  unrealistic  definition  of  scientific 
teasibilitv  can  lead  to  an  underestimation  of  the 
scope,  and  even  the  nature,  ot the  en~ineerinc 
problema  still to  be  tackled,  and  this  in  turn 
will  obscure  the  economic  and  environmental 
constraints that  the  pro~ram imposes." 
'' •••  we  take  the  primary  aim ot  the  fusion  pro~ram 
to  be:  to  provide  a  (comparatively)  sate, 
economic.  and  environmentally acceptable source of 
electrical  power  trom  the  use  of  controlled 
thermonuclear reactions  in  a.  plasma." 
"It criteria of scientific  fea.sibiliitv  for  the 
nuclear  fusion  pro~ram are  to  be  adequate  in  the 
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sense outlined above.  then  thev must  express.  not 
arbitrary stasinc poets  in  plasma phvsice.  but  the 
teasibilitv  ot  attaininc  scientific  landmarks 
directlv  related  to  the declared  aim ot achievins 
a  useful  power  source." 
" ..•  unless  the  demands  ot  the  technolocical 
procramme  are  tullV  expreaaed  bv  the scientitic 
criteria,  certain implicit scientific  demands  mav 
become  neslected  at  a  verv  tundamental  level. 
leadinc to verv coniaiderable  waste  ot resources 
throuch  the  pursuance  ot  unrealistic  or 
unrealiaable coals." 
"Neither ot  the  criteria  currentlv  advanced  aa 
representative  ot  a  demonstration ot scientific 
teaaibilitv ia  in itself  adequate  to  the  task, 
because neither ot  them  takes  into account all the 
power  loaeea 
reactor." 
relevant  to  a  power  producinc 
"In our view  the  correct scientific criterion must 
dominate  the  prosramme  from  the  earlies~ stases. 
The  dancer ot  not  doins  this  could  be  that  the 
entire  procramme  is  dedicated  to  pursuins 
performance  parameters  which  are  simplv  not 
relevant  to  the  eventual  ~oal.  The  result ot 
doinc  this could,  in  the  verv  worst  scenario  be 
the  enormous  waste  of  resouces  on  a  pro~ram that 
is  simply not  scientit'icallv feasible." 
(3-4) 
(3-5) 
(3-9) 
(3-12) 
Chapter  Four.  Encineerin~ FeasibilitY  and  the  Fusion  Reactor. 
THE  DEVELOPMENTAL  STAGE  WILL  BE  MARKED  BY  COMPLEX  ENGINEERING 
PROBLEMS.  MANY  COSTS  ARE  NOT  YET  REVEALED.  THE  TRADE-OFFS  WILL 
BE  INCREASINGLY  COST  CENTRED.  WE  00  NOT  SHARE  THE  VIEW  THAT 
THERE  WILL  BE  A  RAPID  FALL  IN  CAPITAL  COSTS  AFTER  THE 
DEVELOPMENTAL  STAGE,  AND  WE  ARE  NOT  CONVINCED  THAT  THERE  WILL  BE 
ANY  FALL.  WE  RECOMMEND  THAT  TH~S KEY  PARAMETER  IS  RECONSIDERED 
I 
r 
\' 
\. 
I 
IN  THE  CONTEXT  OP  A  DETAILED  STUDY  OF  THE  DEVELOPMENTAL  STAGE.  I. 
Three  main  areas  o~ ensineerinc constraints can  be 
discerned.  Firstly,  the  pure  ensineerins 
problema.  SecondlY.  the  environmental  problems 
such  as materials activation  and  waste,  routine 
releases  and  accident  potential.  Thirdl~.  costs 
which  can  also  seen  to  be  involved  in  the already 
existin~  trade-ott's  between  encineerin~  and  the 
environment. 
R-4 
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There are  at  least  two  dit~erina view•  ot what 
fusion  power  seneration  will  otter,  which  mav 
serve  as  criteria for  judcinc ita  acc~ptabilit~. 
One,  the chief  benefits  are  not  economic.  but  in 
environmental  satetv.  Two,  that  fusion  power  does 
otter cheap electric power  and  the other benefits 
are  secondar~.  In  the first view  fusion  power 
would  not  be  acceptable it it tailed to be  cleaner 
than  a  fast  reactor procramme.  In  the  second,  it 
would  be  unacceptable it  it  tailed to be  cheaper 
than existins alternatives. 
"In tact it is quite possible  that 
would  be  leas  than  two  veare 
optimistic data  ••• 
the wall lite 
even  with  the 
" ••. the choice of  desicn  limit  can  onl~ chance  an 
impossible situation  (wall lite  is  leas  than  two 
months)  into  a  difficult one  (wall lite is of  onlv 
a  tew  ~eara),  dependinc  on  the  aasumptiona  ot 
tolerable  ductilit~." 
(4-2) 
(4-7  (IIASA  1977)) 
Chapter  Five.  Safet¥  and  Environmental  Aspects  ot  Fusion  Power. 
WHILE  FUSION  DOES  NOT  REPRESENT  THE  SAME  RISKS  TO  HEALTH  AND 
SAFETY  OR  TO  THE  ENVIROMENT  AS  FISSION.  IT  DOES  PRODUCE  A  LARGE 
AMOUNT  OF  RADIOACTIVE  MATERIAL.  A  GREAT  DEAL  MORE  ATTENTION 
NEEDS  TO  BE  GIVEN  TO  ASSESSING  THE  RISKS  AND  COSTS  INVOLVED.  THE 
REPORT  OF  THE  NRPB  (NRPB  1987)  ON  RADIOLOGICAL  ASPECTS  OF  FUSION 
SUGGESTS  THAT  THE  PREVIOUSLY  HELD  VIEW  THAT  SHALLOW  DISPOSAL  WAS 
ADEQUATE  HAS  BEEN  MISTAKEN.  WE  RECOMMEND  THAT  A  FULL 
ENVIRONMENTAL  STUDY  IS  UNDERTAKEN.  INDEPENDENT  ASSESSMENT  OF 
FUSION  REACTORS.  INCLUDING  SAFETY,  WASTE  DISPOSAL  AND  HEALTH 
RISKS  TO  THE  PUBLIC  AND  THE  WORK  FORCE  SHOULD  BE  COVERED. 
"INTOR  estimates  ot  total tritium inventory  in  a 
modern  plant  vary  from  2.5  to  3.9K~:  the  UOOOMW 
(thermal)  Starfire reactor would  possess  a  tritium 
inventor~  of  10~...  There  is  therefore 
insufficient  information  to  make  any  jud~ement 
about  possible  maximum  tritium  releases  from 
accident•  associated  with  the  DEMO  reactor as 
currently  desi~ned." 
"Irradiation of  the  structural  materials  inside 
the  reactor  leads  to  the  build-up  of  radioactive 
isotopes.  At  the  end  of  their  life  they will 
continue  to  ~ive  ott  heat  and  require active 
coolin~  for  some  years,  and  in  the  lonaer  term. 
even  when  acceptabl~  cool  will  continue  to 
be  radioactive." 
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"There  is little meaninitt'Ul  conception,  as vet,  ot 
the  degree  to which  the  plasma will  be  containable 
under conditions ot net  enercv  cain,  and  thus  the 
conditions  that  the  first  wall  will  have  to 
withstand  ••• " 
" ••.  Tranamutationa  in  certain  materials  involve 
the  production of  lone  lived  iaotopea.  Thia  ia 
only  one  consideration  amonc  many with respect  to 
the choice  of  materials  from  which  to conatruct 
the tirst wall  and  blanket  of  a  commercial  tuaion 
reactor." 
"The  UK  NRPB  haa  studied  tive  alternative  tirat 
w~l  and  blanket  structural  materials  and 
concluded  that  all  would still be  classified as 
intermediate level waate  100  veara attar removal 
from  the  reactor.  The  EEC  fundinc application on 
the  other hand writes  simply ot  the  'non-existence 
of  important  lone-term  (>100  years)  potential 
hazards.•  It  also  assumes  that  shallow burial 
will  be  acceptable." 
"The  decommissionin~  ot  fusion  facilities with 
their more  complicated reactor  arrangement  and  hot 
cell complex  and  above  all  their very  substantial 
inventory  ot'  hi~h level waste.  presents  as  yet  an 
unassessable situation." 
"Given  current  problema  in  t'indin"  sut't'icient 
disposal sites for  the  relatively small  quantities 
of  intermediate  level waste  t'rom  existin~ fission 
power  facilities.  it  is  dit't'icult  to  envisace 
where  the  massive  radioactive  arisin~s  from  a 
major  fusion  economy  would  be  housed." 
"The  createst hazard  lies  in  the  use  ot lithium  ••. 
I~ this material  ia  expose~ to water  coolant  or 
throuch  a  breach  o~ the  reactor vessel  to air or 
other substances with  which  it will react,  it will 
burn  to  an  intense heat,  1n1tiatin~ rurther 
accident events  and  itse~f releasinc  the  tritiym 
contained  in  the  blanket.  It such  a  sequence  is 
associated with  a  breach ot containment,  then  a 
chemical  tire which  releases  a  eicniticant 
proportion ot  the  radioactive  inventorv  to  the 
atmosphere  on  a  scale comparable  to  that at 
Chernobyl  can  be  envisaged." 
"In  their  stud:rr  of  sol.id  waste  mana~ement  ~or 
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fuaion  reactor•.  the  UK  NRPB  concluded  tha~ onlv 
deep  ocean diapoaal  would  present  an  acceptablv 
low  hazard." 
"The  rad1oloc1cal  conaequencea  trom  an  aaaumed 
maximum  releaae  from  a  tuaion  reactor  are 
eubatantiallv  1•••  than  those which  would reault 
from  a  worat  licht water accident." 
"We  would  recommend  that anv further tundinc of 
tuaion  power  tecbnoloai•• •bould  be  accompanied  bV 
tundina  tor  •tructured probabiliatic ana1v•1•··· 
Thev  need  to be  carried out  bV  orcaniaation• whiob 
do  not  themaelvea  have  a  direct intere•t in the 
aucceaa  of  the project  ••• " 
" ••• the  environmental  ••••••ment  o~ 
compared  with  alternative  technoloc~•• 
carried  out  bv  orcanisat1ona  independent 
intereated reaearch orcaniaationa." 
tuaion 
muat  be 
o~  the 
Chapter Six.  The  Economies  o~ Fusion  aa  a  Resource. 
(5-19) 
(5-20) 
(5-22) 
(5-23) 
THE  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  TO  BE  FOUND  IN  THE  ANNEX  OF  COM(87)  302  IS 
INADEQUATE.  WE  RECOMMEND  THAT  IT  SHOULD  BE  PUT  TO  ONE  SIDE  AND 
NOT  USED  AS  A  BASIS  FOR  PROJECTING  THE  FUTURE  OF  FUSION  POWER. 
NEITHER  IS  IT  SUITABLE  FOR  DECISION-MAKING  IN  THE  RD&D  PROGRAMME. 
It ia  neceaaar~  to place  ~uaion potential in the 
wider  context  of  the  economv.  This  involves 
consideration  ot  lone-term  prices.  capital 
markets.  and  reaourcaa.  Specific coats  (examine4 
in  chapter  7)  can  onlv  have  meaninc  i~  the 
assumptions  made  in  the macro-economic  studY  are 
both explicit and  credible.  The  Expert  croup  who 
have  modelled  apeci~ic coats  have  icnored  this 
requirement. 
" .•.  we  recommend  that  the  tirat  consideration 
should  be  civen  to  basic  questions  of  how  the 
topic ot  ~uaion economics  oucht  to  be  approached." 
"The  kev  issue  ia  how  to  de&~ with  uncertaintv. 
Appraiaal  of  lona-term investment  in  the  public 
sector  uainc  well  tried methods,  ie.  aettinc the 
discount  rate.  coat  benefit  analvaia.  use  of 
scenarios.  The  results  are  usuallY  subjected  to 
aenaitivit~  analysis,  and  (deairablv) 
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"Deciaion-makera  contronted  with  lone-term 
pro~ecta  oucht  not  to  accept  aincle  ticure 
aolutiona.  • •• A  ranee  ot option• which  include 
alternative• ahould  be  recarded  ae  a  minimal  wav 
of approachinc thia probl  ...  " 
The  tuture  ot  fuaion  ia  preaent•d  with  the 
~licit  or  explicit a••u.ption that real enercv 
coat• will have  rieen  aubetantial1V  bV  the tiae 
tueion  coae•  to tb•  aarke~.  That  :1•  po••ible. 
But 1• it  de•irable9  Richer  ener~V  price• are 
aeaociated  with  deflationar.v effect• and  reduced 
national  inco••· 
The  bieber coat  and ri•k ot tuaion auacest  that  a 
hiaher rate of return  wi~l be  expected  than  in  the 
economv  ceneralLv.  There  is  the  ri•k  ot 
over-investment  in such  a  •cenario,  with  lo•a ot 
demand  leavinc  expensive  surplus capacity in  the 
ayatem.  Both  these  phenomena  - hicher prices  and 
aurplua  capacity  - were  experienced  in  the period 
atter 1974  in  Europe.  with  the  consumer  havinc  to 
carr.v  the  coat.  The  preaentation ot fusion •• 
emercinc  in  an  economv  with  hich  enercv  demand 
and  hiah  real  enerav  costa  haa  therefore ita 
drawbacks. 
On  the  supply  aide  aimilarlv  the  assumption  of 
rapid  crowth  in  nuclear  ener~ is over-simplified. 
The  verv  rapid  increaae  in  the  nuclear 
contribution  - from  275  TWh  (1983}  to  792  TWh 
(2000}  - becomina  the market  leader  in electricitY 
supply.  is  unrealistic.  and  on  environmental 
crounde  is almoat  certainlY unacceptable. 
Because  tusion  tuel coata are very  low,  there will 
be  no  caine  trom  tallinc  tuel  coat.  Relative 
advantaae tor tuaion  muat  depend  not  on  talla  in 
it•  tuel coat•,  but  on  ri••• in  those  o~ coal  and 
tiaaion." 
Little  is  known  about  the  resource  coata  ot 
tuaion.  · The  requirements  in  terma  ot larce-acale 
commercia~ procrammea,  ie.  the  trade-otta between 
encineerinc  deaicn  and  materials:  the 
environmental  apin-otta  of  the  uae  ot  Lithium, 
Tritium and  Deuterium;  the  scale of waate  disposal 
and  the  time  spans  involved  all  ot  theae are 
R-8 
(6-1) 
1 
(6-2)  f 
~ 
I 
(6-3) 
I  ' 
I 
(6-3.4) 
(6-S} 
(6-7) Recollllllendatione 
queationa  that require  ~ar more  research  than  baa 
eo  ~ar been  undertaken. 
There  ia,  tor example,  no  conaenaua  on  the extent 
of  lithium reaourcea.  Preaentl¥  lithium  coat• 
around  *55/ke.  It  1• eatimated that price• will 
have  to riae  three~old  before  adequate  reaervea 
would  be  economic&llv recoverable tor larce tuaion 
proarammea.  Kat~ate• of available reaervea varv 
over  a  wide  ranee.  Si~larlv, eatiaatea of the 
lithium  requirement ot tu•ion reactor•  are  verv 
uncertain.  The  potential  of  fusion  in reaource 
te~ can  onLv  there~ore be  atated in  a  verv wide 
band.  We  reco  ...  nd  that  aome  auatained reaearch 
ia undertaken in thia field. 
(6-8) 
(6-8.9) 
Current  reactor deaicn•  atudiea  include  scarce 
met~a.  Bervllium,  tuncaten  and  vanadium  in 
particular.  One  US  atudv  shows  that  these 
materia~• constraint•  could  become  severe  in  a 
300GW  tuaion  economv,  unless  more  abundant  and 
cheaper materials were  found. 
"The  ultimate  economic•  and  aceeptabilit~  ot 
tuaion  ener~.  aa  with  moat  other  enerc~ sourcea, 
will  de~end  to  a  larce extent  on  the  limitations 
ot materials  tor the various  components." 
(6-11) 
(6-11  {US  DOE  1987)) 
The  et~ecta ot  such  resource  coats will be telt in 
the  tuel  cvcle.  Oependinc  on  the  assumptions  __  .,.. 
made,  the  dit~erence  could  ranee  ~rom 50%  o~ the 
ceneration coat  civen  in  COM(87)  302  to  less  than 
1%.  The  low  ticure  arises  from  assumptions  which 
are unrealistic.  In  our view  it  would  be  unwise 
to treat tuel  coats  aa  necliaible. 
(6-11,12,13) 
Chapter Seven.  The  Coat Sensitivity ot  Puaion  Power. 
WB  RAVE  TREATED  THE  DATA  IN  COM(87)  302  TO  SENSITIVITY  TESTS  AND 
THE  RESULTS  SHOW  THAT  IT  COMPARES  POORLY  WITH  ITS  NEAR 
NEIGHBOURS,  NUCLEAR  FISSION  AND  COAL.  ON  PRESENT  EVIDENCE  FUSION 
POWER  APPEARS  TO  HAVE  LITTLE  PROSPECT  OF  BEING  COMPETITIVE.  WE 
RECOMMEND  THAT  A  FULL  ECONOMIC  EVALUATION  IS  ESSENTIAL  AND  THAT 
THIS  REQUIREMENT  SHOULD  BE  ATTACHED  TO  THE  NEXT  FUNDING 
PROVISION. 
We  are  critic&~ ot  the  Commiaaion'a  Expert  Group's 
report.  In  particul&r  "to  derive specific costa 
tor  tuaion  power  trom  conceptualised  deaicna. 
uainc  any  number  ot untested  assumptions,  ia  the 
R-9 RecoDUDendationa 
t~pe ot torecaatins  that tell into disrepute  aome 
veara  aso  ••• " 
We  diaasree with  the  uae  o~ enercv accountins,  and 
the  mix  ot  enercv  accountinc  with  atatiatic• 
derived  trom conventional  aourcee.  "A  shot  cun 
marriace of two  aeta ot data.  both ot poor qualit¥ 
and  inherentl~  incompatible,  ia hardlV coinc to 
laat.  What  it doea  do  ia demonatrate the unique 
detachment  ot  tuaion  technolocv  trom  what  ia 
happeninc in the world  around it." 
Notwith•tandinc that we  diaacreed with  the method• 
adopted we  aub~ected the Expert Groupa'  reaulta to 
a  aenaitivitv teat in order to •ee  how  robust  thev 
micht  be. 
The  economic  parameter•  that  we  chose  in thia 
where  in  all  caaea  leas  favourable  to  low 
tuaion  than  thoae  uaed  bV  the  Expert  Group. 
was  neceaaar~  because  the  ticurea  used  b~ 
Group  had  been  either  verv  optimistic 
neclecttul of  important  variables. 
teat 
coat 
Thia 
the 
or 
"Experience  with  tuaion•a  closest  technolocical 
relatives  in  the  thermal  fiaaion  procramme  and  the 
taat  reactor  procrammea  succeat  stronclv  that 
capital  coats  have  historically  undercone 
escalation  in  the  face  of  predicted  coat 
decreaaea. •• 
In  particular  we  did  not  accept  that  the capital 
coat ot fusion  reactors would  tall  b~ a  factor ot 
2-3 in  a  aeries  of  ten.  Thi•  was  based  not  on 
experience  with  fission  reactors  (where  a  larce 
data base was  not  used)  but  on  encineerinc-driven 
costa.  We  are ot the opinion that  thia ia tar too 
narrow  a  base  to project  a  rapid tall in capital 
coata.  Moreover.  there  are  a  number  ot 
encineerinc  teatureaa  low  power  denait~.  lara• 
aize,  first  wall  replacement.  which  exert 
important  limite  on  coat reduction. 
The  coats ot  R&D  oucht  to  be  recovered.  It adds 
aicni~icantlv to  the  cost  of  fusion  power.  The 
cost of  decommiasiooi~ and  R&D  could  add  50~  to 
the Commiaaion's  lowest Startire estimate. 
"It is  unlikel~ that  a  tuaion  plant,  in  the tirst 
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aeriea at  leaat.  could  be built tor leaa  than  •s 
billion." 
"The  Commiaaion'a  asaumption.  built 
tota1 coat• ia  75-80~ av&ilabilit~. 
ticure  a  reaaonable  tarcet  or ia 
unrealiatic  aaaumption~" 
into their 
I• thia hich 
it  ~uat  an 
"We  are ot the view  that the Coamiaaion  ahould  not 
continue  with  thia  [availabilit~] aaau.ption  and 
that  the~  abould  becin  aerioua  atudiea  on  a 
tull-ran•• acenario •tudV  troa  which  a  central 
eatiaate can be derived." 
"Amon•  the kev variable• attectinc coat,  we  ~udced 
availab111tv to  be  the moat  aenaitive.  The  Expert 
Groupa'  aaaumption ot an  availablitv  ot  75~  or 
hisher  appeared  to  have  no  ~ustitication, 
eapeciallv  tor an  immature  technolocv.  Tested at 
lower availabilities,  the costa  roae verv  rapidlv. 
We  are  ot  the  opinion  that  coat sensitivities 
should  be  re-appraised,  eapeciallv  in the  li~ht ot 
down-time  estimates associated with  the  ~iret wall 
and  blanket  replacement  timea." 
"We  are  o~  the  view  that  ruaion  power  coat 
sensitivities  should  be  re-appraised,  eapeciallv 
in  the  lisht  o~ the  down-t~e estimates associated 
with tirst wall  and  blanket  replacement  times." 
"To  assume  that  tusion  construction will reverse 
the coat  trend ot tission  and  tall bv  at  least  as 
much  as  the other rose  can  only  be  described  as 
heroic.  It  can  onl~  be  treated aa  evidence ot 
blind determination  to make  the  case  tor  ~uaion bv 
aaaertinc what  cannot  be  reaaonablV  demonstrated." 
"The  notion  that  a  technolocv  can  be  broucht  to 
the  market  solelv  bV  technical  improvement, 
capable ot beinc anticipated several decades  ahead 
in tractions ot  a  cent  per  kWh.  acainat  an  assumed 
backcround  ot  constant  real pricea,  and  that  on 
auch  a  baaia  torecaaters  can  claim that it will be 
competitive,  ean onlv be  aeaeribed  as  the  triumph 
ot matter over mind." 
The  application ot enercv  accountin~ to  arsue  that 
tuel costa were  cloee  to  zero  over  the  lifetime ot 
the reactor,  appeared  to  ua  to  be  one  ot  the worat 
R-l.l. 
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(7-13,1&) 
We  concluded  that  the capital  co•t  ot  tu•ion 
repre•enta  a  near intractable  problem.  On1~  a 
verv bich  rate  of return would attract 1nve•tor• 
to tu•ion. 
Chapter lilht.  Deciaion-makin• and Accountabilitv. 
(7-16) 
WE  BBLIBVB  THAT  MANAGEMENT  STRATEGY  OUGHT  TO  BB  BROUGHT  INTO  LIMB 
WITH  LONG-TERM  ENERGY  POLICY  AND  WITH  THE  ORGANISATION  AND 
ECONOMIC  CRITERIA  ON  WHICH  RD&D  SPENDING  IS  BASED. 
l 
WE  RECOMMEND  THAT  THE  NEXT  FUSION  REVIEW  SHOULD  TAKE  TBB  PORM  OP  I 
A  FULL  FEASIBILITY  STUDY  USING  INDEPENDENT  IXPERTISB,  AND 
COVERING  ALL  ASPECTS  OF  THE  FUSION  PROGRAMME. 
The  "Puaion  Review•" ot  1981  and  198~  confined 
themselvea  larcelv  to  technical  aapects of the 
procramme.  Our  view  ia  that  a  more  searchinc 
appraisal  ia required  before the next  atace of  the 
tuaion  procramme  is adopted. 
This  should  be  a  tull  teaaibilit~  studv  that 
should  aim  to provide optiona  tor decisions at  the 
political level.  It  should  be  broadlv  based  in 
ita approach  and  conluaion•  and  seek  to  inform the 
wider  public  about  tuaion  power.  It  ahould  use 
independent  expertise.  and  at  the  same  time 
involve  all  the  concerned  directorate•  and 
committee• within  the  Community  structure. 
For  these reasons  we  believe that  a  repetition of 
the  previoua  t~pe  ot  Fusion  Review would  not  be 
adequate.  The  exercise  should  be  risorou•, 
aettinc  all  the  complex ot factors.  and  de~inins 
the objectives  that  juatit~ dirterent optione,  and 
different levels ot  expenditure,  in  order  that 
clear  decision•  can  be  taken  at the political 
level. 
"We  therefore ask  the  question,  "Can  we  wait until 
$20  billion have  been  spent  be~ore  we  decide  it 
the  mone~  has  been  well  spent,  or whether it 
should  be  abandoned~  We  are  aware  that 
cancellation  at  a  late atace  has  been  done  berore 
in  the  nuclear  pro~ramme  (e~ the  US  decision  to 
cancel  the  Clinch  River  ~ast  reactor  project). 
But  we  felt  that  the  answer  to  the question ia 
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"No",  and  there~ore a  ~ull appraiaal  includinc a 
look at the  propoaed  economic  benefits ia one  that 
oucht  to  be  undertaken." 
"Wideninc  the  scope  o~  appraiaal  ehould,  we 
eucceat,  include wideninc  the  acope  and  akilla of 
the  fuaion manace•ent.  We  are  •••  concerned  to 
draw attention  on1V  to  the aiamatch  between  the 
verv coaplex i•auea  that fueion •• a  technolocv of 
the  future involvea,  and  the  preaent  •anac  ..  ent 
atructure.  We  believe  that  to  cet  the  richt 
b~anoe  here,  1• •• everv bit aa  important •• the 
more  technical aapecta of the appraiaal exerci••·" 
"We  aucaeat  that  it  would  be  de•irable  to 
etrencthen  the  Conaultative  Committee  of  the 
Puaion  Procramme,  and  to  create  more  e~tective 
liai•on  with  other Directorate• with  an  interest 
in  tuaion  and  in  adviainc  the  Council  and 
Parliament.  Wa  also  ausceat  that atroncer links 
are established with  the  Parliament  and  ita Enercv 
and  Research  Committee  in order to brine  polie~ on 
fusion  in line with  polie~ on  ener~." 
Chapter  Nine.  Public  Acceptability. 
" ••• There  ia  as  yet  no  body  of criteria by  which 
judceaente  can  be  made  tor  the  lonser  term  and 
which  commands  wide  social acceptance." 
"The evolution of  larce institutional interests is 
aseociated  with  the  ~rowth of  new  technolosies. 
The  institutions  have  been  a  factor  in  polarisin~ 
the  debate  by  the  manner  in  which  they  have 
wielded  their power." 
"There ia no  reason  whv  fusion  should  be  funded  it 
it  cannot  meet  close  scrutiny  on  safety  and 
environaental  srounda.  Securins  acceptance  on 
the•• crounda  mav  be  more difficult  than  attaininc 
technical  or economic  feasibility.  Acceptance  of 
fusion  on  environmental  crounda  could  be  the 
induatrv'• botton line." 
(8-3) 
(8-6) 
{9-2) 
(9-3) 
(9-5) 
Recommended  Amendments  to  the  Commission's  Proposal  to  the Council 
and  the  Parliament  tor  the  Next  Stage ot  Fundinc  (COM(87)  302). 
R-13 Recommendation• 
"Whereaa  thermonuclear  tuaion  ia  a  potential 
aource  ot  enercv.  it haa  to be  eva~ated  in the 
context ot all  the  available enercv  technoloci•• 
which  the  communit~  i•  tundinc.  and  aaainat 
accepted criteria." 
(Pace  az,  para I) 
"The  new  procramae  will  include  a  aerie•  of 
•tudie• in the  ma~or area•  (includinc  eoono~c•. 
and  the  environment)  of  fu•ion  development, 
contributinc  to  a  tull  teaaibilit~ atud~ carried 
out in con•ulation  with  all  o~ the Directorate• 
concerned  and with  the Parli ..  ent." 
(Pace  A2,  para Ill) 
"Whereaa  the recent propo•al  bv  the  Commia•ion  1• 
an  interim meaaure,  lone-term deci•iona  baaed on  a 
thorouah  ••••••ment  ot  the  pro~ect  includinc 
participation  in  international  pro~ecta will be 
prepared durinc the  interim period,  and  before the 
next  tundinc proposal." 
(Pace  a3,  para I) 
"The  Commiaaion  shall  proceed  without  delav  to  a 
con•ultation  with all the relevant  bodies  on  an 
evaluation  ot  the  pro~ect  in  its  scientific, 
technical,  economic  and  aocial  aapecta.  This 
review proceea  will  seek  to  brine tu•ion as  an 
enercv  source  into  close  relationship  with 
communit~  ener~y  and  research  policiea.  The 
evaluation  shall  involve  independent  expertise in 
all the  major  areas.  It shall be  made  available 
tor discussion  before  the  next  tundinc proposal is 
submitted." 
(Article 3) 
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CHAptER  ONI.  INTRODUCTION. 
The  ob~ect of thia atu4V  ia to provide  the European  Parliament 
with  a  balanced  appraiaal of  the  European  Puaion  Procramme.  We 
have  been  oomaiaaioned  b~ the  STOA  Project to conaider "What 
criteria ahall  be  uaed  to  ~udce the •ucce•• of the European 
Fuaion  Reaearcb  proaramae."  Tbia aav  be  coupled with  the call of 
the European  Parliamen'  tor a  wide ranainc public debate,  firet 
made  in 198&,  on  tuaion  power.  The  Commiaaion  beaan ita reaponae 
to thi• re•olution in 1985  and it reaolved alao that there ahould 
be  a  Review of the tuaion procr ...  e  in 1987,  and  tbat  a  propoa&l 
•hould  be  addreaaed to the Council  to provide tor tundina for "• 
new  ~ive ~ear procr ...  e."  In addition,  the European  Pa»li ..  ent, 
tollowinc the Ad ..  Report,  in 1987  aaked  the co ..  i•eion to 
"undertake a  coaprehenaive  and  loncer tera review of enercv 
ob~ectiv••·"  Tbua,  thia  •tudV  1• placed in the context of a 
review proceee  t&kinc place within the  Communit~ on  thermonuclear 
fusion  and  on  enercv  polic~.  The••  proceaaea are  documented a), 
in  the Commiaaion'•  propoaal  (COM(87)  302)  which  contain• al•o 
the reeulta of  the work of the  two  expert croups  on  the 
Environmental  Iapact  and  the  Economic  Proepecte  of  tuaion, 
carried out at  the  Parliament's requeat.  and  (b),  in the workinc 
documents  of  the  Enercv  Reeearch  and  Technolocv  Committee of  the 
Parliament,  (CEC  (85)  324),  the  Adam  Report  and  the resolution 
adopted  b~ the  Parliament  in April  1987. 
We  are struck  b~ the  absence ot anv  obvious  inter-relation 
between  the report• ot the  Commieaion  and  the  Parliament.  The 
Commission'•  documents  on  tuaion  appear  to  have  been written 
without  takinc into account  the  eners~ policie• adopted  b~ the 
Parliament  and  the Council  o~ Ministers.  At  the  same  time  these 
ener~ polic~ statements  make  no  virtuall~ no  reference to 
thermonuclear  ~ueion aa  such.  The  Parliament's resolution  o~ 
April  1987.  tor example,  re~ere to  ~luidiaed bed  combustion  aa  a 
project  in which  more  research  should  be  undertaken,  but  makes  no 
re~erence to  tuaion  in either clause  (t)  or  {~)  which  covers 
research into  new  enerc.v  sources  in pursuit  o~ the  Communit~'• 
enercv  polic~.  GIVEN  THAT  FUSION  RESEARCH  TAKES  NEARLY  ONE  HALF 
OF  THE  COMMUNITY'S  ENERGY  RESEARCH  BUDGET.  WE  FIND  THIS 
SEPARATION  OF  EXPENDITURE  FROM  POLICY  SURPRISING.  WE  TAKE  THIS 
INTO  ACCOUNT  WHEN  WE  ADDRESS  THE  TOPIC  OP  PROJECT  MANAGEMENT.  WE 
BELIEVE  THAT  IP  A  PROPER  LEVEL  OP  ACCOUNTABILITY  IS  TO  BE 
REALISED  THAT  THIS  SEPARATION  OUGHT  TO  B!  RECTIFIED. 
Independent  aaaeaement  o~ technolosiea  ia beins recocniaed ae  a 
matter ot major  importance in sivinc substance  to democratic 
accountabilit~.  The  European  Parliament,  in  a  manner  analosoua 
to  the  US  Concreea  has  ~ound itaelt in  need  ot external 
appraisals  o~ advanced  technolociea  about  which it haa  to make 
major  reaourcinc decisions.  We  are  sure that this initiative ot 
the  Parliament retlecta  the  need  to brine the  processes  o~ 
accountabilitv into line with  the  complexities  and  problema  that 
it presents  to our societies.  and  to  broaden  the  basis ot 
acceptabilit~.  The  Office ot  Technoloc~ Assessment  o~ the  US 
Con~ress baa  also  recentl~ completed  a  major  etud~ o~ tuaion 
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power entitled "Starpow•r"  (OTA  1987).  It ia  a  document  troa 
which  we  have  benefitted,  and  in  a  number ot important matter• 
our conclusions  co-incide,  althouch  the aituationa  thev analvae, 
and  the method•  uaed,  are often verv ditterent.  We  auc•e•t  that 
these  two  external aaaeaamenta  in their aeparate wava·mav  alao be  1 
aeen  aa  markinc  a  ateep chana• in bridcinc the cap  between  the 
power ot creat  new  technolosi••·  which  neceaaarilv aeek  to 
pro~ect a  future  compatible  to their needa,  and  the public wboae 
wider concern•  have  to be expreaaed  thrcuah the political 
proceaaea of the democratic  atate. 
In addition to makinc  technical obaervationa  we  have  ~ound it 
neceaaar.v  to diacuaa  the  aub~ect of deciaion-m&kinc and 
accountabilitv.  We  a1ao devote  a  chapter to metbcda ot 
appraia~.  We  do  thia becauae we  tound it iapoaaible to aeparate  \ 
the queationa attectinc the tuture of·tuaion aa  a  technolocv,  ( 
trom the perception• ot thoae  in the Puaion Centre•  and 
Directorate,  whose  reaponaibilitv it ia to direct the tuaion  { 
procramme.  We  are familiar with the inatitutional probl .. that 
those  deepl~ involved  in  a  new  field of reaearch will  have  a 
natural  tendencv  to indentitv their future,  iaplicitlv or 
explicitl~.  with  the benetita ot the  technolocv  thev have  been 
responsible tor.  Thev  wi~l therefore find it difficult to 
participate in  an  open-ended diacuaaion.  That  is whv  the 
discussion  at  the  politic&~ level is now  particularlv important 
and  takes  precedence  before deciaions  about  turther tundinc are 
made.  We  are  bv  no  means  sure that  there  has  been  the richt 
balance  between  technical deciaiona  and  political deciaiona  in 
the past.  Possiblv this has  been  because  there is no  settled 
tramework  tor evaluatins the  ~uaion procramme.  CORRECTING  THIS 
LACK  OF  A  RECOGNISABLE  FRAMEWORK  IS.  WE  BELIEVE,  MORE  IMPOR~ANT 
THAN  ANY  OTHER  MATTER  AT  THIS  JUNCTURE.  We  there~ore felt it 
necessary  to  make  clear our view  on  these matters.  We  deve~op 
the  aasumptiona  that  we  ourselves  use  in seekins to respond  to 
the  STOA  term•  o~ reference  tor thia  atudV.  Thev  are ones  that 
broadlv accord with  Communit¥  philosophy  and  practice. 
We  wou~d  ~ike to  acknowled~e the assistance we  have  had  trom  the 
staff and  members  of  the  STOA  project,  the various  members  o~ the 
statt at  the  tuaion centres at  Cu~ham (JET),  Garchinc  (Max  Planck 
Institute)  and  the  European  Commiaaion  (Bruaae1s},  who  have 
responded  conatructive~v to our queetiona  and  enquiries.  We 
would  also like  to  thank  Dr  Gera~d Epstein ot the OTA  office in 
Waahincton,  Judith Clarke  and  Gordon  McKerron  at the Science 
Policv Research  Unit,  Susaex Univeraitv tor their help  and 
commenta.  Earth Resources  Research  have  contributed the chapter 
on  the Satetv and  Environment•~ Aspect•  ot Fusion  Power  and  we 
have  benefitted from  their participation.  The  overall 
responaibilitv tor the report  lies with  the research  team 
attached to the Centre for  Enercv Studies. 
As  an  academicallv  baaed  enercv research  centre we  have  no 
commitment  to fission  power,  or  indeed  to  anv  other  form ot 
enercv  supply.  But  we  are  aware  that  in  the last  two  vears 
public  interest in enorcv  trom nuclear  fission  has  sharpened 
considerablv.  and  while  tusion  is  a  lon~er term  prospect  the 
1-2 Chapter One  Introduction 
public'• perception  o~ the role  o~ nuclear power .. an enercv 
tora will  no  doubt  continue to acquire clearer  de~inition. 
Neceaaaril~.  there will be controver•v about  fusion  aa  there ia 
about  tisaion,  but  there 1• an  evident  need  to extend  and  deepen 
the  public under•tandins ot tu•ion  power •• a  potential enercv 
source  even while it 1• •till in the "laboratorv" •tace.  We  hope 
that thi• report will contribute to that proce••· 
Mr  Colin Sweet. 
Con•ultant  to  the 
Centre for Enercv Studies. 
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CHAPTER  TWO.  THE  FRAMEWORK  FOR  APPRAISING  FUSION  POWER. 
2.1  Introduction. 
In  this  chapter  we  examine  three  issues. 
1.  Requirements  for Appraisal  ot  Fusion  Technolos~ 
2.  Appraisal  of  RD&D  prosrammes 
3.  Guessins  the  Future  and  other pitfalls 
i  -
l  2.1.1  Requirements  tor Appraisal ot  Fusion  Technoloc~. 
I 
Appraisal  of  fusion  technolos~ is  exceptionall~ difficult. 
Firstly,  because it is  technically  complex.  Secondly,  because it 
is  not  vet  known  if it will  achieve  net  enerz~ output.  Thirdl~. 
it is  not  known  how  lon~ it will  be  before  this is  known. 
Fourthly,  because  of  the  very  lone  time  horizon,  it is difficult 
to  conceptualise  the  conditions  under  which  commerical  output 
will  be  be  achieved  or  how,  in  political or institutional  terms, 
fusion  power  can  be  brought  to  the  market.  For  these  reasons it 
is particularly  important  that  excesses  of  optimism  are  avoided, 
and  that  the  persistent  tendency  to  overstate its potential  and 
understate  the  cost  are  countered  by  introducins scenarios  which 
include  pessimistic  assumptions. 
THE  CENTRAL  PROBLEM  IS  DEALING  WITH  UNCERTAINTY  IN  THE  FUTURE. 
THIS  MEANS  THAT  THERE  OUGHT  ALWAYS  TO  BE  A  NUMBER  OF  ANSWERS  TO 
ANY  GIVEN  QUESTION  ABOUT  TECHNICAL  OPTIONS,  TIME  AND  COST. 
Targetted  solutions  or  single  fisure  predictions  should  be  ruled 
out  as  beins  inherently  more  likely wrens  than  risht.  BECAUSE 
DECISION-MAKING  ON  MATTERS  WHICH  AFFECT  FUTURE  GENERATIONS  CAN 
ONLY  BE  TAKEN  AT  THE  POLITICAL  LEVEL,  THEN  DECISION-MAKERS  OUGHT 
TO  BE  PRESENTED  WITH  OPTIONS. 
The  manner  in which  these  options  are  constructed ought  to  be 
consistent with  the  manner  in  which  appraisals  are  made  of other 
enersy  technolosies,  especiallY  those  which  are alternatives  in 
the  sense  that  they  have  a  si~nificant potential  in  supplyins 
energy  if fusion  power  is  not  avaliable.  Choices  are  based  on 
the  notion  that  it is  the  relative advantage  of  one  product  over 
another.  that matters.  This  precludes,  and  is meant  to  preclude, 
the  notion  that  the  future  reduces  down  to  a  overridin~ 
commitment  to  any  particular  ener~Y form.  WE  PROCEED  FROM  THE 
VIEW  THAT  THERE  ARE  NO  IMPERATIVES,  AND  AT  ANY  GIVEN  TIME  THERE 
ARE  A  VARIETY  OF  ENERGY  SCENARIOS  AVAILABLE,  ALL  OF  WHICH  MAY  BE 
PLAUSIBLE.  THEREFORE,  AS  WITH  OTHER  ENERGY  SYSTEMS,  THE  MERITS 
OF  FUSION  CAN  ONLY  BE  PRESENTED  TO  THE  PUBLIC  IN  TERMS  OF  THE 
BENEFITS  FOREGONE  AS  A  RESULT  OF  NOT  CHOOSING  ONE  OF  THE 
ALTERNATIVES. 
Our  first  comment  on  the  presentations  in  COM(87)  302  is  that  the 
authors  fail  to  meet  an~ of  these  requirements.  Whereas  we  mi~ht 
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have  expected  a  consideration of  fusion  in  the  broad  context  of 
enercy  futures  for  the  next  century,  what  we  have  is  a  largely 
pro~rammatic approach,  in  which  fusion  stands  in  isolation  from 
what  is  happeninc  in  enercY  research  in  both  the  Community  and 
beyond.  Whereas  we  would  certainlv  have  expected  the  use  ot  an 
oppo~tunitv cost  approach  aa  basic  to  the  tundins  proposals,  we 
have  been  lett with  the  impression  that  the  authors  ot  COM{87) 
302  have  no  acquaintance  with  such  an  approach.  The  treatment ot 
future  demand  is confined  to  heroic  assumptions  which  are trivial 
in  their content  and  necessarily favourable  to  the  case  beinc 
made.  There is no  element  of  a  scenario analysis,  now  an  almost 
universallY accepted  method  for oftaettinc uncertaintv,  and  one 
which  we  would  have  thoucht  to  have  been  almost  oblicatorv tor 
those  in  seekinc  lone-term tundinc  in electricitv supplv. 
Finallv.  there are  no  planninc  backcrounda,  and  hence  the 
advanta~es of alternative  technolocical  routes  to  tut~re 
electricity supply are  not  available,  and  hence  no  options  for 
decision-makers.  THE  DECISION-MAKER  IS  GIVEN  ONLY  ONE  CHOICE  -
TO  ACCEPT  THE  PROGRAMME  (with  perhaps  some  minor  modifications  in 
the  distribution ot  funds  between  centres,  etc.)  OR  TO  REJECT  IT. 
THIS  IS  PRECISELY  THE  OPPOSITE  OF  WHAT  WE  WOULD  HAVE  EXPECTED  IN 
A  MAJOR  FUNDING  PROGRAMME  FOR  A  LONG-TERM  TECHNOLOGY. 
It  is  important  at  this  sta~e.  in  order  to  avoid  misunderstanding 
of  the  criticism we  have  felt  compelled  to  make,  to  emphasise 
that it is  not  directed  at  fusion  as  a  technolo~y or at  the 
scientists  and  engineers  who  have  worked  in  the  programme  and 
achieved  so  much.  It is  a  criticism that  an~ independent  body  of 
energ~ expertise,  with  experience  in  this  field,  would  almost 
certainly  have  made,  and  it is  one  that  we  believe  is  fundamental 
to  the  manner  in  which  public  funds  are  spent  and  accounted  tor. 
The  European  programme  so  far  has  (in  round  fi~ures)  consumed 
since  1976.  2600  Mio  ECU  (the  Community  has  provided  slightly 
less  than  one  halt ot  this  sum).  This  rate  of  expenditure will 
increase  to  a  total of  a,900  Mio  ECU  by  1991.  and  will  continue 
to  increase  in  size  and  pace.  As  the  sums  increase,  the  possible 
losses  become  larger,  a  situation  that  can  only  be  justified by  a 
convincing  demonstration  that  the  benefits will  be  at  least  equal 
to  those  in  comparable  projects,  if not  larger.  We  have  found  no 
such  demonstration. 
A  demonstration  of  future  benefits  has  to  be  made  in  recognisable 
economic  terms  (eg.  benefit  to  cost ratios with  an  implicit rate 
of  return).  The  discount  rate should  be  set with  reference  to 
projects  comparable  in  scale  and  risk  e~.  investment  in  offshore 
oil exploration,  which  is  expected  to yield  a  real  rate of  return 
between  5  and  15%.  (UK  DOE  1987).  On  present  perceptions  fusion 
will  involve  risks  for  the  utilities  ~reater than  nuclear  fission 
or  conventionally  fuelled  electricity generation.  It may  bear 
comparison  with  some  of  the  more  remote  renewable'energy 
technologies.  In  any  event  a  pattern  is  required  to  inform  us  of 
the  relative merits  of  fusion  and  non-fusion  technologies.  THERE 
ARE  SUGGESTIONS  IN  THE  COMMISSION'S  DOCUMENTATION  THAT  FUSION  IS 
MORE  ATTRACTIVE  THAN  NUCLEAR  FISSION  BECAUSE  IT  IS  LESS  OF  A 
SAFETY  OR  ENVIRONMENTAL  HAZARD.  WE  UNDERSTAND  THIS  TO  MEAN  THAT 
THE  ENVIRONMENTAL  BENEFITS  ARE  SUFFICIENT  IN  THEMSELVES  TO  MAKE 
2-2 Chapter  Two  The  Framework  tor Appraisinc  Fusion  Power 
FUSION  ATTRACTIVE  AS  COMPARED  WITH  FISSION.  IF  THIS  IS  SO  WE 
WOULD  HAVE  LIKED  TO  HAVE  UNDERSTOOD  THE  FORCE  OF  THIS  ARGUMENT 
MORE  FULLY.  GIVEN  THE  PUBLIC'S  CONCERN  WITH  NUCLEAR  HAZARDS, 
THIS  IS  AN  IMPORTANT  CONSIDERATION.  UNFORTUNATELY  NO  SUCH  STUDY 
APPEARS  TO  HAVE  BEEN  MADE  FOR  THE  EUROPEAN  PROGRAMME  AND  WE  HAQ 
TO  RELY  ON  AN  INTERNATIONAL  INSTITUTE  OF  APPLIED  SYSTEMS  ANALYSIS 
(IIASA)  STUDY  OF  1977. 
The  view  is implicit  in  much  of what  is written  that  fusion  will 
be  acceptable a),  because it will displace  nuclear  fission  on 
;rounds ot environmental  protection  and  b),  succeed it on 
economic  crounds.  It needs  hardlv  to  be  said that  these criteria 
have  verv different  implications  tor the  decision-maker.  The 
stud~  b~ IIASA  (IIASA  1977)  came  to  the  broad  conclusion  that  the 
fusion  has  much  in  common  with  the tast reactor,  but  tusion  haa  a 
balance of  advantace  in  environmental  terms.  They  arcue,  that it 
is  the environmental,  not  the  economic  advantace  that matters. 
They  were  unable  to  identify any  economic  benefits  in either 
technology.  The  Commission  should  be  in  search  of  a  methodolocv 
by  which  it can  relate fusion  and  fission  in  a  study of 
comparative  advantage. 
We  accept  that  when  the  Development  sta~e is  reached it will  be 
possible  to  make  more  certain  judgements  about  the  future.  But 
that  point  has  not  been  reached.  Meanwhile  it is  important  to 
clarify precisely  how  the  development  stage  is  to  be  defined  and 
what  is  the  expected  level  of  of  funding.  The  OTA  figure  of  an 
expenditure  approximating  to  $20  billion fits  the  European 
picture  (see  figure  2).  (Note:  The  OTA  estimate  can  be  treated 
equally  as  the  cost  of  an  international  programme,  or  a  national 
or  regional  programme.  The  estimate  for  a  whollY  US  programme  to 
the  completion  of  the  Developmental  stage  (approx.  2010),  taken 
from  the  be~innin~ of  Fusion  research  approximates  to  $20  billion 
as  does  the  estimate  shown  in  fi~ure  2  for  the  European 
programme). 
It is  a  weakness  of  the  sequential  method  (which  we  discuss  in 
detail,  in  chapter  3),  that  it  leaves  no  choice  but  to  spend  such 
a  sum  in  order  to  find  ou~ if it has  been  justified. 
2.2  Appraising  Fusion  RD&D. 
Appraisal  of  fusion  RD&D  is  not  an  easy  task.  Perhaps,  because 
of  its separate status  in  the  Community,  this  has  not  yet  been 
done.  But  we  would  regard  such  an  appraisal  as  a  necessary  basis 
for  the  funding  of  a  fusion  programme,  consistent with  the 
Community's  broad  commitment  to  the  best  use  of  resources  and  to 
an  open  competition  policy  as  an  instrument  of  allocatin~ 
resources. 
Research  on  fusion  power  began  nearly  forty  years  ago.  While  a 
great  deal  has  been  achieved,  it is  measure  of  its complexity 
that  it  is still not  clear  when  the  Research  stage  will  give  way 
to  the  Development  stage,  and  even  less  clear when  that will  give 
way  to  the  Demonstration  stage.  BY  ANY  COMPARABLE  STANDARDS  THE 
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TOTAL  COST  BEFORE  THE  COMMERCIAL  STAGE  IS  GOING  TO  BE  FAR  GREATER 
THAN  FOR  ANY  PREVIOUS  TECHNOLOGY,  INCLUDING  NUCLEAR  FISSION. 
In  seekin~ to  brin~ fusion  RD&D  within  an  assessment  tramwework, 
it is  important  to  define  the  present  position in relation  to  the 
past  and  the  future.  This  is done  ~raphicallV in  fisures  1-3. 
After  1991/2  the  fisures  are  onlv estimates,  and  thev  probablv 
understate  the  likelv costs  of  the  prosramme  as  projected  bV  the 
Commission. 
There  appear  to  be  two  ways  of  justitvinc an  R&D  proc~amme: 
The  first .is what·mav  be  termed  stratesic.  This  mav  ranee  from 
decisions ot state,  the  most  obvious  of  which  are military,  but 
which  mav  also  include  lone-term enersv stratesv.  The  former 
would  not  applv  to  the  EEC  becau•e it is  an  economical  and  not  a 
militarv  based  association.  (The  US  OTA  (OTA  1987)  and  ESECOM 
(Holdren  1987)  studies  however  do  study  the militarv  implications 
ot  fusion  power  at  some  length,  and  it is clear that  such 
considerations  must  arise  in  the  context  of  an  international 
fusion  programme).  Energy  Strategy,  however,  does  fall within 
the  concern  of  the  EEC  as  it has  a  long  term  energy  strategy 
which  is broadly  aiming  at  conservation  of  energy,  motivated  bY 
the  wish  to  be  less  dependent  on  the  world  market  (see  the  Adam 
Report).  Such  a  strategy  however  is  not  based  on  principles 
different  from  those  related  to  the  market.  While  we  understand 
that  a  strategic emphasis  can  be  applied  here,  that  in  itself 
would  not  be  sufficient  to  justify supporting  an  ener~y policy. 
The  Community  cannot  divorce  such  considerations  from  its own 
broad  economic  strategy  (which  embraces  ener~y policy),  and  which 
calls  for  projects  to  be  evaluated  within  a  market  context.  It 
is  recognised  that  there  may  be  reasons  for  assisting  a 
technology with  public  funds  - to  which  must  be  added  the  all 
important  caveat  PROVIDED  THAT  IT  WILL  BE  COMPETITIVEWHEN  IT 
ARRIVES  AT  THE  MARKET. 
The  second  justification of  such  a  strategy  implies  that  there 
will  be  ordering of  priorities.  This  is  clearly  stated  in  the 
Adam  Report; 
"Longer  term  requirements  demand  that  research  and 
development  work  in  new  and  renewable  technologies 
must  be  drastically  increased.  CommunitY 
expenditure  is  currently  only  97  million  ECU 
compared  with  320  million  ECU  spent  on  nuclear 
developments  (1986  committments).  Equivalent  sums 
to  those  spent  on  the  nuclear  side must  be  spent 
on  new  and  renewables." 
For  Privately  funded  RD&O,  the  ability to  survive will  be 
determined  in  the  normal  decision-making  of  the  firm.  Within  the 
public  sector,  however,  the  question  resolves  itself  into  one  of 
deciding  at  what  point  funding  shall  be  sustained,  and  at  what 
point  it shall  cease.  Such  decisions  can  be  most  difficult if 
the  cut-off  is  before  the  product  •ets  to  the  market.  But  unless 
there  is  the  will  to  do  that.  then  the  process  of  evaluation  may 
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become  only  a  cosmetic  exercise. 
The  tundin~ for  the  Research  and  Technolo~y (Framework) 
Pro~ramme,  approved  in  1986,  shows  that  the  stratesy criticised 
in  the  Adam  Report  has  been  maintained  and,  if .anythins,  become 
more  one-sided  in  support  of  nuclear as  compared  with  non-nuclear 
technolosies.  In  the  period  1978-85.  the  spendinc  on  European 
enersy demonstration  projects  totalled  539mio  ECU  compared  with 
1051mio  ECU  for  nuclear projects with  the  Framework  procramme 
(see  Ficure 2.1). 
An  evaluation  framework  therefore rests i'i.rstly  on  an  opportunity 
cost matrix beinc  used  (in  this  case}  to  compare  fusiori with 
non-fusion  technolosies.  The  rationality that  this  implies  is 
not  yet  recosnised  in  the  Community  allocation. of  resources  for 
enersy research.  Fisure  2.1  indicates  broadlY  the  order of 
priorities  in  Community  resourcinc of enersY  RO&D.  It reveals 
that  the  order of  priorities is  determined  institutionallY and 
not  rationally.  Nuclear  research  which  is located  separately  from 
the  Enersy  Research  and  Demonstration  prosrammes  commands  more 
funds.  Yet  the  Demonstration  projects  which  have  to  be  close  to 
the  marKet.  in  a  linked  partnership with  an  industrial or 
commercial  entrepreneur,  will yield  a  far  better real  rate of 
return.  This  inversion  of  priorities  is  not  uncommon.  The  UK 
House  of  Commons  Select  Committee  found  a  similar situation in 
the  UK  (HMSO  1984).  With  respect  to  fusion  it made  the  followin~ 
pertinent  comment; 
"yet  a  commitment  has  already  been  made  to  a  long 
term  programme...  Thi~  approach  seems  to  be 
essentially  based  on  faith  in  the  scientists, 
engineers  and  technolo~ists concerned.  WE  DO  NOT 
CRITICISE  THE  PROGRAMME  ON  THESE  GROUNDS  BUT  WE 
PERCEIVE  IT  AS  BEING  RUN  ON  A  VERY  DIFFERENT  BASIS 
FROM  THAT  ADOPTED  BY  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  ENERGY  IN 
RELATION  TO  SMALLER  NON-NUCLEAR  PROJECTS,  TO  WHICH 
THE  ATTITUDE  APPEARS  TO  BE  ONE  OF  SCEPTICISM 
RATHER  THAN  FAITH." 
(HMSO  1984,  Vol  1,  page  xxv1i1) 
Similarly,  faith  appears  to  triumph  over  scepticism,  in  the 
European  procramme. 
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P'i~ure  2.1 
Research  and  TechnolOif·  Communit~ R&D  Policy. 
(The  Framework  Procramme,  1987-91). 
ntio  !CU 
Fission  - nuclear  safet~ 
Controlled  thermonuclear  fusion  611 
Non-nuclear  enersv  and  rational  use  of  enersv  122 
TOTAL  1173 
=•s••••••••••••••••••••••••=••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
European demonstration projects in the energy f*d, 1978-85 
Aid granted by the EuropeM Community (in milioa ECU) 
Total 
15391 
151 
71 
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Perceptions  about  ener~y futures  are  subject  to  continuous 
chance.  The  Adam  Report  makes  it clear that  in  the  view ot  the 
Enersy  and  Research  Committee,  the  Community's  research 
priorities are out  of  step with  its  ener~~  polic~.  What·is 
noteworthy is that  the  areas  in  which  the  Adam  Report  would  like 
to  see  more  expenditures,  especialv in  improvinc enercv 
utilisation,  correspond  broadlV  to  those  which will brine  the 
best  rates ot return.  The  matrix method  employed  in Table  2.~ 
below  (pace  2-7)  is  important  for its role  in  rankine projects. 
It will  be  seen  that  the~ ranee  from  the  ver~ attractive  (Nol)  to 
the  speculative  and  therefore unnattractive  (No7).  It is 
understood  that  these  are  not  precise and  can  chance with  time. 
A  perspective tor  the  future  has  to  be  sensitive to  the 
possibilities tor technolocical  innovation,  and  their likely 
market  impacts. 
Innovation  is likely to  increase  rather than  decrease  competition 
in  electricitY  suppl~.  The  next  decade,  for  example,  m~ see 
more  development  in  pressurised  fluidised  bed  combustion,  cas 
fired  combine  cycles,  wind  and  tidal  ener~y.  An  RD&D  assessment 
that  is  across  the  board,  will  place  such  prospects  in  a 
mana~eable perspective. 
2.3  Criteria and  Performance. 
In  this  context  the  expected  contribution  that  fusion  will  make 
when  it comes  to  the  market  has  to  be  defined  - albeit 
tentatively.  IF  AN  ASSESSMENT  IN  THE  CONTEXT  OF  AN  RD&D 
PROGRAMME  (based  on  opportunity  cost  principles)  IS  NOT 
AVAILABLE,  THEN  PROGRESS  FROM  THE  RESEARCH  STAGE  TO  THE 
DEVELOPMENT  STAGE  OUGHT  NOT  TO  GO  AHEAD. 
2.3.1  The  Supply  Side. 
Systems  Requirements  in  Electricity Supply. 
The  mar~inal cost  of  fusion  power  will  be  determined  in  a  systems 
study.  We  see  no  reason  why  the  essentials of  this  should  not  be 
studied  by  the  Commission.  They  would  need  to  address  such 
questions  as: 
o  How  ~ood a  fit  to  the  pattern  of  electricity 
supply,  is  fusion  likely  to  be? 
o  What  is its likely reliability as  a  base  load 
supplier? 
o  To  what  form  of  load  duration  curve  does  it fit? 
o  What  are  the  exDected  availabilities? 
o  What  are  the  minimum  unit  sizes  for  fusion  power 
stations? 
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o  How  flexible  is it in  adjustment  to  chansinc  load 
demand  (takin~ into  account  the  possibility  that 
micro-electronic  consumer  mana~ement may  very well 
be  extensive  by  the  mid  21st  century)? 
These  are all questions  to  which  answers  should  be  soucht  and 
civen  accordinc  to  the  limits ot present  knowledce,  in order to 
cive  tusion  a  profile as  a  provider of  power  into  an  electricitv 
system. 
Sitinc/Environme~tal Issues. 
Where  would  tvpical  tusion stations  be  sited?  Can  the~ be 
located  in  urban  areas,  where  the~ micht  be  competitive with 
combined  cycle or other district heatinc  schemes?  Licensinc 
should  be  no  more  difficult  than  that with  nuclear  fission  power 
stations.  However,  some  attempt  should  be  made  to  project  the 
direction  in which  reculations will move. 
Waste  Management. 
What  waste  disposal  problems  does  fusion  ~ive rise  to?  What  will 
be  the  decommissioning  requirements  and  costs? 
The  Fuel  Cycle. 
What  are  the  fuel  cycle  supply  lo~istics?  The  location  of 
lithium enrichment  plants,  tritium reprocessing plants,  deuterium 
plants,  etc. 
Answers  to  these  questions  may  not  yet  exist,  but  models  are 
possible,  and  these  can  be  refined  as  the  research  makes 
progress.  It is  necessary  from  an  early  stage  to  define  the  role 
of  fusion,  and  as  part  of  this  process  to  indentify  the  supply 
side  costs  which  fusion  will  incur.  The  answer will  onlY  have 
value  in  so  tar as  they  help  us  to evaluate  fusion  relative  to 
other  forms  of  enercy  supply.  It is this  task  that  the  R&D 
assessment  is concerned  with. 
2.3.2  The  Demand  Side. 
On  the  demand  side  of electricity supply,  the  complex  of 
variables  micht  reduce  itself to  a  a  scenario analysis offerinc  a 
range  of  possible  growth  projections.  Figure  2.2  is  a  simplified 
presentation of  three  scenarios  rancin~ from  low  to  high  growth. 
They  might  all  be  regarded  in  principle  as  being  feasible, 
although  none  of  them  may  turn  out  to  be  a  close fit  to  reality. 
Their  purpose  is  to  provide  a  framework  for  discussion  and 
analysis  of  the  likely  trends  in  the  future.  If  they  are  judged 
to  be  reasonably  credible,  they  will  give  a  feel  for  the 
conditions  under  which  fusion  mi~ht be  competitive. 
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Scenario  I  is  a  low  growth  future.  It  should  be  noted  that  this 
is  broadlY  consistent  with  Community  energy  policy with its major 
emphasis  on  conservation,  but  Scenario  II  is  a  better fit  to 
current  Community  projections  on  GNP  growth.  There  is 
considerable explicit documentation  of  the  low  ~rowth scenarios 
in  the  energy  policies  of  member  states  as  well  as  in  Community 
policy overall.  Its credibility will  be  strengthened  by  the 
technological  changes  on  the  supply  side,  which  increase 
efficiency  both  at  the  primary  production  level  and  in 
utilisation.  Here  it may  be  seen  that electricity will  be  under 
very  considerable  market  pressure  both  from  those  technolo~ies 
which  are  not  so  constrained  by  Second  Law  Eff'iciences  {which 
make  the  overall efficiency of  fusion  stations  low),  and  also 
from  the  advances  that  continue  to  be  made  in  the utilisation of' 
energy. 
Scenario  III offers  a  view  of  the  energy  economy  into which 
fusion  might  emerge.  The  assumptions  are  those  which  are  stated 
in  the  sensitivity  study  in  Chapter  7  and  it will  be  noted  that 
they  differ markedly  from  those  in  the  Annex  to  the  Commission's 
report.  which  are  cri  tieised  in  detail  in  Chapter  7.  The 
sensitivitY  used  in  Figure  ~  is  reactor availability,  as  this  is 
judged  to  be  the  most  uncertain  and  important  variable  that  will 
characterise  the  performance  of  fusion  reactors  as  they  come  on 
stream. 
2.~  The  RD&D  Matrix. 
Bringing  the  supply  side  and  demand  side  together with 
apDropriate  economic  variables,  we  have  what  we  call  an  RD&D 
matrix  (see  Table  2.U).  Although  much  of  it is  judgmental  it 
seeks  to  provide  consistency  bY  assuming  all  RD&D  programmes  can 
be  appraised  using  market  related criteria.  The  degree  to  which 
they  meet  these  criteria,  is  shown  by  the  scores  given  in  the 
matrix.  It  gives  the  decision-maker  a  ranking  for  all projects 
on  which  he  can  act  if he  wishes.  This  holds  for  those  for  which 
a  long  period  is  required  for  the  Development  and  Demonstration 
stages.  Those  defined  within  market  values  are  ranked  according 
to  the  money  values  that  accrue  as  benefits.  Table  2.U  below,  is 
a  summary  extract  from  a  recent  RD&D  study  of  the  UK  Department 
of  Energy  (UK  DOE  1987).  The  extract  shows  how  performance  and 
expectation  can  be  matched  against  ct•iteria  in  electricity 
supply.  The  approach  adopted  to  the  assessment  of  individual 
technologies  is essentially  an  investment  appraisal  of  the 
technology  as  a  whole,  at  the  point  in  time  when  it might  be 
commericallY  deployed.  Annual  net  benefits  are  calculated  each 
year  to  2030.  It  is  recognised  that  some  technologies  cannot 
expect  to  yield  benefits  until  after  2030,  and  attempts  to 
quantify  benefits  will  be  "highlY  speculative." 
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ASSESS"ENT  OF  TECHNOLOGIES  APPRAISAL  OF  RD&D 
ACHIEVABLE  COST 
TECHNICAL 
FEASIBILITY  "ARKET 
TI"E-
SCALE 
CONTRIBUTION  - ECONO"IC  EFFECTIVE- OTHER  I'<AHKIH6 1 
(1-])  TECHNOLOGIES  SCALE  CATEGORY  NESS  FACTORS 
EXTRACTION  TECHHOLOGIES 
Conventionil  Coal 
Extract ton 
Underground  Coal 
Gasification 
Offshore  Oil  Technology 
Passtve  Solar  Oesiqn 
(Heat  end  Fuel) 
Deployed  World  coal 
Speculative  World  gas 
Deployed  World  oil 
Deployed  low  te•p 
Heat 
Btofuels  - Organic  ~astes  Oep/De•o 
(CoabiJStJonl 
lnd  process 
ENERGY  UTILISATION  TECHNOL061ES 
Budding  Sector  Deployed  Low  tetp 
heat 
Now 
Ked/ 
long 
Now 
Now 
Now 
(££ 
[£/(££ 
£££ 
££ 
£££ 
lndustnal  CHP  Deployed  low  tetp  heat  +  No~ 
elec  appltanc~s 
£/(£ 
iran spar t  Sect or  (Road  Dep 1  eyed 
Yehtcle  and  Eno1ne  Oestqn) 
ELECTRICITY-PRODUCING  RENEWABLES 
~1nd  Pcwer 
T  1 da l  Power 
?hotavol t.H cs 
Geothenal 
Hot  Dry  Rodr. 
De to 
De to 
De to 
Spec/NYD 
Transport 
El edri  Cl ty 
Gener at1 on 
E  I  ec t r i C1 t  y 
Generation 
Electricity 
EhdrtCl ty 
6ener at 1  on 
.. -------------------
EltCTRICirY  PkOOUCTION  TECHNOLOGIES 
Fast  Reactor  and 
Fuel  Cycle 2 
Fuston 
Deployed 3  £lectrtc1ty 
Deao 
Genera t 1  Of\ 
Electricity 
Gener atl on 
Speculat1ve  ElectriCity 
GPneratton 
---- --------------------
1  l 
Now  (££ 
Fuels 
Short/  £/££ 
"ed1t;t 
l'led1ua  ~c 
/1ediUI  ( 
Now  (£/£££ 
l'ledt u1  ~fl((( 
EA  ffff 
p  ff 
EA  fft 
EA-l  HH 
EA/P  HI 
EA/P-L  tHt 
EA/P  ftlt 
EA  ftft 
p  it 
P-L  H 
u 
p  ft 
EA  H/ttt 
P/EA-L  ., .. 
u 
Export 
Potential 
Inter- 4 
nationd 
Collaboration 
ltport  2 
possi bi 1i ties 
Export  potenti•l 
Tech.  excellance 
Export 
Potential 
International 
Coli aborat ion 
Export 
Potential 
Export 
Potent1 al 
Export 
Potential 
Techno-
1  oglC al 
Excel! ance 
2 
6 
l n  t er nat 1 on • I 3 
Collaboration 
International  5 
Collaborattcn 
fechnologtc.tl 
txC!?ll clnCP. 
International 
Collaoore~tton 
Technoloqlcal 
Excel! ance 2 
3 
Techn1cal 
Feasibtltty 
Dep:  dep 1  eyed 
Deta:  deeonstrated 
NYD:  not  yet 
deeonstratu 
Spec:  speculative 
Achievable 
Contn button 
(:  Value  < £1  bn 
££:  Value  > (l bn, 
< £5  bn 
£££:  Value  >  £5  bn 
TABLE  2.B  continued. 
Econoeic 
Category 
KEY. 
EA:  econoeically 
attractiVe 
P:  protlSinq 
U:  unpra1isinq 
l:  treated  as  a 
lanq-ten 
technology 
Cost 
Eff ecti  vene~s 
••••  RD•D  highly  cost-effective  in  all  scenartos 
•••  RD~D cast-effective  in  all  scenarios 
tt  RD'D  cost-effective it SOit,  but  not  all 
"eft if  i CK 
•  RDlD  cast-effective in  no  scenario 
the  r.nking  is by  cast-effectiveness,  ie  an  energy  supplier  would  invest  in  a technology  ranktd  1 in  prefertnee 
to  one  rink!d  2-&  ind  so  forth.  No  7 has  aa  aerit at  present  because  its  c~t effectivene1s  is zrro. 
The  cast  effectiveness  of  nuclear  f1ssion  as  g1ven  by  ETSU  has  been  reduced  by  one  unit,  ie  by  one  £ for 
achievable  contrtbution  and  one  t  for  cost  effect1vene~s.  Th1s  is  to  brin~ the•  into  line  with  the  change  in  UK 
percept1ons  at  nuclear  econottcs. 
The  PwR  1s  treated  as  deployed  and  not  tn  the  detonstrat1an  stage  as  ~iven by  ETSU,  in  order  to  bring  the 
classtftcatlons  tnt~  ltn~ w1th  Eurooean  !~oer1ence. 
The  UK  RD&O  study  concluded  with  the  followin~  jud~ements; 
Economic  ?~oSDects. 
" ;._ 1 t  h o u g h  f  :.1 s i an  c y c 1 e  c o s t  s  s h o u l  d  be  1 owe  !:'  t  h an 
for- e.  fast  rer1ctor,  the  difference  •...JaS  jl.ldg-ed  to 
be  far  short  ~f  o:rsettinb  the  much  greater 
ca~ital cost  of  :he  reactor  island.  The  latter 
however,  was  ~u=h  the  ~est  uncertain  part 
3.nalys:.s.  in  '/!.•"!'"'  of  the  gross  '...:r.cer-<:ainties  cf  a 
r~actor cor.cept  '..)r  ·.::esign ....  ~t  this  stage  all 
estimates  .:1r·e  hi,.;;nl~,:  s;:>e<:'....!lati.•Je." 
A~hievabl~ Contribution. 
In  a  futur~ where  fast  reactcrs  w~re  the  Dr-inciDal 
source  of  s;-eneretion,  prospects  W0 1lld  appear  to  be 
sm.J.ll  unless  the  relative  capital  costs  were 
r-educ~d.  !n  th~~  ~ven~  fission  power- ~enerally, 
or- f'flst  rear.tor·:::;  tn  ~.).rticul9.r,  became  politically 
or  ~>(Jc:i.a.lly  t1r\.1C<':t~t)1':.·'1.bl0,  "\n·l  Lt."  high  pr-tces  .<3.n,j 
en·;ironmental  con::::r-a.tnts  r-·~·::-:~·ir:-r::Ad  :'ass.!.!.  :" 1..1•::1 
g ~net'  13.  t  ion  ,  the  p :· o :.3  p ~  r:  r. s  f  :'J't•  '!  1..J  s  i. an  co  u l. d  C)~  m u cr. 
:; r  ~~ a t  e r- . " 
'/ lC'.;ttJ 
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international  collaboration  project  at  JET  is 
judged  timely.  Equally,  in  view  of  the  long  time 
before  expected  deployment  and  is  highlY 
speculative.  RD&D  outside  the  framework  of 
international  collaboration  may  be  re~arded  as 
untimely." 
There  is  an  inconsistency  in  these  jud~ements in  so  far  as  the 
authors  su~gest that  because  fusion  cannot  meet  the  basic 
economic  tests  that it is  'speculative'  (which  means  that  there 
are  as  yet  no  benefits  to  recommend  it),  that  an  international 
option  is  the only  one  that  can  be  considered.  But  is  an 
economically  sub-optimal  scorin~ (ie.  a  ne~ative result  in  terms 
of  reeource  allocation)  made  any  better  by  bein~ shared  amon~ a 
number  of  actors  in  an  international  consortium? 
In  Table  2.a  above,  the  approved  RD&D  technologies  (described  as 
economically  attractive),  are  those  that  score  a  Benefit  to  Cost 
Ratio  greater  than  unity  under  all scenarios.  On  the  supply  side 
the  economicallY  attractive areas  are  the  conventional  supply 
technologies.  The  best  results  come  from  energy  utilisation  RD&D 
because  most  of  the  benefits  come  quickly  and  are  able  to  compete 
with  short  term  investments  with  discounts  of  around  25%.  By 
comparison  fusion  is classified  as  s~eculative,  ie it is  not  yet 
technicallY  viable.  The  UK  study  takes  the  view  that: 
"Fusion  RD&D  is  pursued  for 
only.  Viewed  from  the  present, 
to  be  cost  effective  in  a 
reactors  are  deployed." 
strategic  reasons 
it is  never  likely 
future  where  fast 
(UK  DOE  1987) 
What  emer~es from  this  RD&D  appraisal  can  be  summarised  as 
follows.  Firstly,  that  the  field  of  electricity  supply  is  likely 
to  remain  very  competitive  as  technologies  develop.  Secondly, 
that  it will  be  a  long  time  before  fusion  power  will  be  able  to 
compete.  The  time  span  is  not  just  a  function  of  the  learning 
process  in  fusion  technology,  but  of  the  high  cost.  WHILE  WE 
CANNOT  SAY  ANYTHING  SPECIFIC  ABOUT  THE  COST  COMPETITIVENESS  OF 
FUSION  (or  any  other  energy  form).  FOR  MORE  THAN  FIFTY  YEARS 
AHEAD.  INTUITIVELY  WE  CAN  SAY  THAT  ONLY  A  MARKET  IN  WHICH  THE 
DEMAND  FOR  ELECTRICAL  POWER  IS  OUTSTRIPPING  SUPPLY  BY  A 
CONSIDERABLE  MARGIN  IS  LIKELY  TO  BE  A  FAVOURABLE  ONE.  IT  DOESN'T 
HOWEVER  FOLLOW  THAT  FUSION  WILL  BE  THE  ANSWER  TO  SUCH  A 
SITUATION.  INDEED  IF  ITS  INTRODUCTION  IS  ATTEMPTED  BEFORE  IT  IS  A 
MATURE  TECHNOLOGY  IT  MAY  BE  THE  CAUSE  OF  SUCH  A  CRITICAL  GAP 
BETWEEN  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND. 
The  choice  for  decision-makers  is  not  an  easy  one. 
analysis  so  far  the  following  emer~es: 
From  our 
(1)  RANKING  TECHNOLOGIES  IN  TERMS  OF  THE  CONVENTIONAL  CRITERIA, 
FUSION  IS  SPECULATIVE  RATHER  THAN  TECHNICALLY  FEASIBLE  AND 
THEREFORE  OPTIONS  RANGING  BETWEEN  A  MINIMUM  AND  A  HIGH  LEVEL  OF 
FUNDING  WILL  HAVE  TO  BE  SET  OUT.  AS  IN  THE  OTA  REPORT. 
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(2)  TRYING  TO  GUESS  THE  FUTURE  WE  RECOGNISE  THAT  A  LARGE  RISE  IN 
ELECTRICITY  DEMAND  (AND  IMPLICITLY  THE  REAL  COST  OF  ENERGY)  COULD 
BRING  FUSION  FROM  A  BACKSTOP  TECHNOLOGY  STATUS  TO  THAT  OF  A 
MARGINAL  COST  PRODUCER.  WE  THINK  HOWEVER  THAT  FORECASTS  OF  A 
LARGE  RISE  IN  ELECTRICITY  DEMAND  N!EDTOBEOOCUMENTED  BETTER  THAN 
THEY  HAV!  BEEN. 
(3)  BECAUSE  OF  ITS  EXCEPTIONALLY  LONG  PERIOD  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 
DEMONSTRATION.  AND  THE  LONG  LEAD  TIMES  FOR  CONSTRUCTION  OF  FUSION 
POWER  STATIONS.  IN  MARKET  TERMS  THIS  WILL  PROVE  TO  BE  AN 
INFLEXIBLE  TECHNOLOGY,  ESPECIALLY  IF  DEMAND  MANAGEMENT  BECOMES 
MORE  SENSITIVE  TO  CONSUMER  CHOICE  AND  MARKET  PRICES.  FUSION  WILL 
BE  FAVOURED  BY  AN  ECONOMIC  ENVIRONMENT  IN  WHICH  LONG-TERM  RD&D 
PROGRAMMES  CAN  BE  FUNDED  AGAINST  TH!  PROSPECT  OF  A  PREDICTABLE 
RISE  IN  ENERGY  DEMAND  AND  PLANNED  ENERGY  GROWTH  IN  THE  PUBLIC 
SECTOR. 
The  conclusion  ~hat would  be  drawn  consistent with  an  across  the 
board  RD&D  exercise  ~or allocating  funds  would  be  that  fusion's 
benefits  to  society  are  as  a  science  research  project  and  have  to 
be  evaluated  firstly  on  those  terms.  As  a  potential  back  stop 
technology  its  funding  would  rise  as  it improves  its position 
relative  to  to  other  medium  and  lon~-term technologies  on  a 
recognisable  scale  of  criteria. 
2.5.  Guessin~ the  Future. 
I~  is  not  too  strong  a  statemen~ to  say  that  the  case  for  fusion 
rests  in  the  eye  o~ the  beholder:  that  is,  in  the  ability  ~o 
~uess  the  future.  Energy  forecas~ing has  become  an  almost 
obligatory activity,  especially  for  ~overnmental bodies  which  are 
charged  with  ~he  task  of  lookin~ beyond  the  marKet  to  the  longer 
term  needs  of  society.  While  in  general  there  can  be  no 
objection  to  this  because  markets  (and  very  often  governments) 
are  notoriously  short  sighted,  the  reality  is  that  the  art of 
forecasting  has  been  greatly  abused  - with  the  result  that  it is 
an  activity which  is  littered with  the  bones  of  failed 
forecasters.  This  has  not  deterred  the  fusion  research 
interests.  Indeed  i~  the art of  forecastin~ had  not  been  well 
developed  when  fusion  science  got  into its stride.  then  it would 
have  had  to  have  invented it.  As  forecastinc  is  so  essential  to 
the  rationale ot  fusion.  it is  a  pity  that  they  have  treated it 
so  badly.  The  future  can  too  easily  become  a  convenient  way  of 
justifyin~ claims  on  the  present  resources  o~ society. 
To  be  specific.  the  followin~ are  the  main  fallacies  which  we 
believe  should  be  expunged  from  all  serious  literature.  it 
clarity  is  going  to  be  achieved. 
2. 5.1  Heroic  Assumptions. 
Hero!c  ~~sumptions should  be  avoided  at  all  cosrs,  eg  to 
introduce  every  presentation  !or  e~sion  funding  with  the  claim 
that  it  is  an  inexhaustible  or  "a:most  inexhaustible  source  or 
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energy"  is neither  illuminating  nor  informative.  The  earth's 
crust  and  atmosphere  has  a  super  abundant  supply  of  ener~y. 
Fusion  is  one  technolo~y capable  of  unlocking  some  of  that 
energy.  This  does  not  make  it unique  as  an  energy  source. 
EssentiallY it is only  another  way  of  boiling water  which  is then 
passed  as  steam over  a  turbine  to  make  electricity.  Fusion 
theretore  is  not  unique  economically  speakin~.  We  have  many 
other ways  of  generatin~ electricity,  and  most  of  them,  in 
economic  terms,  are  more  rewarding  than  fusion  because  on  present 
knowledge  they  are  less  complicated  and  almost  certainly much 
less  expensive.  In  terms  of  the  best  use  of  present  resources, 
makin~ the  right  investment  choices  tor  the  future  is  a  pressing 
problem,  because  nuclear'research  dominates  the  Community's  RD&D 
fundin~.  and  thereby  pre-empts  the  development  of other energy 
forms  which  may  be  more  accessible  and  less  costly. 
2.5.2  Over-optimism. 
Forecasts  about  fusion  have  become  couched  in  an  aura of 
over-optimism.  With  the  resulting risk  that  serious errors of 
judgement  can  be  made  and,  in  our  view,  are  being  made.  The 
fusion  industry  could  learn  from  the  experience  of  its near 
neighbour,  nuclear  fission,  where  almost  every  prediction  on  the 
to~ic of  nuclear  power  has  erred  on  the  side  of  excess  optimism. 
This  continues  to  be  done  (see  for  example  "Energy  2000"  (CEC 
1986)  which  projected  a  near  trebling  in  nuclear  electricity 
supply  between  1983  and  2000.  This  was  in  the  context  of  a  50% 
increase  in  electricity consumption).  Almost  every  official 
prediction  that  has  been  made  in  this  area  has  not  proved  just 
wrong,  but  hopelessly  wrong.  The  for~casters,  sensing  what  was 
expected  of  them,  have  fallen  into  the  habit  of  making  the  wish 
the  father  of  the  thought.  It  ts  true  that  "To  be  human  is  to 
err",  in  which  case  we  suggest  it would  be  better  now  to  begin  to 
err  in  the  other direction.  Murphy's  Law  (if the  worst  can 
happen  it will!)  may  be  extreme,  but  psychologically  speakin~ it 
would  act  as  a  useful  corrective  - a  more  robust  way  of  grap~ling 
with  the  future. 
Such  a  robustness  is essential.  The  biggest  problems  still lie 
ahead.  The  history of  technology,  and  nuclear  technology  in 
particular,  has  shown  that  the  biggest  problem  is  making  the  leap 
from  the  imagination  of  the  scientist  to  the  pragmatism of  the 
engineer.  Professor  Gowing  in  her  offical  history  of  the  UK 
nuclear  industry  ex~resses it  thus,  when  describing  the 
intellectual  problems  that  attended  the  birth  of  fusion's  near 
neighbour,  the  Fast  Reactor; 
"The  engineers  in  charge  of  the  project  wrote  that 
'at  first  sight  this  fast  reactor  scheme  appears 
unrealistic.  On  closer  ex~mination  it  appears 
fantastic.  It  might  well  tH:  arg11ed  that  it could 
never  become  a  s~rious  engineering 
proposition.' ... 
The  physicists  might  ch&n~e  their  minds  next  year, 
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said  the  engineers.  'but 
to  [us]  to  get  on  with  the 
the  problems  they  can. 
problems  they  have  to."'" 
until  they  do  it is left 
job.  "Scientists  solve 
Engineers  solve  the 
(Gowini:  197U.) 
No  matter  how  hard  the  road,  the  plasma  physicist  has  trod  to 
reach  the  present  point,  it is  sensible  in our  view  to  reco~nise 
that  the  journey  to  achieve  commercial  fusion  has  hardlY  be~un, 
and  the  most  difficult  problems  lie ahead.  They  may  prove 
intractable  - at  least  in  terms  of  social costs. 
Lord  Marshall  perhaps  had  this  in  mind  when  he  said of  fusion •.•• 
"It is  a  subject of  infinite possibility but  zero 
chance  for  success" 
Of  course  he  had  an  institutional interest.  As  a  former  head  of 
the  UK  Atomic  Energy  Authority  he  not  only  saw  fusion  from  close 
up.  but  he  saw  its less  problematic  nuclear  neighbour,  the  fast 
breeder.  come  close  to  being  relegated.  Making  it operational 
was  proving  to  be  more  than  problematical,  and  as  the  problems 
mounted  so  did  the  cost. 
A3  a  backstop  technology,  the  fast  reactor  is  being  placed  on  the 
back  burner.  If  the  fusion  reactor  is  to  be  successor  to  fission 
systems  then  the  same  logic  may  apply.  The  purpose  of  a 
feasibility  study  is  to  discover  if  that  is  the  case  or  not. 
Being  placed  on  the  back  burner  is  not  to  be  abandoned,  it is 
only  a  recognition  that  at  present  our  society  is  not  able  to 
manage  such  technologies.  However  the  longer  the  gestation 
period  the  greater  the  cost.  The  opportunity  cost  of  Fast 
Reactor  RD&D  has  now  risento a point  where  its future  is  in 
question,  in  a  number  of  countries  which  has  originally  invested 
heavily  in  a  Fast  Reactor  energy  future.  There  will  inevitably 
be  some  'knock-on  'effect  from  this  high  premium  demanded  by  the 
fast  reactor.  for  fusion  t€chnology. 
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CHAPTER  THREE  SCIENTIFIC  FEASIBILITY 
3.1  INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS 
Two  important  aspects  of scientific  feasibility  in  relation  to  a 
scientific  pro~ramme must  be  clarified before  discussin~ the 
particular case  of  fusion.  These  are: 
1)  The  relationshis;>  of  scientific  ~easibilitv to  the 
so-called sequential  method  and 
2)  The  adequacy  of criteria of scientific  ~easibilitv 
to  the  declared  aims  of  the  s;>ro~ram. 
3.1.1  The  Sequential  Method 
The  sequential  method  in  a  scientific  program  is  generally 
represented  (and  is  represented  in  the  fusion  program  - cf  CEC 
1987b  and  Carruthers  1976  eg)  bY  the  followin~.  supposedly 
sequential,  three-step  schema: 
{ i) 
( i i) 
(iii) 
scientific  feasibility 
enginee~ing feasibility 
socio-economic  feasibility. 
Socio-economic  feasibility  is  used  here  to  include  all criteria 
of  economic  social  and  environmental  acceptability. 
The  sequential  nature  of  the  schema  is  that  the  initial research 
thrust  of  a  scientific  pro~r£~ is  aimed  at  demonstrating  the 
scientific  feasibility of  the  concept  in  question.  When  this  has 
been  settled.  the  engineering  issues  are  tackled  and  finallY  the 
social,  economic.  and  environmental  feasibility  is  assessed. 
Whether  or  not  this  method  is  ever  actuallY  adhered  to  in  any 
scientific  program  (not  excepting  the  fusion  program)  may  be  a 
matter of  some  contention.  As  a  methodolo~y however.  the 
consequences  of  adopting  such  a  schema will  have  considerable 
financial  and  environmental  impact.  both  for  the  immediate 
sponsors  of  the  pro~ram and  for  the  ~eneral public.  It  pays  us 
therefore  to  devote  some  attention  to  considerin~ the  force  of 
this  methodolo~~. 
For  the  purposes  of  our  diAcussion  we  identify  two  distinct 
positions  which  we  will  call  the  weak  seQuential  method  and  the 
strong  sequential  method  respectivelY.  The  weak  sequential 
method  is  encapsulated  in  the  following  propositions: 
The  Weak  Sequential  Method 
The  demonstration  ot'  the  scientific.  en~ineering and  socio-
economic  feasibility  o~  a  technolo~ical  pro~ram can  only 
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proceed  (if at  all}  in  the  following  sequence: 
(i)  scientific feasibility 
(ii}  engineering  feasibility 
(iii)socio-economic  feasibility. 
The  strong sequential  method  contains  small  but  essential 
differences: 
The  Strong Sequential  Method 
The  question  of  the  scientific,  en~ineering and  socio-
economic  feasibility of  a  technological  program  can  only  be 
settled in  the  following  sequence: 
(i)  scientific  feasibility 
(ii)  en~ineerin~ feasibility 
(iii)socio-economic  feasibility. 
The  two  positions  are  denoted  weak  and  strong  respectively  to 
reflect  the  nature  of  their  lo~ical relationship  to  one  another, 
namely  that  the  strong  sequential  method  implies  the  weak 
sequential  method  but  not  vice-versa. 
It  is  easily  demonstrated  that  the  position  we  have  called  the 
weaK  sequential  method  is  a  valid  one  in  the  following  sense: 
Assessment  of  the  socio-economic  i.mpact  of  a  particular 
technological  pro~ram depends  crucially  on  the  inventory  of 
economic  and  environmental  parameters  required  by  the  program. 
Such  parameters  include,  for  example,  the  material  resources 
required  for  construction of  the  technology,  as  well  as  the 
potential  environmental  hazards  involved.  These  parameters  cannot 
be  fully  specified  (although  they  may  be  partly  specified) 
before  the  exact  nature  of  the  en~ineerin~ constraints  has  been 
determined.  These  constraints  depend  in  their  turn  upon  the 
proposed  engineerin~ solutions  to  the  scientific  problems 
inherent  in  the  pro~ram.  The  only  relevant  solutions  to  these 
problems  are  those  pertainin~ to  a  scientifically feasible 
pro~ram.  Scientific feasibility  must  of  course  be  demonstrated 
before  these  solutions  are  known. 
Of  course  the  weak  sequential  posi~ion is  not  really  a  'method' 
as  such.  Its methodological  force  lies  in  the  following  two 
methodological  imperatives:  firstlY  that all scientific  issues 
must  be  tackled  at  the  very  earliest  stages  of  the  ~;>rogram;  and 
secondly,  that  the  final  arbiters  for  or  ~~ainst  the 
implementation  of  a  particular  technolog~'  in  the  market  are  the 
criteria of  social.  environmental  and  economic  acceptability. 
This  is  not  at  all  to  relegate  the  socio-e0onomic  criteria.  On 
the  contrary,  it assigns  them  a  primary  role  in  assessing  the 
fea~ibility or infeasibility of  a  program. 
It  is  tempting  to  use  the  validity of  the  weak  sequential 
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methodolo~y to  imply  the  validity of  the  stron~ sequential 
methodology.  This  would  not  only  be  lo~ically fallacious  (a weak 
p~oposition does  not  imply  a  stron~ proposition)  but  could  prove 
both  costlY  and  dan~erous.  To  assume  that  the  two  methodolo~ies 
are  equivalent  would  be  to  be~ the  question  not  only  of 
scientific feasibility  but  also of  both  en~ineerin~ and  socio-
economic  feasibility.  The  strong  sequential  method  su~~ests that 
socio-economic  ~feasibility cannot  be  demonstrated  before 
en~ineerin~ and  scientific infeasibility has  been  demonstrated. 
This  is  a  position which  we  re~ard as  patentl~ false  for  the 
tollowin~ reasons: 
The  final  arbiters  tor or  a~ainst the  implementation  of  a 
particular  technolo~y in  the market  are  the criteria of  socio-
economic  feasibility.  Lon~ before  the  issue of  scientific 
feasibility  is definitely settled one  way  or another it may 
become  apparent  that  the  scientific  nature of  the  program  makes 
certain  en~ineering demands  which  in  their turn  impose  social, 
environmental  or  economic  constraints which  are  totallY 
unacceptable. 
The  dangers  of  neglectin~ this  possibility are  twofold.  In  the 
first  instance,  considerable  resources  may  be  squandered  pursuing 
infeasible or  unacceptable  technolo~ies.  Secondly,the  momentum  of 
an  expensive  research  pro~ram primarilY  concerned  with  scientific 
feasibilitY  may,  very  understandably,  provoke  a  tendency  to 
demote  or devalue  the  conditions  of  socio-economic  acceptability 
when  the  time  comes  to  implement  the  technology.  In  this  respect 
the  strong methodolgical  position  is  not  only  false  but 
dangerous. 
IN  OUR  VIEW  IT  IS  ESSENTIAL  THAT  THE  POWER  OF  SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CRITERIA  AS  THE  FINAL  ARBITERS  MUST  BE  ACKNOWLEDGED  BY  A 
CONTINUOUS  ASSESSMENT  OF  SCIENTIFIC  AND  ENGINEERING  PROGRESS  IN 
30CIAL,  ENVIRONMENTAL,  AND  ECONOMIC  TERMS. 
3. 1. 2  Adequacy  of  criteria 
It  is  an  almost  immediate  corollary of  the  ~osition outlined  in 
the  ~revious section  that  the criteria used  to  assess  the 
scientific feasibility of  a  technological  program  must  be 
sufficient  to  the  scientific  demands  made  by  the  technolo~ical 
program.  Unless  this  is  the  case.  there  is  a  significant 
likelihood  that  unrealistic  assessments  will  be  made  as  to  the 
~enuine  pro~reas achieved  towards  the  declared  aims  of  the 
program.  In  particular,  AN  UNREALISTIC  DEFINITION  OF  SCIENTIFIC 
FEASIBILITY  CAN  LEAD  TO  AN  UNDERESTIMATION  OF  THE  SCOPE,  AND  EVEN 
THE  NATURE,  OF  THE  ENGINEERING  PROBLEMS  STILL  TO  BE  TACKLED,  AND 
THIS  IN  ITS  TURN  WILL  OBSCURE  THE  ECONOMIC  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSTRAINTS  THAT  THE  PROGRAM  IMPOSES.  If  this  happens,  then  with 
the  best  intentions  in  the  world  it will  not  be  possible 
accuratel¥  to  assess  the  socio-economic  acceptability  of  the 
Dr-ogram. 
The  first  step  towards  fulfilling  a  condition  of  adequacy  of  the 
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criteria of  scientific feasibility must  be  to  express  clearly  the 
aims  of  the  technolo~ical  pro~ram.  In  the  case of  nuclear  fusion. 
WE  TAKE  THE  PRIMARY  AIM  OF  THE  FUSION  PROGRAM  TO  BE:  .TO  PROVIDE  A 
(COMPARATIVELY)  SAFE,  ECONOMIC,  AND  ENVIRONMENTALLY  ACCEPTABLE 
SOURCE  OF  ELECTRICAL  POWER  FROM  THE  USE  OF  CONTROLLED 
THERMONUCLEAR  REACTIONS  IN  A  PLASMA. 
IF  CRITERIA  OF  SCIENTIFIC  FEASIBILITY  FOR  THE  NUCLEAR  FUSION 
PROGRAM  ARE  TO  BE  ADEQUATE  IN  THE  SENSE  OUTLINED  ABOVE,  THEN  THEY 
MUST  EXPRESS,  NOT  ARBITRARY  STAGING  POSTS  IN  PLASMA  PHYSICS,  BUT 
THE  FEASIBILITY  OF  ATTAINING  SCIENTIFIC  LANDMARKS  DIRECTLY 
RELATED  TO  THE  DECLARED  AIM  OF  ACHIEVING  A  USEFUL  POWER  SOURCE. 
It is  eas~ to  find  examples  of  scientific criteria which,  thou~h 
temptin~.  are  not  adeQuate  to  the  declared  aims.  For  instance the 
followin~: 
(i)  the  existence of  thermonuclear  reactions  between 
nuclei 
(ii)  the  existence  of  thermonuclear  reactions  between 
nuclei  in  a  controlled  laboratory  environment 
are  representative  of  such  related  but  not  adequate  criteria.  The 
first  of  these  is easily satisfied.  It  has  been  known  for  many 
decades  now  that  thermonuclear  reactions  between  nuclei  are  the 
source  of  the  sun's  energy.  The  existence of  nuclear  fusion  in 
the  sun  is  no  indication  however  of  the  scientific feasibility of 
p~oducing electricity  through  nuclea~ fusion  under  terrestial 
conditions  (except  perhaps  via  the  intermediate  step  of 
photovoltaics  which  a~e  indeed  known  to  be  scientifically 
feasible).  The  relevance  of  the  second  possible  criterion is less 
easily  demolished. 
As  long  ago  as  1957  neutrons  \~ere  observed  from  the  experimental 
toroidal  machine  Zeta  at  Harwell  operatin~ with  deuterium  (an 
isotope  of  hYdrogen)  at  abou~  a  million  degrees  Celsius  (cf  eg 
Thonemann  et  al  1958).  Neu~rons ace  a  product  of  the  fusion 
reaction  between  deuterium  nuclei  and  for  a  short  time  it was 
believed  that  the  Zeta  results  were  ~n  adequate  demonstration  of 
the  scientific feasibility of  controlled  nuclear  fusion.  Spectral 
analysis  revealed  however  that  these  neutrons  were  produced 
predominantly  in  collisions  be~ween deuterium  nuclei  moving 
parallel  to  the  axis  of  the  toroid.  rather  than  in  randomly 
directed collisions.  The  reactions  were  therefore declared  to  be 
~eactions between  artificially accelerated deuterium nuclei.  The 
unacceptability of  the  existence  of  these  reactions  as  a 
criterion  for  the  feasibility  of  a  power-producin~ fusion 
reactor  lies  in  the  enormous  inp•Jt  power  required  to  artificially 
accelerate  the  collidin~ beams.  Such  a  process  could  never  be  a 
net  producer  of  powe~. 
T h c  P rob  1 em  w  1 t  t1  b o t  h  0  t
7  ttl  e  >t tn'""> v e  t"' o s s i  b 1 e  c r i t e r  i  a  i s  t h a t  t: h ·~ y 
exoress  some  btJt  not  •il  1  of  the  ~::;cientifjc  demands  imoosed  by  tlH: 
aims  of  the  pr0gram. 
There  a=e  three  distinct  ~ays  in  whlch  the  adoption  of  such 
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inadequate criteria can  be  misleadin~.  Firstly,  an  inaccurate 
portrayal of  the  extent  ot  pro~ress towards  the  declared  aims  is 
likely.  Secondly,  the  lack of  clar1tv in  assessins the scientific 
objectives  has  conseQuenc~s tor  the  assessment  ot  both 
ensineerins and  socio-economic  feasibilitY which will obscure  the 
decision-makin~ process.  Finally,  and  most  unfortunately, 
UNLESS  THE  DEMANDS  OF  THE  TECHNOLOGICAL  PROGRAM  ARE  FULLY 
EXPRESSED  BY  THE  SCIENTIFIC  CRITERIA,  CERTAIN  IMPLICIT  SCIENTIFIC 
DEMANDS,  MAY  eECOME  NEGLECTED  AT  A  VERY  FUNDAMENTAL  LEVEL, 
LEADING  TO  CONSIDERABLE  WASTE  OF  RESOURCES  THROUGH  THE  PURSUIT 
OF  UNREALISTIC  OR  UNREALISABLE  GOALS. 
3.2  CRIT!RIA  OF  SCIENTIFIC  FEASIBILITY  IN  THE  FUSION  PROGRAM 
On  a  simplistic analysis,  the  generation of electricity  throu~h 
ma~netic nuclear  fusion  requires  that  a  very  hot  ionised sas,  or 
plasma, (temperatures  must  be  in  excess  of  100  million desrees 
Celsius)  is  confined  in  a  magnetic  field at  sufeicient density 
and  eor  sufficient  times  that  ions  collidin~ with  each  other  in 
the  ~lasma release sufficient  thermonuclear  (fusion)  ener~v to 
compensate  for  the  power  losses  from  the  plasma  and  be  a  net-
producer  of  useful  Dower.  On  this  very  simplistic analysis,  the 
three  crucial  fusion  parameters  become  the  temperature  T,  the 
density  of  the  plasma  n,  and  the  so-called  confinement  time~. 
The  mathematical  representation  of  this  simplistic  analysis 
reveals  in  fact  a  very  straightforward  relation  between  the  three 
fusion  parameters.  It  emer~es that  the  relevant  performance 
parameter  is  the  'fusion  product'  n~ of  the  three  crucial 
parameters  temperature  (central  ion  temperature  to  be  precise), 
densit~ (central  ion  densit~)  and  confinement  time.  Using  this 
fusion  product  it is  possible  to  formulate  certain basic criteria 
which  are  commonly  taken  in  the  literature  as  the  foundations  eor 
the  scientific feasibility  of  nuclear  fusion.  We  list these  in 
order  oe  their severity. 
(i)  'Breakeven'  (Q 1 ~,.  =  1) 
The  quantity  Q.':.  is defined  a.a  the  ratio of  the  thermonuclear 
power  P~" generated  in  the  ~lasma to  the  power  lost  P~  trom  the 
plasma via radiative  processes.  When  Q,  .  ._•  1,  we  have: 
1)  P_  =  P,  , 
'1\  -
ie  the  losses  from  the  plasma  are  compensated  for  by 
thermonuclear  power  ~ained:  hence  the  ori~in of  the  term 
'breakev~n•.  It  must  be  noted  however  that  this  re~resents  a 
'breakeven'  within  the  plasma  and  NOT  within  the  system.  For  a 
Deuterium-Tritium  (D-T)  plasma  the  value  of  the  fusion  product 
required  to  achieve  'breakeven'  in  this  sense  are  in  the  region 
of  102.
1  m -! keVs. 
{ ii)  'Lawson's  Cri ter-i.)n' 
In  1955.  in  the  very  early  days  of  fusion  research,  an  attempt 
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was  made  to  provide  a  minimum  necessary criterion tor  a  'power-
producin~ thermonuclear  reactor'  by  John  Lawson.  The  condition 
that  he  proposed  has  come  to  be  known  as  the  Lawson  Crit•rion and 
has  in  some  sense  been  the  inspiration tor subsequent analyses ot 
the  problem.  Lawson's  criterion differs  trom  the  Q:~ •  1  case  bV 
includin~ an  attempt  to  come  to  terms  with  the empirical  limit to 
the etticiencv with  which  heat  ener~v (released  trom  the  plasma) 
may  be  converted  to electrical  ener~y needed  to  supplv  the 
heatin~ circuits.  Lawson  assumes  that all the  power  released  from 
the  plasma  (includins  both  P~ and  P~  )  mav  be  thus  converted.  The 
mathematical  expression ot the situation in which  the total 
elect~ical power  sained  trom  the  plasma is sutticiant to 
compensate  tor the  radiative losses  mav  be  written  - in  the 
terminolosv ot  the  previous  case  - as: 
"\.  ( p Tt'\  +  p 1..  )  •  p '-
LaWSOn  takes  '\  to  be  one  third  so  that  this  condition  m~ be 
written: 
2) 
Values  of  the  fusion  Droduct  required  to  satisfy  2)  are 
correspondin~lY  hi~her than  those  reQuired  for  case  1).  For 
satisfaction of  the  Lawson  criterion  in  a  D-T  plasma  we  require 
values  of  nT't  in  the  re~ion of  2.  < 10.:'  m·\ keVs. 
(iii)  'Ig;nition' 
The  fusion  Drocess  releases  two  tYDes  of  energetic  ~articles. 
Helium  nuclei  end  neutrons  accordin~ to  the  followin~ equation: 
D  +  T  -;  He  +  n 
(A  similar equation  holds  for  the  D-D  fusion  reaction).  About  80% 
of  the  thermonuclear  ener~y released  durin~ this  reaction  is 
carried  bY  the  neutrons.  while  the  remainin~  20~ is carried  bY 
the  Helium  nuclei.  The  ener~etic neutrons  leave  ~he plasma  very 
quickly  and  contribute  nothin~ directl~ to  the  heating;  o~ the 
plasma.  It is  possible  however  that  the  alpha particles  (Helium 
nuclei)  remain  lon~  enou~h within  the  plasma  to  contribute 
si~nificantly to  the  heatin~ effect.  When  enou~h fusion  reactions 
take  place  for  the  alpha particles  to  provide sufficient energy 
to maintain  the  plasma  at  the  required  temperature without 
external  heatin~ sources  the  plasma  is  said  to  have  reached 
i~nition.  On  a  simplistic  analysis  in  which  the  alpha particles 
transfer  all  their  ener~y to  the  plasma  (and  do  not  increase 
losses  from  the  plasma)  the  mathematical  condition  for  'i~nition' 
is  ~iven by: 
3) 
Values  of 
plasma  are 
P ;-~  =  5P._. 
the  fusion  ~reduct required  for  i~nition 
1n  the  re~ion of  5  -<'10:'  m·)keV. 
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3.4  PROGRESS  TOWARQS  MEETING  THE  CRITERIA 
Accordins  to  the  analvsis  of  the  previous  section,  the crucial 
parameters  tor  assassin~ scientific prosress  towards  nuclear 
fusion  are  the  temperature,  densit~ and  confinement  time  of  the 
plasma.  In  JET,  values  for  these  parameters  have  now  been 
obtained  individuall~ which  are  ver~ close  to  those required  to 
satisfy the  'i~nition'  criterion.  The  problem which  has  become 
the  b6te noir of  modern  fusion  technolosY  however,  is that of 
achievin~ the  required values  tor these  three  parameters 
simul taneoualy. · 
For  instance it has  been  possible  usin~ a  variet~ of  insenious 
heatins  techniques  (ohmic,  radio-frequenc~.  neutral  beam)  to 
increase  the  temperature  of  the  plasma  to well  within  the  ran~e 
required  for  fusion,  but  increased  temperatures  have  resulted  in 
de~radation of  the  confinement  time.  Another  ~roblem encountered 
is  the  instabilit~ of. the  plasma  under  increased densities. 
Collapse  of  the  plasma  under  such  instabilities  can  result  in 
si~nificant mechanical  and  thermal  stresses  on  the  apparatus 
which  constitute  a  safety threat  (cf  Chapter  5)  as  well  as 
limitin~ the  operational  capacity of  the  device.  Yet  another 
problem  area  has  been  the  disparity  between  the  response  of  ion 
tem~erature and  electron  temperature  to  additional  heatin~ power. 
For  fusion  conditions  i~ is  imperative  that  these  two 
temperatures  remain  rou~hlY the  same. 
Values  of  the  fusion  product  currently  achieved  remain  a  factor 
of  f'ive  away  from  those  required  for  the  Q,·'- =  1  criterion  and  a 
factor  of  25  away  from  those  required  for  the  'i~nition' 
criterion. 
The  current  'beat-shot'  for  the  fusion  product  at  JET  is  in  the 
re~ion of  2"'  10~  m- 1 keVs.  This  has  been  achieved  using  lOMW  of 
neutral  beam  heating  during  the  so-called  X-point  operation  in  H-
mode.  This  mode  of  operation  employs  a  magnetic  configuration  in 
which,  as  a  matter of  course,  far  more  interaction exists  between 
the  plasma  and  certain parts  of  the  surrounding  structure  than  in 
the  usual  limiter mode,  impoain~ consequently  considerable 
challen~es to  the  en~ineerin~ and  environmental  as~ects of  the 
pro~ram.  Furthermore,  it is  not  expected  (cf  OTA  1987)  that 
neutral  beam  heated  plasmas will  be  used  in  practical reactors. 
Althou~h neutral  beam  heatin~ is effective  in  increasing  the 
neutron yield  in  the  plasma  {lar~ely due  to  interactions  between 
particles  in  the  beam  and  particles  in  the  plasma),  the  beams 
themselves  require  a  lot of  power  to  o~erate. 
It is  hoped  that,  with  the  known  scaling  laws,  and  once 
additional  heating  has  been  commissioned  in  JET  and  modifications 
to  the  poloidal  current  which  drives  the  plasma  current  have  been 
made,  the  value  for  the  fusion  ~reduct  in  JET  will  then  approach 
that  required  by  the  criterion  (1)  above. 
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3.5  CRITIQUE  OF  THE  CRITERIA 
The  question  we  must  immediatel~ pose  concern1n~ the criteria 
outlined  in  section  3.2  is  this: 
Do  all or  an~ of  these criteria meet  the  requirements 
of  adequac~ proposed  in  section  3.17 
f 
Let  us  first  remark  that  in order  to  prove  the  scientific 
feasibilit~ of  any  concept,  it is  not  necessaril~ essential  to 
demonstrate  this  feasibilit~  experimentall~.  It is enoush  that 
the  theoretical  understandin~ of  the  concept  is both  complete, 
and  reliant  onl~ on  empirical  concepts  which  are experimentally  l  -
verified.  What  iA essential  is  that  the  criteria upon  which  the  ( 
scientific  feasibilit~ is to  be  jud~ed are  themselves  adequately 
formulated  in  the  sense  of  section  3.1  to  reflect all the 
scientific  issues  embodied  in  the  aims  of  the  pro~ram. 
The  anal¥s1s  leadin~ to  the  formulation  of  the  three criteria in 
section  3.2  above  was  described  as  simplistic  because  (with  the 
exce~tion of  the  second  criterion)  the  only  losses  taken  into 
account  in  formulatin~ the  mathematical  expression  are  those 
associated with  losses  from  the  Dlasma  itself.  In  the  so-called 
'break-even'  criterion  for  instance,  the  function  Q~~ 
representin~ the  ratio  of  ener~y produced  by  thermonuclear 
reactions  to  the  total  ener~y stlPPlied  to  the  plasma  takes  into 
account  the  losses  quantifiable  in  terms  of  the  'classical 
confinement'  of  the  Dlasma  and  some  radiative  losses.  Not  taken 
into  account  in  Q~~  are  the  'circulatin~ losses'  in  the  system, 
associated with  the  ma~netic confinement  of  the  plasma  and  the 
~eneration of  Dlasma  current,  and  with  lnefficiencies  in  the 
heating circuit.  Conductive  losses  fro~1  the  plasma  through  minor 
disruDtions,  and  increased  r~diative losses  due  to  high  impurity 
levels  are  in  addition  extremely difficult  to  quantify. 
There  is  no  question  that  the  achievement  cf  an  ignited  plasma 
will  constitute  a  mejor  scientifir  achievement  for  plasma  ph~sics 
and  a  significant  advance  towards  a  Dower-producin~ thermonuclear 
reactor.  The  analysis  for  the  mathematical  definition of  the 
ignition criterion  however.  is  simplistic  in yet  another  respect: 
it maKes  the  assumption  that  the  behaviour  of  the  alpha-particles 
in  the  ma~netic field will  be  such  as  to  allow all  the  energy  of 
~he  char~e~ particles  to  be  available  to  heat  the  plasma.  In  fact 
the  behaviour  of  the  alpha-particles  in  a  hot  plasma  is still 
very  much  a  matter  of  guesewor~t.  Plasma  physics  is still, 
relatively  s~eakin~.  an  in~ant  technology:  its  theoretical 
background  is  not  well  estsbll~hed and  there  is  very  little 
experimental  evidence  concerning  the  behaviour of  alpha  particles 
in  a  hot  plasma  - or  indeed  concernin~ the  behaviour  of  a  hot 
~lasma under  the  influence  of  quite  high  proportions  of  alpha 
particles. 
Strictly speaking  the  second  of  the  aoove  criteria does  not 
belen~ to  our  'simplistic'  analysis.  This  is  because  it 
introduces  a  system  parameter  not  directly  related  to  the  process 
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of  nuclear  fusion  within  the  confined  plasma,  namely  the 
efficiency of  electrical conversion.  When  Lawson  published  his 
criterion  in  1957  however.  he  made  it quite  plain  that  evert 
includin~ the  ~eneration efficiency was  not  to  su~~est that  a 
sufficient condition  for  a  practical  power-producin~ reactor was 
bein~ proposed.  He  writes: 
'The  analysis  is based  on  simple  assumptions;  it  is 
desi~ned  to  illustrate the essential  features  of  the 
problem  and  is neither  ri~orous  nor  complete.  The 
assumptions  made  are  in all cases  optimistic,  so  that 
the  criteria  established  are  certainly  necessary, 
thou~h  by  no  means  sufficient,  fo~  the  successful 
operation  of  a  thermonuclear reactor.' 
Despite  this  warnin~.  and  despite  the  fact  that  the  Lawson 
criterion does  not  account  for  circulatin~ power  losses either. 
it remains  - even  thirtv odd  vears  after it was  proposed  - a  more 
realistic  attempt  at  scientific feasibility  than  the  other  two 
criteria,  apecifically  because  it attempts  to  deal  with  the  issue 
of  scientific feasibility  in  terms  Qf  the  declared  aims  of  the 
p~oject,  namely  to  pr~vide an  electricity-producin~ thermonuclear 
reactor. 
What  we  have  said  so  far  appears  to  be  a  very  damnin~ indictment 
of  the  process  of  evaluating  the  scientific  pro~ress of  the 
fusion  pro.cram.  It is  certainl~·  a  very  aerious  criticism of  the 
currentlY  el~bcrated  methodolo~y.  Nevertheless  it is  possible  to 
raise  a  counter-ar~ument that  nothing  we  have  said  actuallY.  in 
itself,  invalidates  the  criteria outlined  above  as  suitable  for 
the  demonstration  of  scientific  feasibility.  This  is  true.  It  is 
p o s s i  b 1 e ,  b u t  o  ~,- no  me a. n s  B e l. f  - ~  ._, i d en t  ,  t hat  c i  r  c u l at  i  n g  power 
losses  are  in  fact  lrrelevant  to  tne  scientific  analysis  of  the 
Droblem.  Equally  lt is  possible  that  the  sim~listic assumDtions 
conce~ning Dlasma  los~es  end  alpha-particle  behaviour  are 
sufficient  for  the  DUrDoses  of  scientific feasibility. 
Our  criticism of  the  methodology  however,  must  remain: 
NEITHER  OF  THE  CRITERIA  CURRENTLY  ADVANCED  AS  REPRESENTATIVE  OF 
A  DEMONSTRATION  OF  SCIENTIFI~ FEASIBILITY  IS  IN  ITSELF  ADEQUATE 
TO  THE  TASK,  BECAUSE  NEITHER  OF  THEM  TAKES  INTO  ACCOUNT  ALL 
POWER  LOSSES  RELEVANT  TO  A  POWER-PRODUCING  REACTOR,  AND 
CONSEQUENTLY  DOES  NOT  ADEQUATELY  EXPRESS  ALL  THE  SCIENTIFIC  AIMS 
OF  THE  PROGRAM.  Si~nificant additional  asgumDtlons  must  be  made, 
conccrnin~  ~enuinely scientific  aspe~ts of  the  system,  for  any  of 
the  above-ment1oned  crir~~ia  to  be  acceptable  ~s  rt~monstrations 
of  scientifi~ feasibility.  As  it  stan~s.  these  assumptions  ac~ear 
to  be  inadeQuately  back~~  bY  theor~tical understanding  or  bY 
ex~erimental verificAtion.  Even  if  these  assumptions  are 
warranted  it is  ~ssential.  ~ethadcl~~ically,  that  they  be  made 
ex.Dlicit. 
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3.6  A  Sufficient Criterion  for  Scientific Feasibility 
Let  us  now  ask  the  Question:  what  would  be  a  sufficient 
criterion tor  the  demonstration of  the  scientific feasibility of 
a  power-producin~ thermonuclear  reactor?  Since  the  term  'power-
producin~'  in  this  context  means  that  the  system as  a  whole  (ie 
takin~ into account  all  circulatin~ power  losses  as  well  as 
plasma  losses)  is  a  net-producer  of electrical  power.  the 
tollowin~ criterion.  which  we  shall call  'system breakeven'  to 
distin~uish it from  'plasma breakeven'  is certainly sufficient  to 
demonstrate  the  scientific feasibility of  the  pro~ram: 
System  breakeyen 
System  breakeven  is  reached  when  the  total  power  recovered 
from  the  system  (ie  the  fusion  reactor)  is  eQual  to  the 
total  power,  includin~ all  circulatin~ losses.  into  the 
system. 
To  illustrate  the  magnitude  of  the  difference  between  this 
condition  and  the  'plasma  breakeven'  condition of  section  3.2  we 
quote  the  followin~ extract  from  the  recent  report  on  the  US 
fusion  program's  ToKamak  Fusion  Test  Reactor  (TFTR)  in  Princeton, 
carried  out  by  the  Office  of  Technological  Assessment: 
'TFTR  is  bein~  u~~raded to  deliver  up  to  27  MW  of 
neutral  beam  power  to  the  plasma.  To  reach  (plasma] 
breakeven.  where  the  fusion  Dower  ~enerated equals  the 
extex•na.l  power  injected  into  the  plasma.  27MW  of  fusion 
power  would  have  to  be  ~enerated in  the  plasma.  If 
reaching  breakeven  were  to  require  TFTR  to  draw  near 
the  maximum  amount  of  power  available  from  its 
electrical  SUDDlY.  it could  consume  close  to  1000  MW  of 
electricity.  This  amount  is  37  times  greater  than  the 
fusion  power  to  be  produced  at  (plasma]  breakeven.' 
As  an  example  of  the  kind  of  system  losses  which  create  this  sort 
of  disparity  between  plasma  breakeven  and  s~stem breakeven,  let 
us  consider  the  oower  consumed  by  magnetic  confinement  of  the 
plasma.  In  JET  two  flywheel  generators  (powered  by  the  grid) 
deliver  a  peak  power  output  to  the  toroidal  and  peloidal  ma~nets 
durin~ a  plasma  pulse  of  UOOMW.  The  current  best  fusion  power 
output  from  the  device  (if operated  with  a  D-T  Dlasma)  would  be 
around  lMW.  In  terms  of  system  breakeven  this  thermonuclear  power 
output  is  barel~ significant  in  relation  to  the  total  system 
input  power.  The  enormit~ of  this  disparity will  be  ~reatly 
reduced  in  future  desi~ns where  the  electromagnets  will  be 
replaced  bY  supercooled  auperconducting  magnets  which  consume  a 
fra.c t ion  of  the  Dower·  cons11med  by  the  more  convent  iona.l  electro-
magnets.  NeverthJess.  it is  worth  making  two  points  concerning 
this  example. 
Firstly,  the  demands  or  scientific  feasibility,  which  in  this 
case  a.re  glarin~ly  obvt~..)us,  force  an  en~ineering constraint  on 
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the  program.  namely  that  of  employin~ supercooled  ma~nets to 
provide  confinement.  The  technology  of  supercooled  ma~nets, 
especiallY  in  such  a  lar~e-scale engineering  context,  is 
relativelY  new.  In  addition,  these  magnets  supercooled  to 
temperatures  approaching  absolute  zero  are  in  ver~ close 
proximity  to  very  high-temperature  regions  of  the  reactor.  This 
not  only  presents  increased  engineering difficulties,  it also 
poses  an  increased  environmental  risk,  albeit slight,  over  the 
use  of  conventional  magnets. 
We  have  here  a  precise  example  of  the  way  that  scientific 
constraints  enforce  engineering  and  environmental difficulties of 
significant  magnitude.  Without  a  methodology  prepared  to  accept 
the  arbitration of  socio-economic  criteria,  no  structure exists 
tor assessing at  a  sufficiently early stage  in  the  pro~ram to 
avoid  wasted  resources,  whether  or  not  such  a  solution to  the 
scientific  problem  is  acceptable. 
The  second  point  is  even  more  serious.  The  use  of  supercooled 
magnets  will drastically  reduce  the  system  power  losses  but it will 
not  eradicate  them  entirely.  (ln  particular,  for  a  tokamak  reactor 
considerable  power  must  still be  supplied  to  provide  the  current 
drive  for  the  plasma. )  T.f  these  losses  are  not  taKen  into 
account  in  the  mathem~tical formulation  of  the  scientific 
criteria,  it is  possible  to  assume.  as  is  currentlY  done~ 
that  the  provision  for  these  losses  is  totallY  unrelated  to 
achieving  the  desired  performance  tar~ets.  This  is  not  the  case. 
A  reformulation  of  the  'break-~ven'  criterion  to  include all 
relevant  plasma  and  system  losses  mi~ht look  liKe  this: 
.::  p  ....  p  < 
where  P:  may  or  may  not  need  modification  to  taKe  account  of 
disru~tion and  impurity  Losaes,  and  Piri  represents  the  non-
recoverable  system  losses. 
When  the  losses  are  included  in  the  mathematical  formulation  of 
the  breakeven  criterion  the  first  thin~ that  one  notices  is  that 
there  is  no  lange~ any  ~uarantee that  the  fusion  product  is  a 
relevant  parameter  by  which  to  judge  the  scientific feasibility 
of  fusion.  The  fusion  product  is  a  mathematical  consequence  of  a 
~articular set  of  rather simpli8tic  assumptions  about  the 
scientific  context  of  the  pro~ranL  It is extremely misleading  to 
divorce  this  parameter  from  that  scientific context.  Whether  or 
not  the  fusion  product  remainR  a  valid  parameter  for  the 
assessment  of  scientific  feasib1lity  depends  cruciallY  upon  the 
mathematical  formulation  of  the  other  s~stem losses. 
Worse  than  this.  the  scientific  ~~asibility of  the  program  itself 
depends  crucially  on  rhe  math~matical formulation  or  the  relevant 
system  losses.  As  a  r~ypothetical  exa.m~le,  let  us  consider  the 
magnetic  system  losses  in  more  detail. 
One  of  the  problems  assoctated  with  achievin~ high  temperatures 
and  densitie~  in  plasmas  has  beel~  the  de~radation of  confinement 
time.  One  way  o~  tacklin~ this  problem  is  to  improve  the  magnetic 
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confinement  of  the  plasma.  Various  ma~netic  confi~urations are 
currentlY  bein~  inveati~ated to  determine  which  have  the  best 
confinement  properties.  One  obvious  way  of  improvin~ the 
confinement  is  to  increase  the  ma~netic field  stren~th.  (This 
also  improves  the density  limit  in  the  plasma.)  Increasin~ the 
ma~netic field  stren~th however,  necessarily  involves  increasin~ 
the  circulating losses.  Another  way,  would  be  to  work  on 
increasin~ the  efficiency  0  with  which  the magnetic  field 
confines  the  plasma.  Experimental  evidence  su~~ests however.  that 
physical  properties of  the  plasma  - ie  ~enuinely scientific 
limitations  - prevent  ~·values from  bein~ increased 
indefinitely. 
These  are all questions  fundamental  to  the scientific feasibility 
of  fusion.  Questions,  concernin~ which,  current  theoretical  and 
empirical  underatandin~ is  very  limited.  Whether  or  not  such 
issues  eventuallY affect  the  scientific feasibility of  fusion  is 
not  the  point  here.  The  fact  is  that  bY  not  including all 
scientific  issues  relevant  to  the  ultimate  aims  of  the  program  in 
our scientific criteria,  there  is  no  way  that  those  criteria will 
in  themselves  be  able  to  determine  whether or  not  the  program is 
scientificallY  feasible. 
We  have  established  that  the  s~stem breakeven  condition  is 
sufficient  to  demonstrate  scientific  feasibilitY:  it necessarily 
includes  all scientific  asDects  associated  with  the  system. 
Finally  we  ask~  is  the  condition  n~~essa~~ for  scientific 
feasibility?  Certainly  it  is  neces3ary  to  achieve  this  condition 
in  order  to  demons~rate ~nerimentally the  scientific  feasibility 
of  the  program.  We  have  already  remarKed  however,  that  actual 
experimental  verification  is  not  necessarily essential  to  the 
process  of  demonstratin~ scientific  ?easibility. 
In  fact  we  have  no  means  or  l<nowing  whether  or  not  a  weaker 
condition  might  suffice  for  the  ~urposes of  demonstrating 
scientific feasibility  11nlesa  the  system  breakeven  is  formulated 
mathematicallY.  making  explicit all  assumptions  and  all 
theoretical  implications. 
IN  SUMMARY  THEN,  WE  HAVE  ESTABLISHED  THAT  THE  CRITERIA 
GENERALLY  REGARDED  AS  RELEVANT  TO  THE  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE 
SCIENTIFIC  FEASIBLITY  OF  A  NUCLEAR  FUSION  ARE  NOT  IN  THEMSELVES 
ADEQUATE  TO  THE  AIMS  OF  A  POWER-PRODUCING  REACTOR.  WE  HAVE  ALSO 
ESTABLISHED  THAT  THE  SYSTEM  BREAKEVEN  CONDITION  IS  SUFFICIENT 
FOR  THIS  PURPOSE.  A  WEAKER  CONDITION  MAY  SUFFICE  AS  THE  CORRECT 
SCIENTIFIC  CRITERION  BUT  THIS  HAS  NOT  BEEN  DEMONSTRATED. 
IN  OUR  VIEW  THE  CORRECT  SCIENTIFIC  CRITERION  MUST  DOMINATE  THE 
PROGRAM  FROM  THE  EARLIEST  STAGES.  THE  DANGERS  OF  NOT  DOING  THIS 
COULD  BE  THAT  THE  ENTIRE  PROGRAM  IS  DEDICATED  TO  PURSUING 
PERFORMANCE  PARAMETERS  WHICH  ARE  SIMPLY  NOT  RELEVANT  TO  THE 
EVENTUAL  GOAL.  THE  RESULT  OF  DOING  THIS  COULD,  IN  THE  VERY  WORST 
SCENARIO,  BE  THE  ENORMOUS  WASTE  OF  RESOURCES  ON  A  PROGRAM  THAT  IS 
SIMPLY  NOT  SCIENTIFICALLY  FEASIBLE. 
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We  a~e not  su~~esting that  this  is  the  case with  the  nuclear 
fusion  pro~ram.  We  are  su~~estin~ that  insufficient effort  has 
been  dedicated  to  ensurin~ that it is  not  the  case. 
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CHAPTER  FOUR.  ENGINEERING  FEASIBILITY  AND  THE  PUSION  REACTOR. 
4.1.  The  Interrelations  between  Engineerinc.  the  Envircnmeot, 
and  the  Cost  of  A  Fusion  Reactor. 
4.1.1  Introduction. 
"The most  di~ficu~t  prob~ema  appear  to  be  those 
associated with  materia~• aciencea  superconductors 
to  withatand  enormous  mechanical  atreaaea  ~or 
~ears;  mirrors  and  lensea  to  handle  tena  of 
thouaands  of  laser  pulaea  ot devaetatinc power 
dailya  fir•t-wall materials,  next  to  the  tua1on 
plaama,  which  must  be  resistant  to  swellinc, 
eputterins,  blisterins,  crackinc,  and  loss  ot 
strensth  under  intense  bombardment  b~  fusion 
reactions,  x-raya,  and  enercetic  ions,  and  which 
must  also  be  compatible  at  their  elevated 
operatinc  temperature  with  the  coolant  and 
tritium-breedinc  and  neutron-multiplvinc 
materials:  electrical  insulators  that  can  retain 
their properties  in  this hostile environment&  and 
so  on.  Extraordinary demands  will also  be  placed 
on  vacuum  technolo~y.  instrumentation  and  control 
technolo~y.  enercy  storace  and  switchinc 
technolo~y.  and  systems  intecration.  If all this 
can  be  pulled  tocether  to  ~roduce a  semblance  of  a 
power  reactor  within  15  ~ears  or  so  ot  the 
scientific feasibility demonstration  that  is, 
say.  by  the  ¥ear  2000  - it will  be  an  amazin~ 
accomplishment." 
(Holdren  1978) 
"On  the  basis  of  current  evidence,  the  Tokamak 
Fusion  Test  Reactor  (TFTR),  now  under  construction 
at  the  Princeton  Plasma  Physics  Laboratory,  should 
demonstrate  more  than  enerzy  break-even  after its 
completion  in  1982.  Furthermore,  extensive 
technolocv  development  pro~rams  in  the resiona 
mentioned  above  indicate  that  there  is  no 
fundamental  technolosical obstacle to tranalatinc 
the scientific  success  o~ tokamak  development  to 
the production of  controlled fusion  power." 
{Clarke  1980) 
The  two  quotes  above  indicate  a  disparity or  views  on  the 
enzineerins feasibility  phase  o~ the  fusion  R,O&D  procramme,  in 
this  section  we  shall explore  the  r~aaona for  such  a  diver~ence 
of opinion  in  some  deta~l with  a  view  to  identifYins  the critical 
areas  of  a  ~usion  ~ower  pro~ramme. 
We  have  seen  that  JET,  althou~h it may  satiety the  Lawson 
criteria.  is  not  in  a  position  to  tully prove  scientific 
feasibility,  and  it is  now  seen  that  NET  will  have  to  be  flexible 
enou~h to  finish  the  task of  provinc scientific feasibility as 
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we~l as  bein~ an  en~ineerin~ teat reactor  (and  similarly will 
1nit1a~~~ run  on  K-0  plasma rather than  D-T  (Atom  1987)).  NET 
wi~l have  two  aspects  o~ ensineerins  feasibility  inte~ral to its 
deaisn.  Firstly.  thoae encineerinc problema  aaaocia~ed with 
( 
f 
obtaininc reactor  plasma  parameters,  which  we  have  seen  from  the  J 
discussion  o~  scient1~1c eeasibilitv are  provinc  to be  more 
demandinc  than  was  anticipated.  Secondlv,  there are those 
en~ineerinc problems  concerned with  provinc the  posaibilit~ that  J 
fusion  power  can  be  uaad  to cenerata  electricit~ in  an  actual 
reactor.  There  are  a  larce amount  o~ unknowns  involved  in this 
part of  the  prosramme,  and it is likelv to be  the moat  demandins 
and  costlv part of  the whole  procramme. 
Work  has  besun  on  possible reactor deaicna,  mainl~ as  an  exercise 
in  problem tindinc rather than  problem  aolvina.  Aa  evervone 
involved is keen  to point  out,  these  are necessarily tentative 
and  speculative.  However,  these studies  have  been  extremal~ 
useful  in  identityinc the  kind of  constraints that will apply to 
a  fusion  reactor.  THREE  MAIN  AREAS  CAN  BE  DISCERNED.  ~IRSTLY, 
THERE  ARE  THE  PURE  ENGINEERING  PROBLEMS  SUCH  AS  FUELLING  AND 
EXHAUST,  E~FECTS OF  HEAT  AND  NEUTRON  IRRADIATION  OF  MATERIALS, 
TRITIUM  HANDLING  AND  EXTRACTION,  BREEDING  MATERIALS,  ETC. 
SECONDLY,  THERE  ARE  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROBLEMS  SUCH  AS  MATERIALS 
ACTIVATION  AND  WASTE.  ROUTINE  RELEASES  AND  ACCIDENT  POTENTIAL. 
HOWEVER,  IT  BECOMES  CLEAR  IMMEDIATELY  THAT  SUCH  ISSUES  ARE  NOT 
DISCRETE,  THERE  ARE  CLEAR  TRADE-OFFS  BETWEEN  IDEAL  ENGINEERING 
SOLUTIONS  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  SOLUTIONS.  THE  THIRD  AREA,  COSTS, 
CAN  ALSO  BE  SEEN  TO  BE  INVOLVED  IN  THE  ALREADY  EXISTING 
TRADE-OFFS  BETWEEN  ENGINEERING  AND  THE  ENVIRONMENT.  Typicall~ 
then,  major  en~ineerin~ decisions  wi~~  invo~ve  estimatin~ the 
likely effects  on  the  environment  and  on  electricity  suppl~ cost 
as  well  the  usual  en~ineerin~ choices.  Many  decisions  on  the 
desi~n ot  fusion  reactors  have  already  been  taken  on  this basis. 
These  decisions  are  not  taken  in  a  particularly coherent  way,  it 
is more  that  certain options  may  be  excluded it they  are  thou~ht 
to  involve  too  much  o~  a  particular sort of  coat,  althou~h it 
must  be  understood  that  al~ options  involve  some  costs. 
Obviously,  extreme  solutions  are  not  feasible.  A  reactor  desi~n 
where  every decision was  taken  in  favour  ot the moat 
environmentallY  clean alternative  wou~d be  prohibitive!~ 
expensive.  Similarl~ the  cheapest  reactor would  be  dirt~ and 
dangerous  in  environmental  terms.  It follows  that reactor 
desi~ns will  have  to  take  account  ot  the  role that  ~uaion power 
is expected  to  tu~til and  ita acceptability  to decision-makers. 
THERE  ARE  AT  LEAST  TWO  DIFFERING  VIEWS  OF  WHAT  FUSION  POWER 
GENERATION  WILL  OFFER,  WHICH  MAY  SERVE  AS  CRITERIA  FOR  JUDGING 
THE  ACCEPTABILITY  OR  OTHERWISE  OF  FUSION  POWER.  ONE  IS  THAT  ITS 
CHIEF  BENEFITS  ARE  NOT  IN  THE  AREA  OF  ELECTRICITY  COSTS  BUT  IN 
ITS  ENVIRONMENTAL  SAFETY.  ON  THAT  BASIS  DECISIONS  TAKEN  ON  COST 
ALONE  COULD  BE  UNFAVOURABLE  TO  FUSION  POWER.  ANOTHER  VIEW  IS 
THAT  FUSION  POWER  OFFERS  CHEAP  AND  RELIABLE  ELECTRICITY  FIRST  AND 
FOREMOST  AND  THE  OTHER  ADVANTAGES  ARE  SECONDARY.  IN  THE  FIRST 
VIEW,  FUSION  WOULD  NOT  BE  ACCEPTABLE  IF  IT  FAILED  TO  BE 
SIGNIFICANTLY  CLEANER  THAN  AN  FBR  PROGRAMME.  IN  THE  SECOND  VIEW 
IT  WOULD  BE  UNACCEPTABLE  IF  IT  FAILED  TO  BE  CHEAPER  THAN  EXISTING 
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ELECTRICITY  GENERATION  TECHNOLOGIES.  CLEARLY  ENGINEERING 
DECISIONS  WOULD  FAVOUR  ENVIRONMENTALLY  CLEAN  OPTIONS  IP THE  FIRST 
VIEW  WAS  PREVALENT  AND  WOULD  NOT  IF  THE  SECOND  VIEW  WAS 
PREVALENT.  Thus  it is durinc  the eneineerinc phase  that  we  becin 
to underatand  the  likel~ social coat ot tusion  power. 
In  the  tollowinc we  shall attempt  to outline the main  areas where 
trade-otts  in  the desicn of  reactors arise.  and  asaeaa what 
implications  such  trade-ott• micht  have  tor tuaion  power. 
Finally.  we  ahall  attempt  to  aaaess  how  fusion  reactor deaian is 
pertorminc in  terms ot ita enercv aupplv acenario  and  what 
problema  mav  be  anticipated in  a  fusion  reactor proaramme. 
4.1.2  Terms  ot Reference. 
Throu~hout this  study  a  number  ot conceptual  reactor desicn 
studies are used.  There  are  two  main  reasons  tor this. 
?irstly.  these  studies  are  extremely usetul  in  caininc 
understandinc ot  the  main  area•  of ditticulty which  would  be 
encountered  by  an  attempt  to  build  a  fusion  power  plant.  As  such 
they  are  extremely  useful  to  the  proeramme  mana~ement,  showin~ 
the critical areas  where  more  work  needs  to  be  done.  There is no 
attempt  to  su~eest that  these  studies  bear  a  very close 
resemblance  to  what  a  reactor will  actually  look  like.  The 
studies  are  based  on  lon~ burnin~ plasmas  up  to  5000  seconds, 
althou~h it is  not  yet  established  that  such  a  Quasi-stead~ state 
is attainable,  let alone what  the  specific  plasma conditions will 
be  associated  with  such  situation.  Also.  most  studies  are  based 
on  a  'reasonable'  extrapolation of  existin~  technolo~ies and 
clearly there is  no  certainty  about  how  easy  or  coatl~ some 
solutions  to  problems  will  be.  The~ may  be  si~nificantly harder 
than  assumed.  Similarly  aome  problems  may  prove  to  be 
siQ:nificantly easier.  althou~h it has  to  be  said  that  the 
methodolo~y adopted  seems  to  favour  optimistic  outcomes  to 
problem  areas. 
The  second  reason  tor  studyin~ reactor  desiQ:n  parameters,  related 
to  the  first,  concerns  the  Question  ot assessins fusion's 
taasibility.  While it ia clear that  one  cannot  demonstrate 
en~ineerinc or economic  teaaibilit¥ with  an~ certainty until 
scientitic teaaibility ia estab1ished,  it is  a  lo~ical  tallac~ to 
say  that one  cannot  demonstrate  en~ineerinc or economic 
inteaaibilit~ until  a~ter  acienti~ic  ~easibilitv ia established. 
Vet  this  ia  the  approach  adopted  in  the  manasement  ot  the  tusion 
prosramme.  This  has  two  main  e~tects.  One.  is that  those 
tundins  the  pro~ramme are  committed  to waitins an  unusuallY  lons 
time  and  spendin~ a  lar~e amount  ot  money  before  one  can  say 
whether it has  been  worthwhile.  Secondly.  such  a  approach  to  the 
mana~ement  o~ the  pro~ramme leads  to  criticism ot  the  wav  the 
pro~ramme  ~roceeda.  As  Cart·H there  and  Schmitter  put  it; 
"The  demonstration  o~  'scientif'ic feasibility'  in 
a  confinement  ~eometr~  ror  which  it  had  to  be 
admitted  that  there  was  no  possibility  of 
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proceedinc  trom  that  point  to  a  tueion reactor 
could  be  embarrassing." 
(Carruthers at al 1976) 
In reality,  strict  en~ineerinc inteaaibilit~ is  unlikel~ to be 
revealed.  rather that  the  ran~e ot encineerinc options available 
mav  preclude  the eatabliahment ot economic  teaaibilit~.  the 
economic  or environmental  coata  mav  be  too  hich.  It is not 
uncommon  to hear encineers  in  the  tuaion  procramme  s~inc that 
the  tokamak.  althouch  beins  a  device which  aeema  moat  likel~ to 
be  able  to achieve  the reactor relevant  plaama conditions,  is ot 
a  deaicn  auch  that it ia  unlikel~ to  be  able  to produce 
electricit~ at  a  price that will  tavour ita introduction. 
4.2  En~ineerins Problems. 
En~ineerin~ problems  tall broadly  into three  croups; 
(1)  tirat wall  problems 
(2)  fuel  cvcle  problema 
(3)  ma~netic confinement  problems 
There  are  many  sub-divisions  and  some  are  more  inte~rally linked 
with  envrionmental  problems,  e~ the  first wall,  than others.  The 
solutions  to  these  problema  will  obviouslv  be  ot critical 
importance  to  the  kev  questions  of  capital costs  and  availability 
ot  a  fusion  reactor. 
4.2.1  The  First Wall. 
(a)  Wall  Interactions. 
The  first wall  of  the  DEMO  reactor would  consist  of  a  3mm  copper 
wall  backed  by  Helium  cooled  Inconel  tubes.  2mm  thick  tun~sten 
tirat wall  tiles would  be  attached  to this wall  bv  meana  ot  a 
support  structure made  ot  lmm  thick  tunsten.  The  tiles would 
have  an  operatin~ temperature  ot  around  2250  C  and  most  ot  the 
thermal  enercv would  be  transferred  to  the wall  behind  by  heat 
radiation.  There  are  several  proble~s ot interaction with  the 
plasma.  The  main  en~ineerin~ ones  are  that  impurities  toul  the 
plasma  and  that  such  interactions mav  reduce  the lite ot  the wall 
and  any  pieces or  equipment  in  that  area,  such  as  heatinc 
devices,  diacnoatics.  etc. 
There  ia  an inconsistency  between  the  rather optimistic 
statements.  baaed  on  JET  operatin~ experience  and  the  problems 
enviaaced when  conaiderin~ reactor  desi~n concepts: 
"Impuritv  levels  presented  a  problem.  as  they 
reduce  the  number  oe  plasma  ions  available  for 
fusion  and  cause  radiation  losses.  Experiments 
with  low-Z  (carbon)  tiles on  the  inner walls  and  a 
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carbonized  vessel  showed  reduced  levels ot  meta~ 
and  o>Q'cen  impurities." 
(CEC  19878) 
"Practical  deaicn  solutions  tor  the tirst wall 
were  tound  to be  heavili~  conatrained  b~ mutualLv 
contlictinc  requirements.  Durinc  the  plasma 
heatinc  phase,  cood  isolation  o~ the  plasma trom 
the tile• will  be  required  to  avoid  an  excesaive 
concentration ot hich  Z  impuritit~  in  the plasma. 
Thi•  hae  not yet  been  1nveaticated." 
(IAEA  1985A) 
Also,  attar a  vear ot operation,  JET  waa  found  to have  •uttered 
some  tairl~ aerious  and  •••entiall~ unpredicted electron damace 
(neutron  damaae  waa  neclicible due  to  the  tact that  JET  currentl~ 
operates onlv  on  ~dro&en-Deuterium tue~ below  reactor levels): 
"Erosion  feature•  attributable  to  run-aw~ £Past 
electrons,  to unipolar  arcin~.  and  to rare  power 
arcs  have  been  identified.  Sputterinc  and 
evaporation  processes  are  seen  and  redeposition 
and  cros•-eontamination  of  elements  within  the 
torus  are  clearl~  observed.  Severe  local effects 
ot  thermal  excursions  are  seen  on  protection 
plates. 
"Detri·tus  recovered  from  the  vacuum  vessel 
includes metallic droplets  and  films,  and  f1brour 
material,  probably  trom  clothin~." 
(Lomer  1985) 
Such  events  may  have  a  number  o~ implications.  and  it is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  such  problems  will  not  diminish  when 
usin~ hi~her  ener~y plasmas  and  tritium  fuel.  This  may  be 
exa~~erated by  operational  modes  invo~vin~ routine first wall 
interaction  (limiters  and  X-point  operation)  currently  bein~ 
explored  in  an  attempt  to  improve  con~inement times.  It impurity 
levels  ~et too  hi~h.  then it becomes  difficult tor fusion 
reactions  to  take  place.  Reducin~ the  level ot  impurities  caused 
bv  such  events  ia  not  at  an  advanced  ata~e so little can  be  said 
about  the methode  that  could  be  used,  except  perhaps  that it wi~l 
not  be  easv.  It it proved  neceasarv  to  clean  the reactor 
recu1arlv that would  be  coatlv.  There  are also  implications  on 
the environmental  aide  and  tor the tuel  cvcle. 
(b)  Wall  Materials. 
The  question  of  wall materials  in  tueion  reactors  was  dealt with 
in  some  len~th in "l'usion  and  P'a.st  Breeder Reactors"  ((IIASA 
1977)  and  (Brandt  et  al  1980)).  and  this  study  serves  to  indicate 
the  main  issues  in  reactor  en~ineerin~.  In  the  section  on 
'Eftecta  o~ Fusion  Reactor  Environment  on  the  Properties  of 
Materials',  the  ~ollowin~ problems  are  mentioned  with  a  brief 
discussion  o~ the  level  oe  importance  and  knowled~e about  the 
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behaviour ot the materials  in  tuaion  reactor condition•.  We 
brietly summarise  the  section  belowa 
Problem.  Importance.  Level ot Knowledce. 
1.  Oimen•iona1  Inatab11it~. 
(a)  Swellinc due  to  Void•  Hich 
(b)  Swellinc  due  to  Gaa  Bubbles  Bich 
(c)  Growth  [in Graphite]  Hich 
Virtuall~ none 
Rea•onable 
Virtuall~ none 
2.  Mechanical  Property Chance•  That  Could  Be  Important  in  CTR 
Materials. 
(a)  Ductilit~ 
(b)  Potential Creep  Problems 
(c)  P'aticue 
Verv  hich 
Rich 
Very  hich 
On1¥  tor SS316 
Virtuall.V  none 
None 
(except  tor Mirror•) 
3.  Some  Physical  Properties of  CTR  Materials  That  Depend  on 
Radiation  Oamace. 
(a)  Electrical Resistivity  Moderate  Poor 
(b)  Radiation  Oama~e to 
Superconductinc Maanet 
Materials  Moderate  Reasonable 
Further: 
,.The  de~rade.tion  of 
neutrons  results  in  at 
major ettectst 
materials 
least  the 
(1)  reduced  etticienc~t 
(2)  reduced  plants  factors; 
(3)  increased  capital  costs; 
(U)  increased  operatinc costs: 
properties  by 
six  tollowinc 
(5)  increases  in  the  volume  ot radioactive waste  which 
must  be  processed  and  stored;  and 
(6)  demand  on  scarce elements" 
The  Chapter  concludea1 
"Undoubtedly  more  problems will  be  identified in 
the  future.  We  must,  therefore,  reluctantly 
conclude  that.  next  to  the  plasma  physics 
problema,  radiation  dama~e  is  the  aecond  most 
serious  obstacle  to  the  commercialisation  ot 
fusion  power" 
(IIASA  1977) 
It  seems  to  be  the  case  th~t knowledce  about  the  behaviour ot 
materials  under  hi~h MeV  neutron  bombardment  is  sorel~ missinc in 
the  en~inerrin~ phase  of  the  fusion  pro~ramme.  The  US  Department 
ot  Ener~y.  in  conjunction with  Canada.  Japan.  and  Euratom 
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(includinc Sweden),  did  plan  to build  to build  a  Fusion Materials 
Irradiation Teat  Facilit~ and  the  majorit~ of  the deaicn work  was 
completed.  However,  in  the  context  oe  "a cenera1  contraction ot 
ener~ RD&D  budceta  in most  IEA  countries"  (IAEA  1976),  the 
projected  •220  mi1lion  coat waa  too hich,  and  the project waa 
shelved in 1985.  The  US  procr ...  e  doe•  not  currentl~ include 
buildinc an  FMIT  facilitv until the earlv 2oooa.  aaaum~nc 
Concreas  cranta  them  the  tundins  the~ require  (US  DOE  87). 
The  constraint• on  the first wall encineerins are  auch  that  a 
critical variable becomes  the lite-time ot the tirat wall,  both 
in environmental  teraa  and  coat  tera•·  There ia  a  major 
trade-off over the thickne•• of  the first-wall tilea.  The tile• 
have  to  be kept  thin to allow the neutron•  to pa••  throuch  to 
breed  tritium in the blanket.  The  DEMO  deaicn e•timate•  that the 
proposed  first-wall  reduce•  the  tritium breedinc ratio (the ratio 
of  tritium bred  in the reactor to  the  amount  used  aa  fuel)  bV 
13~.  On  the other hand,  the  thinner the tirat-wall the more 
trequentl~ it will need  replacinc which will  obvioual~ have 
eetects on  the  availabilitv of  the reactor and  thus  on  the 
ceneration coat.  The  need  to replace  the first wall  beeore  the 
reactor has  reached  the  end  of its useful  life has  lone been 
recocnised  as  necesaar~ from  an  encineerinc  point  ot view.  The 
lencth ot  time  usuallY  quoted  tor tirst wall  replacement  is 
somewhere  between  2  and  10  years.  However,  trom detailed reactor 
desi~n studies it would  appear  that  conditions  are  so  extreme  in 
the first wall  of  a  tusion  reactor  that  not  onl~ is replacement 
atter  two  years  beinc  considered,  it has  actually  emer~ed as  a 
TARGET,  and  one  that  may  be  hard  to  actually achieve.  The 
~irst-wall  desi~n chosen  in  the  DEMO  stud~ is  in  accordance with 
a  tar~et of  replacement  ever~ two  years.  When  referrinc to  the 
problem of  duetilit~ due  to  the  lar~e Helium  ~eneration rate in  a 
~uaion reactor,  the  IIASA  study  makes  the  tollowin~ observation: 
"Theref'ore,  it  is  dif~icult  to  place  a  definitive 
wa~l  life,  unless  one  were  to  use  the  most 
pessimistic data.  Such  an  approach  would yield  a 
life of  two  to  ~hree  months  in  a  reactor like 
UWMAK  II.  If  one  uses  the  U.E.  desicn  limit  of 
one  per  cent  (elon~ation],  the  situation  becomes 
much  worse.  IN  FACT  IT  IS  QUITE  POSSIBLE  THAT  THE 
WALL  LIFE  WOULD  BE  LESS  THAN  TWO  YEARS  EVEN  WITH 
THE  OPTIMISTIC  DATA .••.  The  whole  point ot this 
exercise is to  point  out  asain  that  the  hish 
helium  seneration  rate  will  probably  place  an 
upper  temperature  limit  on  the first  wall  lite, 
recardlese ot  the  corrosion or creep  behaviour ot 
the  material,  Secondl~.  THE  CHOICE  OF  DESIGN 
LIMIT  CAN  ONLY  CHANGE  AN  IMPOSSIBLE  SITUATION 
(wall  life  is  leas  than  two  months)  INTO  A 
DIFFICULT  ONE  (wall lite is of  only  a  tew years), 
dependin~  on  the  assumptions  ot  tolerable 
ductility."  (Our  emphasis]. 
(IIASA  1977) 
The  environmental  and  cost  implications ot such  a  short first 
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wall  replacement  time will  be  explored  below. 
4.2.2 Tritium Handline. 
Tritium will  be  present  in  a  number ot area•  in  a  tuaion reactor. 
It will  be  present  in  the  tuel  and  exhauat,  in the  breedinc 
blanket,  it will  need  to  be  stored,  and it will present  in 
var~inc quantities  in  the reactor structure.  Tritium handline 
ia  a  problem due  to ita abilitv to  permeate  throuch  solid 
structure•,  particularlv Niobium.  Vanadium  and Titanium 
retractor¥ allo¥•·  Ita permeabilitv increaaea with  temperature. 
The  aeriouan••• ot thia qualit¥ ot Tritium dependa  to  a  certain 
extent on'the material  choaen  aa  the  coolant  in  a  tuaion reactor. 
To  overcome  this permeation  problem it ia  proposed  to oxidise it 
upon  leavinc the  breedinc elements  and  then  carr¥ it in the 
coolant  aa  tritiated water.  Howevor,  tritium is extremely coatlv 
to  remove  trom water  (Stace~ 1984).  A  dual-purpose  coolant  ia 
proposed  to both  remove  the  Tritium  trom  the  breedinc blanket  and 
the  heat  trom  blanket.  methods  will  have  to  be  devised  to remove 
it quicklV  and  cleanly.  One  wav  ot doins  this  under  studv ia  to 
remove  the  tritiated water  b~ allowins  approximate!~  1~ ot the 
coolant  tlow  to  be  diverted  to  a  tritium extraction plant  and 
remove  it the  tritiated water  bV  means  ot molecular  sieve  beds. 
Costlv  precautions  will  have  to  be  taken  to  ensure it does  not 
present  an  occupational  hazard  to  those  in  the  containment  area. 
Tritium  stora~e could  also  present  a  lar~e and  costlv problem,  as 
could  the  need  to  transport  it.  The  lar~est potential  problem 
with Tritium could  well  be  due  to  the  need  to  build  a  lar~e 
enou~h Tritium stock  to  fuel  a  fusion  ~ower programme.  This  will 
be  dealt  with  under  the  fuel  cycle. 
a.2.3  Tritium  Breedin~. 
Tritium  can  only  be  bred  from  Lithium.  Natural  Lithium is  a 
compound  consistin~ of  approximately  7.5%  Lithium  6  and  92.5% 
Lithium  7.  Unfortunate!~.  the  rarer ot  the  two  natural  Lithium 
isotopes,  Lithium  6,  breeds  much  more  readily  than  Lithium 7. 
The  ratio ot Tritium bred  to  that  "burnt"  in  the  reactor is  known 
as  the  Breedin~ Ratio  (BR).  As  the  price ot Tritium is somewhere 
around  $10,000/~  (Stace~ 198U),  tor  ~ood economies it is 
essential  that  the  Breedinc  Ratio  is  hi~h  enou~h to  supplv  the 
Tritium needs  ot  a  developin~ tusion reactor  prosramme.  However, 
the abilitY to  produce  a  sufticientlv  hi~h Breedins Gain  to 
ottaet  not  only  pro~ramme requirements  but  also various  losses 
due  to  extraction/reprocessin~ inetticiencv and  the  short  Tritium 
halt-lite  (12.36  ~ears),  have  been  shown  to  be  severel~ 
constrained  bv  en~ineerin~ tactors.  For  example,  in  the  context 
ot  the  requirements  of  obtainin~ an  acceptable  breedin~ ~ain in  a 
solid  breeder  fusion  reactor  an  IAEA  report  o~ an  UKAEA 
discussion  reports; 
''Practical  deai~n  solutions  ~or  the  first wall 
were  ~ound to  be  heavily  constrained  by  mutually 
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contlictinc requirements.  It is desirable  to  k6~P 
the  wall  thin  to minimise  neutron ab•orption and 
thermal  stress.  On  the  other  hand,  lP  A 
MAINTENANCE  CYCLE  OF  2  YEARS  BETWEEN  REPLACEMENTS 
IS  ADOPTED,  the wall  has  to  be  initiall~ thick,  it 
made  ot •tainl••• •teal  aa  in  INTOR,  to allow tor 
sputterinc  damace  under  norma1  and  disruptive 
operation  and  to  reduce  the  rate  ot  tritium 
permeation  from  the  plaama to  the coolant."  [Our 
emphasis]. 
(IAEA  1985A) 
The  •olid lithium metaailicate breeder concept  in the  DEMO  •tudv 
requires  Lithium enriched  to  30~ Lithium  6  (hicher enrichment  ia 
obvioual~ unde•irable  from  a  coat  perspective}  contained in 
breedina element•  cont&inina  80%  beryllium  (a neutron "breeder") 
with  a  two  vear blanket  replacement  period  to obtain an 
acceptable  ~loba1 breedina ratio  (tar~ets  approximate1~ 1.1). 
With  neutral  beam  injector windows  (reducina the  possible 
breedinc area)  in  tour ot  the  twelve  reactor modules,  a  breedinc 
ratio ot only  1.19 +or- 0.004  is obtained,  despite  the tact 
that  the  DEMO  stud¥  did  not  allow  tor  any  of  the  breedinc area to 
be  taken  up  b~  dia~noetic equipment  in  an  attempt  to  reach  the 
80%  cover  tar~et.  If it proves  impossible  to  use  the  area under 
the divertor  for  bre6din~ this  falls  to  1.023.  Such  low breedins 
ratio  ti~urea are  worryin~ when  one  has  take  into account  tritium 
losses  in  the  extraction/reprocessin~ procedure  and  the  taat 
decay  rate ot  tritium.  An  alternative  liquid breeder  concept  was 
developed  in  DEMO.  lithium enriched  to  50%  lithium  6  and  mixed 
with  70%  lead  (also  a  neutron  breeder)  in  breedin~ cans.  The 
~lobal  breedin~ ratio obtained  by  this  method  is 1.117 +or-
0.003.  Lead  is not  a  favourable  matarial  because  it becomes 
radioactive  and  it forms  a  more  corrosive mixture  th$n  lithium 
itself when  mixed.  The  resource  implications  ot  usin~ enriched 
lithium and  beryllium are  not  1nsi~nificant (tor example,  one 
requires  12a of  natural  Lithium per  ~ram of  90%  enriched  Lithium 
(IIASA  1977)).  Both  solid and  liquid  breeder  concepts  make  use 
ot bervllium  to  enhance  the  breedin~ process.  Beryllium  bein~ 
neither abundant,  cheap  nor  clean. 
4.2.4  Extraction/Reproceasin~. 
There  are  two  typea  of extraction  involved  in  a  fusion  reactor. 
Firstly,  there ia  the  extraction  needed  to  re-enter spent  ~:A~! 
into  the reactor.  In  a  0-T  Tokamak  reactor  1 t  ia  anvis-:.6-sd  t:."."St 
the •pent  tue~ will  consist ot  between  85-90%  0-T.  between  1-~o~ 
Hvdrosen,  between  5-10~ He1ium  a.  Oxy~en,  Nitro~en and  Carbon 
will  make  up  1%  and  0.01%  metallic  impurities  (Stacey  198~). 
These  are necea•arily  contin~ent  ti~uree  ~iven the discussion 
particularlv  on  wall  interactions.  This  extraction  proc«ss  ~­
enviaased  thu•& 
"the  metallic  impurities  can  be  removed  from  the 
exhaust  by  electro•tatic  precipitation.  thus 
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leavinc  a  stream  of  hydrocen  atom•  and  caaeoua 
impurity  atom•  (C.  O,  N,  He.  etc).  Oxvcen, 
nitrocan.  and  carbon  are  present mainly  in the 
form  ot  the  chemical  compounds  water  (DTO), 
ammonia  (N(O,T)3),  and  methane  (CD.aTm) 
reapective1v.  After  aepar&tion  fro•  the  main 
stream,  a11  theae  compounds  muat  be  chemicall~ 
diaaociated  to  aeparate  and  recover  all  the 
chemically  combined  tritiu.  and  diacharce  the 
impuritv  atoma  to  a  tritium-tree waate" 
(St&Cfa¥  1984) 
In  the  DEMO  atudV  there  ia  no  reference  aa  to  how  thia thia aicht 
be  achieved,  there ia no  treatment ot  impurit~ removal,  isotopic 
aeparation  in the  plasma or coolant atre  .... 
The  second  form  of extraction is involved  in the breedinc 
process.  Given  the  larce  number  ot poaaible breedinc method•, 
coolants  and  structural materials,  it ia hard  to be  clear about 
the  likel~ problema  aaaociated with  thi• area.  However,  it does 
seem  to  be  amercinc  that  there will  be  a  need,  civen  the 
d1tf1cultiea ot obtaininc  an  adequate  breedinc cain,  to  actuall~ 
reprocess  the breeder elements.  particular!~ solid breeders  (thev 
appear  to  be  more  prone  to  awellin~ and  distortion)  and  those 
components  uains  Beryllium  (IIASA  1977). 
~.2.5  Ma~netic  Con~inement. 
It is  ~enerally  acce~ted that  su~er-conductins macneta  will  have 
to  be  used  in  a  fusion  reactor  as  the¥  are  much  more  efficient 
and  are  able  to  reach  very  hi~h ma~netic fields.  It is however. 
a  relatively  new  technolo~y and  producin~ tielda sreater than  12 
Tesla is  an  en~ineer1n~  cha~lensa in  a  fusion  reactor 
environment.  The  main  problema  anticipated  in  such  a  project  are 
the  problem  of  keepins  the  ma~neta supercooled  (to  approximate!~ 
4  de~rees Kelvin)  in  such  a  hot  environment,  and  also  that 
superconduct ing  compounds  "~o normal"  it subject  to  too  much 
neutron  irradiation.  It has  been  estimated  that  the 
superconductors will  require  more  than  1m  of  shieldin~ to escape 
this kind  ot  threat  (Stacey  198~). 
A.3  Conclusion. 
We  have  aeen  how  environmental  and  ensineerinc trade-otta  have 
tended  to concentrate  around  certain kev  variables,  sue~  a~ 
wall-li~e.  tritium breedinc.  etc.  It remains  to consider the 
relationship  theae  factors  have  with  coats.  There  is  no  simple 
model  appropriate  to  underetandinc  such  a  relationship. 
interdependence  between  the  variables,  rather  than  depender.ce  or 
independence  is  the  rule. 
We  have  seen  that  there  seems  to  be  little to  be  ~ained at  this 
ata~e.  with  the  limited  amount  of  intormat~on available.  to 
attempt  to attach  specific  costa  to  elements  of  fusion  power 
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elect~icitv production.  However,  it one  took eertain ceneric 
teaturea  o~ tuaion  reactor deaicns  then  one  can  understand  the 
type  o~ coat  structure associated with  tuaion.  This  ia  a  task 
that  can  uaetully undertaken at  this stace.  In  the absence ot 
such  an  attempt,  the  table  below  attempts  to  summarize  the  tvpe 
o~ trade-ott'a  aaaociated with  k~ variable•  and  indicate the 
direction  that reactor deaicn  appears  to  be  coinc in. 
Table  ~.3  Summar~  o~ Reactor  Desicn  Trade-otts. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- VARIABLE  BENEFITS  COSTS  COMMENTS 
----------------------------------------------------------------- Wa.ll  Materials 
ss 316. 
P'erritic 
at  eel 
Nb,  Ti,  V 
Alloys. 
Cheap. 
Rel&tivel~ 
well  understood. 
Good  with  He. 
Short-lived 
activation 
products. 
environment. 
Coolants/Tritium  Breed1n~. 
Water.  Good  thermal 
conductivity. 
Lone halt-lite. 
Expensive,  rare. 
Unknown  behaviour 
in  fusion  reactor 
bombardment. 
P'erritic appeara 
to  be  t'avoured 
aa  eo little is 
known  about 
alternative 
material.& 
behaviour under 
heav~ neutron 
Difficulty with  Dual  purpose 
tritium extraction.  Helium  coolants 
Hi"h  pressure. 
Lithium.  Simplicity.  Pumpin~ problems 
seems  to  be 
preferred  in 
recent  European 
reactor  desi~ns. 
Excellant  thermal  in  hi~h fields. 
Helium. 
conductivity. 
Wel.l  known. 
Very  stable 
inert  ~as. 
Breedinc Materials. 
Liquid. 
(Li/Pb) 
Relativel.#'  hi"h 
breedin6r  ratio. 
Solid.  Less  mobile. 
(Lithium  Leas  corrosive. 
metasilicate) 
Hi~h chemical 
reactivity. 
Corrosive 
More  complex 
fuel  cycle. 
Hi.fith  r;>ressure. 
Poor  therma~ 
conductivit~. 
Hi~hly corrosive. 
Hard  to obtain 
~ood breedins  ~ain. 
More  distortion. 
---------------------------------------------------------------·--
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5.1  INTRODUCTION 
There  is  a  major  problem with  any  attempt  to  assess  the 
environmental  effects ot  fusion  power  in  that  there is not  even 
one  specific  technolo~y that  can  be  assumed  to represent  the real 
situation  that will prevail it and  when  commercial  fusion 
reactors  are  in place.  However,  at  any  one  time,  as  R,  D  & 0 
work  evolves,  there  is  a  current set ot  technolo~ies which  are 
seen  as  bein~ most  likely to solve  the scientific and  en~ineerin~ 
problems  confrontin~ fusion  scientists.  Whilst  these 
technolo~ies may  in  the  end  prove  to  be  technically and/or 
financiallY  unviable  or other  technolo~ies prove  to  be  more 
attractive,  it is nevertheless  both  possible  and  necessary  to 
identifY  and  evaluate  probable environmental  impacts  of  specific 
technolo~ies  from  their earliest  point  of  consideration  and  as 
designs  evolve,  so  environmental  impact  assessment  needs  to  be 
incorporated  as  part  of  the  desi~n and  development  process. 
This  section  reviews  work  that  has  been  carried out recently 
relatin~ to  the  ~otential environmental  impacts  of  currently 
favoured  fusion  technolo~ies and  also  identifies  gaps  in  the 
assessment  process  as  hitherto  developed.  The  variety  and 
complexity  of  technologies  currently  under  consideration  is 
such  as  to  make  it difficult  to  ~ubdivide the  analysis 
satisfactoril~.  On  consideration  we  have  decided  to  look first 
at  problems  associated with  the  fuel  cycle,  then  to  look  at 
reactor associated  problems  and  finally·to  draw  the  conclusions 
from  these  in  terms  of  health  hazards.  The  whole  analysis  is 
preceded  by  an  overview  that  distinguishes  'current'  concerns 
from  potential  concerns  relati~~ to  alternative  technolo~ical 
developments.  The  analysis  ends  with  en  assessment  of  needs 
with  respect  to  fur~her work. 
5.2  GENEBAL  ISSUES 
5.2.1  What  Technolog~? 
A  number  of  possible  technolo~ical  confi~urations have  been 
devised  to  achieve  controlled  nuclear  fusion  for  purposes  of 
extractin~  ener~y and  experiments  have  been  devised  to  test 
ttH!:::ii- f'ea.sibilit,y.  These  include  'stellara.tors',  'tokama.ks'. 
laser,  mirror  and  reverse  field  pinch  reactor.  Whilst  there is 
at  this  time  no  guarantee  regarding  which  of  these will  prove 
the  most  effective  (or if any  of  them will)  nevertheless.  the 
~rea.t  majorit.Y  of  research  is  currently  ~oin~ into  the 
development  of  tokamaks  and  hence  there  is  more  information  with 
which  to  assess  the  potential  environmental  im~acts of  these  and 
at  this  sta~e they  seem  the  most  likely  to  achieve 
commercialisation.  This  analysis  is  therefore entirely  focussed 
upon  this  technology. 
It  has  been  hooed  since  the  early  days  of  fusion  research  tha  .... 
ultimately  there will  be  a  possibilitY of  fuelling  the  contrvll~d 
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~usion process  entirely on  the  hydro~en isotope  deuterium  (the 
0-0  reaction);  this  mi~ht provide  almost  limitless quantities of 
energy  from  a  source  which  is  not  itself radioactive.  The  more 
accessible  route  to  fusion  power  is via  a  reaction  between 
deuterium  and  a  further,  radioactive,  hYdro~en isotope tritium 
(the  D-T  reaction).  Tritium is not  found  in  nature.  but  can  be 
produced  by  irradiation of  lithium.  Currently all work  on 
nuclear  fusion  is  focussed  upon  the  eventual  use  ot  tritium. 
derived  from  lithium,  as  tuel  and  the  tollowin~ analysis 
therefore  looks  exclusively at this option.  However.  it should 
be  noted  that  the  notion  that it micht  be  acceptable to initiate 
a  major  D-T  based  fusion  pro~ramme in  the  hope  that experience 
will  lead  to  the  development  o~ feasible  D-D  technolo~.  and 
that  the  result will  be  free  of radiation  problems  must  be  \ 
guarded  a~ainst.  The  tuaion  process itselt creates  radioactive  1 
products  and  so  a  0-0  reactor would  not  necessarilY generate  a 
lower  radioactive  inventory  than  a  D-T  reactor  (1). 
As  no~ed elsewhere  in  this  report,  the  ~easibility of  achieving 
a  net  energy  gain  from  controlled nuclear  fusion  is  as  yet 
unproven.  Whilst  progress  has  been  steadily made  towards  this 
objective.  manY  unforeseen  problems  have  been  encountered  on  the 
way  and  there  is  as  ~et  no  ~uarantee that it is  achievable. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  assessment  of  environmental 
impacts  of  an  eventual  commercial  reactor,  the  implications  of 
this  are  that  the  achievement  of  fusion  power  may  yet  involve 
signieicant  chan~es in  technology  as  yet  quite  unforeseen.  The 
a~parent concreteness  of  technolo~ical options  presented  below 
must  therefore  be  tem~ered and  seen  as  no  more  than  best  guesses 
on  the  basis  of  current  developments. 
Nevertheless, 
in  existence. 
a  ~igni~icant number  of  experimental  reactors  are 
albeit  insufficientlY developed  to  achieve 
'system  breakeven'.  which  provide  some  basis  for  environmental 
assessment.  Furthermore,  a  number  of  extensive  design  studies 
have  been  undertaken  both  as  a  basis  ror  the  next  generation  of 
experimental  reactor  and  as  a  first  attempt  to  estimate  the 
en~ineering,  and  to  a  lesser extent  the  economic  and 
environmental,  parameters  of  a  possible  future  commercial 
reactor.  The  following  assessment  is  focussed  predominantly  on 
the  possible  impacts  of  a  future  fusion  economy  and  hence  is 
baaed  on  the  technical  parameters  that  have  arisen  from  these 
engineering studies,  especially,  the  United  States  'Starfire' 
project  (2)  and  the  joint  European  'DEMO'  conceptual  designs 
put  forward  by  UKAEA  (3). 
5.2.2  What  Materials? 
The  construction  of  fusion  power  stations  and  supportin~ 
facilities will  raise  a  number  of  environmental  issues 
including,  inter alia,  ecological.  visual  and  social  impacts, 
which  cannot  be  very  well  estimated  prior  to  the  development  o~ 
discrete  power  station  proposals.  However.  genericallY  the 
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environmental  assessment  oe  fusion  ~ower is dominated  bY  the 
question  of  radioactive  release.  This.  in  turn,  is crucially 
determined  b~ the  inventor~ of  radioactive materials  which  will 
be  contained  in  and/or  ~enerated by  a  fusion  ~ower station  and 
its ancilliary facilities.  By  the  time  desi~ns for particular 
commercial  fusion  power  stations are  bein~ made,  the  inventory 
of  radioactive materials will  have  been  well  worked  out  and it 
is decisions  with  re~ard to  these materials  which  need  above 
all  to  be  analysed  with  respect  to  environmental  impacts. 
The  choice ot materials is attected  bY  several  parameters. 
These  include:  en~ineerin~ variables  such  as  conductivitv, 
resistance  to  heat  and  abrasion  trpm  the  plasma  and  neutron 
penetration characteristics;  cost  and  availability of materials; 
the  potential  hazard  involved  in  their use;  and  their potential 
environmental  impact.  Choices  therefore  involve  complex 
compromises  and  trade-offs with  no  objective criteria as  to  the 
relative weight  which  should  be  ~iven to  the  various  factors 
involved.  The  tendency  hitherto  has  been  to  seek  out  any 
materials  which  will  achieve  the  basic  scientific  and 
en~ineerin~ objective of  'ener~y breakeven'  and  to  assume  that 
less  hazardous  and  less  environmentally  dama~in~ materials will 
be  found  in  process  of  developin~ a  commercial  reactor,  once  the 
first  objective  has  been  achieved  (4).  There  is  a  danger  in 
this  approach  of  over-commitment  to  certain materials  and  an 
inbuilt  disregard  for  hazard  and  environmental  impact  develo~ing 
within  the  institutionalisation of  fusion  power  and  it is 
therefore  advisable,  as  disc~ssed further  at  the  end  of  this 
section,  to  introduce  a  more  structured  approach  to  hazard 
assessment  and  environmental  im~act analysis  integral  to  the 
develoDment  process.  Specific  ma~erials currently  under 
consideration  for  various  parts  of  the  eusion  reactor  and 
related  plant  and  functions  are  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the 
relevant  subsections  below. 
5.2.3  What  Criteria? 
Hitherto  practicallY all  the  serious  work  carried  out  on  the 
potential  environmental  1m~acts of  fusion  power,  in  so  far  as 
this  has  attempted  any  comparison  with  alternative  means  to 
achieve  the  same  ultimate  ener~y  ~oal,  has  evaluated it in 
relation  to  fast  breeder  reactors  and  the  universal  conclusion 
has  been  that  fusion  power  is  liKely  to  be  more  environmentallY 
benign  by  a  very  substantial  mar~in.  This  procedure  is well-
illustrated  by  the  US  ESECOM  study  (Holdren  et  al,l987). 
The  reasoning  behind  this  restricted  comparison  has  been  that 
bY  the  time  fusion  ~ower has  reached  the  sta~e of 
commercialisation  - perhaps  during  the  second  quartile of  the 
next  century  - 'conventional'  energy  sources,  including  t0ss11 
fuels  and  fission  energy,  will  no  longer  represent  a  feasible 
o~tion. 
However,  In  summarising  their  views  on  environmental  ques~lons 
as  part  of  a  major  review of  the  ~ossibilities f0r  fast  breeder. 
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fission  and  fusion  ~ower carried  out  within  the  frameworK  of 
the  International  Institute for  Applied  Systems  Research, 
Hafele  et  al  wrote: 
'It is  possible  to  envision  fusion  systems  in  which 
many  of  the  most  important  environmental  advanta~es 
compared  to  fission  do  not  materialise  ••• The  pitfall 
is  that  the  desire  to  brin~ fusion  to  commercial 
fruition  in  time  to  compete  in  the  transitional  time 
frame  may  lead  in  fusion  pro~rammes around  the world 
to  a  disproportionate emphasis  on  early  en~ineerins 
feasibilitY at  the  expense  of potential environmental 
advanta~es. •  (5) 
It is  therefore  necessary  to  look  at  fusion  in  a  broader 
framework  that will  overcome  the  tendency  to  ~enerate a  race 
between  fusion  and  fast  breeder  fission  technolo~ies.  There  are 
certainly possibilities  to  develo~ a  broader  front  for  the 
solution  to  future  energy  requirements,  includins in 
particular major  investment  in  efficiency measures  and 
renewable  energy  technolo~ies.  These,  too.  will  have 
environmental  impacts  as  well  as  engineerin~ and  economic 
problems  to  be  solved.  But  they  all address  the  same  issue  and 
should  be  evaluated  in  the  same  framework.  . If  the  criteria 
used  to  evaluate  the  DOtential  environmental  impact  of  fusion 
power  are  restricted merely  to  that  technology  or  to  a  slightly 
broader  set  that  encom~asses fast  breeder  fission  power.  then 
major possibilities  for  solvin~ the  ener~y needs  of  the  next 
century  in  ~  more  environmentallY  benign  way  may  be  ne~lected. 
').)  ,..?E  FUEL  CY,CLE. 
The  basic  D-T  reaction  involves  the  fusion  of  one  atom  of 
deuterium  with  one  of  tritium  to  produce  an  atom  of  helium  (Hea) 
and  a  neutron:  although  very  substantial  heat  is  required  to 
initiate  the  reaction  (at  least  one  million  and  perhaps  one 
hundred  million  degrees  centigrade),  once  triggered  there  is  a 
ver~  lar~e net  heat  gain.  As  already  noted,  tritium is  not 
found  in  nature  but  can  be  produced  by  the  irradiation of 
lithium.  This  reaction  involves  the  splitting of  lithium atoms 
to  produce  helium  and  tritium.  The  only  radioactive  substance 
involved  is  tritium,  with  a  half-life of 12.3 years.  However, 
the  neutrons  produced  by  the  fusion  reaction  affect  an 
activation of  many  of  the materials  in  the v1cinit¥ of  the 
reaction,  includin~ reactor walls.  associated machinery  and  even 
the  air  surroundin~ the  reactor  - that  is  to  say  that  atoms  of 
various  materials  in  these  components  are  converted  to  atoms  of 
other materials,  some  of  which  are  radioactive.  In  this 
subsection.  the  discussion  focuses  on  the  problems  associated 
with  the  ~eneration and  circulation  of  tritium;  the  next 
subsection  then  deals  with  problems  arising  from  the  irradi~tion 
of  the  reactor  and  associated  question8. 
5. 3. 1  Tritium  Production  and  Processing 
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ChemicallY  tritium possesses  the  properties of  hydro~en.  At 
normal  temperatures it is  therefore  a  ~as with  a  high  diffusion 
propensity:  it is  thus  difficult  to  contain  in  ~aseous form. 
passing  readilY  through  structural materials.  However.  it 
reacts  easilY with  many  materials  and  oxidises  to  form 
'tritiated water'  (HTO).  Whilst  easier to  handle.  tritiated 
water  is  25,000  times  more  hazardous  than  tritium in  gaseous 
form. 
The  assumption  of  current  work  on  fusion  power  is that  the 
tritium fuel  cycle will  be  contained  almost  entirely within  the 
confines  of  the  reac~or site.  A  new  reactor will  require 
initial fuel  to  be  transported  to site and  the Starfire 
project  estimated  this  to  comprise  some  10  Kg  for  a  U,OOO 
MW(th)  reactor.  All  further  tritium fuel  will  be  generated  on 
site in  the  fusion  process.  Immediately  behind  the  inside 
lining oe  the  reactor vessel  - termed  the  'first wall'  - a 
thick  layer.  or  'blanket',  of  lithium will  be  located.  This 
will  thus  be  irradiated  by  the  reaction  inside  the  vessel  and 
the  tritium  produced  will  subsequently  be  introduced  into  the 
reactor  as  euel.  Besides  breeding  tritium.  the  eirst wall  and 
blanket  must  also  collect  r.he  heat  from  the  reaction  to  be 
conducted  away  for  electricity production. 
There  are  vari~us possible  configura~iona for  containin~ the 
lithium,  removing  the  tritium  and  removin~ the  heat,  all with 
their  own  advantages  and  disadvantages.  An  elegant  engineering 
solution  involves  the  use  of  circulating  liquid  lithium metal  as 
breeder.  tritium  removal  medium  and  coolant  and  some  early 
designs  were  made  on  this  basis.  However,  liquid  lithium is  an 
extremely  reactive material,  combining  at  normal  temperatures 
with  all  cea~ttve  ~ases,  with  water  and  even  concrete.  Mainly 
because  of  tt1is,  more  recent  designs  have  substituted other 
coolants.  Nevertheless.  thou~ht is still being  given  to  the  use 
of  liq11id  :ithium,  in  allo~ form,  at  least  as  breedin~ material; 
further  consideration  is  being  ~iven to  the  use  oe  solid  lithium 
alloys  as  breeder.  However.  i~  may  prove  necessary  from  an 
engineerin~ or  economic  standpoint  to  us  liquid  lithium  in  an 
eventual  commercial  fusion  reactor.  Hence  it cannot  yet  be 
assumed  that  this  potential  hazard  has  actuallY  been  overcome. 
For  the Starfire project,  water  has  been  chosen  as  coolant  and 
helium  for extraction  of  tritium  from  a  blanket  made  up  of 
pellets of  lithium  aluminium  oxide  (LiA102).  The  UKAEA  DEMO 
studies  nave  considered  a  solid  lithium metasilicate  {Li2Sj.O~) 
and  a  liquid  lead/lithium alloy  as  alternative  breeder 
possibilities.  In  both  cases  helium  is  proposed  as  coolant  and 
for  tritium  removal.  The  use  of  a  sin~le helium  circulation 
both  for  heat  and  tritium  removal  is  complicated  by  the  lar~e 
volumes  involved  and  by  the  diluteness  of  tritium:  there  is also 
~  hazard  involved  in  tritium  circulatin~ in  this  way  in  gas  P0rm 
and  the  intention  is  to  oxidise it at  source.  For  practic~l 
~urpo8es only  a  small  volume  or  the  coolant  would  be  detritiated 
during  any  one  helium  cycle  and  this  would  mean  that  the  helium 
coolant  would  contain  a  significant  inventory of  tritiate~ ~ste~ 
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throu~hout the  circui~.  The  level  ot  tritium deemed  acceptable 
by  the  desi~ners is  10  ~rams on  the  assumption  that  a  total  loss 
of  coolant  accident  would  release  no  more  than  10  ~rams ot 
tritium;  this  is discussed  further  in  subsection  5  below. 
The  complete  tritium  processin~ facility  in  a  tusion  power 
station is  a  complex  arran~ement  involvin~ three  initial 
streams  and  then  stora~e and  tuellin~  arran~ements.  Exhaust 
gases  from  the  reactor will  include significant  amounts  ot 
tritium which  must  be  extracted  throu~h  reprocessin~.  There 
are  then  the  arrangements  tor  extractin~ tritium  from  the 
helium  pur~in~ system.  FinallY it will  be  necessary  to  include 
a  system  tor  extractin~ tritium that  has  tound  its wav  into  the 
atmosphere  inside  the  reactor containment  structures  and 
associated  facilities. 
5.3.2  Tritium  Inventory  and  Losses 
The  total  tritium  inventory of  a  fusion  Plant will  thus  be  made 
up  of  a  number  of  separ~te elements  which  in  ~eneral could 
include  the  followin&: 
plasma  and  vacuum  system: 
coolin~ and  tritium extraction  circuits: 
fuel  processing  Qlant: 
b lank.e t; 
3torage: 
in  ~eneral circulation. 
Various  national  teams  contributing  to  the  international  INTOR 
reactor  studies  r1ave  made  seDarate  estimates  of  the  possible 
total  tritium  inventory  of'  a  plant  and  its distribution  in 
various  ~lant  com~onents  (6).  These  estimates  vary  from  2.5  K~ 
to  3. 9  Kg;.  However,  the  distributton  bet·.-.~een  components 
estimated  by  the  various  teams  varies  considerably  and  is 
clearly  influenced  first  b¥  the  confi~uration of  the  technolo~y 
- and  in  all  cases  this  is  currently little more  than  notional. 
The  inventory  for  the  Starfire project  is  estimated  somewhat 
hi~her (this  being  envisa~ed a9  a.  fully  commercial  facility), 
The  blanket  alone  ia  assumed  to  contain  10  K~ of  tritium  and  the 
rest  of  the  system  to  sum  to  about  2  Kg;. 
INTOR  ESTIMATES  OF  TOTAL  TRITIUM  INVENTORY  IN  A  FUSION  PLANT 
VARY  FROM  2.5  TO  3.9  KG;  THE  U,OOO  MW(TH)  STARFIRE  REACTOR 
WOULD  POSSESS  A  TRITIUM  INVENTORY  OF  lOKG. 
Turnin~ now  to  the  question  on  losses  and  releases  for  tritium 
from  a  fusion  power  station,  we  first  look  at  routine  releases 
and  then  at  non-routine  releases  resultin~  f'rom  accidents.  It 
has  already  been  noted  that  tritium  in  ~aseous  f'orm  (jiff'tHJea 
throu~h  atructur~l material.  This  me~ns  that  aome  routine 
release  of  tritium  f'rom  operatinz  f'·l~ion  Qlant  "''0tlld  be 
inevitable.  In  addition  to  this  some  Loa3es  are  likely  to 
occur  alon~  the  pr-ocessin~  and  f'tH~llin-=  D~th. 
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Althou~h there  is  as  yet  no  experience  of  fusion  reactors 
operating with  tritium and  althou~h nuclear  fission  does  not 
employ  tritium as  a  fuel,  nevertheless,  heavy  water  fisaion 
reactors  do  generate  tritium  throu~h neutron  absorption  by  the 
deuterium water.  Pickering,  a  lar~e CANOU  nuclear  facilitv, 
possess  a  tritium inventory of  3.5  K~ during  normal  operation. 
Losses  from  this  facility  averaged  5  ppm/day  between  1977  and 
1981  (7);  this  represents  almost  1/700th ot  the  total  inventorv 
released  in  the  course of  a  year. 
The  procedures  through  which  tritium will  be  handled  in  tusion 
power  stations  is  clearl~ more  elaborate  than  that  encountered 
in  heav~ water  nuclear plants.  Currently work  is  proceedin~ on 
investigating the  practicalities of  tritium handling  in  a  test 
assembly  at  Los  Alamos  in  the  United  States  (8).  Meanwhile. 
however,  although  objectives  are  being set for  limits  to  routine 
tritium release  ~rom future  commercial  reactors  - an  objective 
of  0.5  ~ram per year  for all operating  phases  has  been  set  by 
the Starfire project  (that  is  3U  times  less  per  unit  of  tritium 
inventory  than  the  existing Pickering  CANDU  facility)  and  of 
0.36  gram  per  year  in  the  EEC  fundin~ proposal  (p.7) -it is not 
possible  to  make  any  useful  assessment  of  what  mi~ht be 
practicably achievable  in  a  future  fusion  power  station  bY  way 
of  limitin~ routine  tritium releases.  There  is  also  no 
assessment  of  the  levels  of  tritium  to  which  workers  in  a  fusion 
plant  might  be  subjected  (9)  although  there  is  a  recognition  for 
the  need  to  install  equipment  with  which  to  detritiate the 
atmosphere  within  the  containment  and  ~o deal  with  accidental 
tritium releases. 
Attempts  to  conjecture  accident  scenarios  for  fusion  power 
stations  are  ~s yet  little developed.  In  the  next  section 
there  is  some  discussion  cf  possible  reactor failure  scenarios: 
here  we  look  briefly at  possible  maximum  releases  of  tritium 
due  to  an  accident.  As  already  noted,  the  DEMO  desi~n includes 
a  limitation  on  the  total  tritium  inventory within  the  coolant 
to  10  ~rams  ex~licitly to  reduce  the  possible  release  ensuing 
from  a  total  loss-of-coolant  accident  to  this  amount.  An 
estimate  was  also  made  of  a  maximum  of  270  grams  of  triti  ·~ 
contained  in  the  tritium extraction  plant  at  any  one  time. 
However.  no  estimate  for  tritium  inventory  in  other  parts  of 
the  plant  has  been  provided.  THERE  IS  THEREFORE  INSUFFICIENT 
INFORMATION  TO  MAKE  ANY  JUDGEMENT  ABOUT  POSSIBLE  MAXIMUM  TRITIUM 
RELEASES  FROM  AN  ACCIDENT  ASSOCIATED  WITH  THE  DEMO  REACTOR  AS 
CURRENTLY  DESIGNED. 
An  attempt  has  been  made  in  the  context  of  the  Starfir~  projec~ 
to  cate~orise components  of  the  tritium  inventory  as  bein~ 
'vulnerable'  or  'non-vulnerable'.  The  10  Kg  of  tritium  ~rapped 
within  the  blanket  is  considered  to  be  non-vulnerable  - ~P 
relatively  immob 11 i sed  even  under  major  ace iden  t  cond:!. t  io.1.3. ~  :·ti:! 
total  vuln~rable inventory  that  might  oe  rel~ased  ~~~~­
conditiona  of  multiple  failure  amcunts  to  ur.der  400  ~ramR.  ro. 
should  also  be  noted,  however.  that  an  accident  in  the  tra.n~port 
ot  tritium  fuel  to  a  new  plant  might  involve  as  much  as  tn  ~-­
The  EEC  funding  application  (p.6)  has  assumed  a  maxi~um 
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conceivable  accidental  tritium release  to  be  200  ~rams.  This  is 
more  than  an  order  of  ma~nitude lower  than  accident  scenarios  in 
some  other studies. 
5.4  REACTOR  ASSOCIATED  ISSUES 
A  tokamak  fusion  reactor is  a  circular tube  within  which  a  rins 
of  deuterium  and  tritium  ~as,  in  the  form  of  a  plasma.  is broucht 
up  to  a  temperature  and  confinement  pressure where it fuses 
~ivins of~ a  substantia~ net  enercY  surplus.  The  tube is 
evacuated of  a~l other cases  and  the  plasma is necessarily held 
away  from  the  wa~ls of  the  tube:  no  solid material  can  withstand 
a  fraction  ot  the  temperature at which  the  plasma  burns  and, 
indeed,  i~  the  confinement  of  the  plasma is destabilised  and 
collides with  the  wall,  local  areas of  the wall material  may  be 
broucht  to  the  boil.  However,  the  amount  of  ~as present  in  the 
~eactor at  any  one  time  is extremely  small  so  that 
destabilisation of  the  plasma quickly  leads  to dissipation ot  the 
ener~y which  it contains  while  burnin~. 
As  already  noted,  the  reactor is  lined on  the  inside  bY  a 
'first wall'  which  must  withstand  severe  radiation  and  heat  as 
well  as  abrasion  from  'sputterin~'  plasma.  The  wall  is 
interrupted  in  places  by  ducts  associated  with  maintenance  of 
the  vacuum  and  the  processes  whereby  the  plasma  is initially 
heated  to  the  point  where  the  reaction  becomes 
self-sustainin~.  There  ar~ also  intrusions  into  the  reactor 
space,  the  most  important  of  which  is  a  line  of  baffles 
associated  with  the  control  of  the  plasma  p~ofile,  the 
inser-tion  of  f11el  and  the  extraction of  exhaust  ~ases,  helium 
and  unburned  fuel.  These  baffles,  termed  'limiters'  or 
'diverters'  dependin~ on  the1r  configuration  and  ~recise 
functioning,  are  subject  to  Qarticularly  severe  operating 
conditions. 
Immediately  behind  the  first wall  comes  the  complex  structure 
of  the  blanket  and  cooling:  aystem  referred  to  in  the  previous 
subsection.  This  comprises  a  large  number  of  lithium breeder 
containers  and  pi~ework for  the  circulation of  coolant  and 
tritium  pur~in~ medium.  The  whole  is  contained  in  a  reactor 
wall  desi~ned both  to  contain  the  vacuum  and  provide  a  shield 
a~ainst radiation.  Confinement  of  the  plasma  to  the  centre of 
the  reactor is  effected  by  a  aeries  of  magnets  (peloidal  and 
toroidal)  situated  immediately  conti~uous  to  the  reactor vessel. 
In  current  tokamaka  (JET  e~)  these  ma~nets are  elect~oma~~et~ 
requiring  lar~e electrical currents.  Future  desi~ns utilize 
supercooled  electroma~nets  involvin~ associated  cryogenic  systems 
(liguid  nitrogen  and  helium).  The  reactor is  connected  bY  many 
ducts,  pipes  and  cables  to  its associated  systems.  but  must 
remain  accessible  for  maintenance  purposes. 
The  simultaneous  solution  to  the  requirements  1Jf  all  these 
systems  necessarily  raises  a  multiplicity of  imperatives  and 
constraints  which  must  be  weighed  up  and  fitted  together.  A 
number  of  key  issues  immediately  arise  in  relation  to  que3ticns 
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of  safet¥  and  environmental  impact.  The  first concerns  the 
consequences  of  the  irradiation of  the  materials  from  which  these 
complex  systems  are  made.  The  second  concerns  the  consequences 
of  an  accident  in  any  one  system  or  an  accident  involvin~ the 
interaction of  various  S¥stems. 
5. 4. 1  Structural Activation 
IRRADIATION  OF  THE  STRUCTURAL  MATERIALS  INSIDE  THE  REACTOR  LEADS 
TO  THE  BUILD-UP  OF  RADIOACTIVE  ISOTOPES.  THIS  WILL  MEAN  THAT  AT 
THE  END  OF  THE  LIFE  OF  THESE  REACTOR  PARTS,  THEY  WILL  CONTINUE  TO 
GIVE  OFF  HEAT  AND  REQUIRE  ACTIVE  COOLING  FOR  SOME  YEARS  AND  IN 
THE  LONGER  TERM,  EVEN  WHEN  ACCEPTABLY  COOL,  WILL  CONTINUE  TO  BE 
RADIOACTIVE.  Different materials  display very different 
radioactive  properties  under  these  circumstances  and  in principle 
it would  be  possible  to  select materials which  minimise  the 
residual  heat  and  radioactivity. 
As  noted  at  the  outset  of  this  section.  minimisation  of 
environmental  impacts  is  onlY  one  of  several  considerations which 
enter  into  the  decisions  with  regard  to  materials  choice.  A  whole 
range  of  engineering constraints  must  be  considered  and  once 
commercialisation  is  more  seriously  under  consideration  questions 
of  ~aterials availability  and  cost  will  also  enter  into  the 
decision-making  Drocess. 
In  the  most  coherent  attempt  to  da~e to  analyse  the  possible  ~ 
safety  and  environmental  aspects  of  fusion  power.  the  ESECOM 
study  (Holdren  et  al.  op  cit)  conjectured  eight different  reactor 
types  usin~ different  combinations  of  materials  and  investigated 
the  environmental  impacts  of  these.  However.  currently. 
technolo~ical considerations  dominate  work  on  fusion  power  and  it 
is  worth  looking  brieflY at  these  in  order  to  illustrate why 
nothing  ap~roaching optimal  environmental  effects  may  in  the  end 
be  achievable.  Clearly  the  whole  reactor vessel  must  remain 
mechanically  robust  under  all operating conditions.  The  immediate 
inside  surface will  be  subjected  to  extremely  high  radiant 
temperatures  and  abrasion  from  plasma  'sputtering'.  AS  YET  THERE 
IS  LITTLE  MEANINGFUL  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  DEGREE  TO  WHICH  THE  ~LASMA 
WILL  BE  CONTAINABLE  UNDER  CONDITIONS  OF  NET  ENERGY  GAIN  AND  THUS 
THE  CONDITIONS  WHICH  THE  FIRST  WALL  SURFACE  WILL  HAVE  TO 
WITHSTAND  UNDER  OPERATING  CONDITIONS.  So  designs  are  currentlY 
carried out  based  upon  assumptions  with  re~ard to  what  will  be 
f'easible. 
If energy  breakeven  is  achieved  and  desii;n  commences  aimed  a.t  a.n 
eventual  commercial  reactor.  the  first  wall  will  need  to  possess 
a  surface  coating  adequate  to  protectin~ the  main  wall  material 
f'rom  abrasion  which  might  release  impurities  into  the  plasma. 
The  main  wall  material  - perhaps  in  the  form  of  tiles  - wil~ 
then  be  connected  back  to  the  blanKet.  Several  materialg  a~~ 
likelY  to  be  involved  in  these  structures.  However,  th€ 
differential  temperature  across  the  first  wall  and  blanket  wiil 
be  extremely  large  and  so  materials  must  be  chosen  which 
minimise  differential  expansion.  It  is  hoped  that  corTUTlerc].n:·. 
5-9 
I Chapter  Five  Environmental  Aspects 
fusion  reactors will  be  able  to  operate  in  a  'steady state', 
that  is  that  fuel  can  be  supplied  and  impurities  removed  on  a 
continuous  basis.  However,  it seems  more  likely that it wi~l be 
necessary  to operate  reactors  in  a  'pulsed'  mode,  wiih  tuel  burn 
takin~ place  for  only  some  seconds  or minutes  at  a  time,  the 
temperature  then  bein~ reduced,  impurities  removed  and  new  fuel 
inserted,  before  brin~in~ the  reactor  back  up  to  power.  In  this 
pulsed  mode,  first wall  metal  fati~ue will  be  extreme  and 
clearly this will  have  a  further  limitin~ effect  on  the  choice 
of materials. 
The  first wall  and  blanket  structural materials will also  have 
to  possess  ~ood properties  oe  conduction  eo~ heat  and  neutron 
flux  in order  to  facilitate  removal  of  heat  for electricitv 
~eneration and  irradiation of  the  lithium blanket.  A  further 
problem arises  throu~h the  forms  of  transmutation which 
different structural materials  under~o through  neutron 
bombardment.  For  instance  althou~h copper  may  be  a  useful 
material  for  certain  structural  ~urposes.  under  neutron 
bombardment  it is  converted  to  nickel  which  reduces  its thermal 
and  electrical  conductivit~;  in  other cases,  structural  stren~th 
is  impaired. 
TRANSMUTATIONS  IN  CERTAIN  MATERIALS  INVOLVE  THE  PRODUCTION  OF 
LONG-LIVED  RADIOACTIVE  ISOTOPES.  THIS  IS  ONLY  ONE  CONSIDERATION 
AMONG  MANY  WITH  RESPECT  TO  THE  CHOICE  OF  MATERIALS  FROM  WHICH  TO 
CONSTRUCT  THE  FIRST  WALL  AND  BLANKET  OF  A  COMMERCIAL  FUSION 
REACTOR.  At  present  e~fort  amon~st  fusion  design  teams  is  to 
obtain  a  wall  and  blanket  design  that will  possess  an  acceptable 
life under  the  strin~ent conditions  of  commercial  reactor 
operation.  The  Starfire project  estimated  that  a  six  ~ear wall 
life will  be  achievable  on  the  assumption  that  steady-state 
ODeration  is  achieved.  Under  conditions  of  pulsed  operation, 
assumed  by  the  DEMO  project  team.  the  objective  is  to  achieve  a 
two  year  first wall  life. 
A  number  of  studies  have  been  carried out  into  the  possible 
residual  radioactivity  in  fusion  reactor structural materials 
and  their decay  profiles.  Two  sets  of  such  profiles  are 
illustrated  in  Fi~ure 5.1.  In  practice  these  profiles will  depend 
on  the  particular neutron  spectrum  and  flux  and  on  the  duration 
of  exposure.  Furthermore,  many  of  the  problematic  isotopes 
result  from  the  irradiation of  impurities  in  the  structural 
materials  which  are difficult or  impossible  to  remove  or  reduce 
below  certain  levels  (10}.  The  UK  National  Radiolo~ical 
Protection  Board  (NRPB)  recently  completed  a  study  into  the 
radiolo~ical aspects  of  the  mana~ement of  fusion  reactor solid 
waste,  focusin~ on  a  selection of stainless steels  and  vanadium 
alloys  that  mi~ht  be  used  as  basic  first wall  and  blanket 
structural materials  (11). 
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Upon  removal  from  the  reactor.  all the materials  looked at  b~ 
the  NRPB  would  be  classified  as  'hich  level waste',  that is thev 
would  be  heat  ~eneratin~ and  require storins in  conditions 
involvin~ active  coolin~.  They  noted  that althouch it ia 
difticul~ to  be  precise about  when  waste  is  no  lonser to  be 
considered  heat  generatinc (ie when  it chances  trom  hish  level 
to  intermediate  level waste),  after tive  ~ears all the steels, 
but  not  the  vanadium  allovs,  would  have  a  heat output ot more 
than  one  kilowatt  per  ton.  However,  even  atter a  hundred  ~ears 
none  of  the materials  would  yet  have  achieved  the  low  level 
waste  cate~or~. 
THE  UK  NATIONAL  RADIOLOGICAL  PROTECTION  BOARD  HAS  STUDIED  FIVE 
ALTERNATIVE  FIRST  WALL  AND  BLANKET  STRUCTURAL  MATERIALS  AND 
CONCLUDED  THAT  ALL  WOULD  STILL  BE  CLASSIFIED  AS  INTERMADIATE 
LEVEL  WAST!  100  YEARS  AFTER  REMOVAL  FROM  THE  REACTOR.  THE  EEC 
FUNDING  APPLICATION  (P.20)  ON  THE  OTHER  HAND  WRITES  SIMPLY  OF 
"THE  NON  EXISTENCE  OF  IMPORTANT  LONG  TERM  (>lOOA)  POTENTIAL 
HAZARDS".  IT  ALSO  ASSUMES  (P.A3)  THAT  SHALLOW  BURIAL  WILL  BE 
ACCEPTABLE. 
'  The  NRPB  considered  ~he possibility of  recyclins materials 
rather  than  disposal.  Whilst  this  would  have  clear  advanta~es 
in  the first instance  in  reducins  the  volume  of waste  there 
would  be  an  inevitable  penalt~ in  terms  ot workforce  exposure  to 
radioactivity  and  eventuallY materials  would  need  to  be  disposed 
ot  and  these  final materials  will  probably  contain  hi~her 
concentrations  of  lon~-lived radionuclides  (12).  (The  !EC 
fundin~ application  (p.l9)  took  a  ~articular!~ uncritical  view 
of  this  possibility).  Thou~ht  amon~st fusion  desisn  teams  is 
certainlY  ~oin~ into  achievin~ a  material  choice  that will 
result  in  the  possibility of  recyclin~ all,reactor elements 
within  100  years  (13)  and  the  Startire project  looked  towards 
the  possibility of  recyclin~ the  reactor shield  and  all 
materials  outside  this within  50  years. 
However,  it has  been  necessary  for  the  purposes  ot  the Starfire 
and  DEMO  projec~s  to  make  some  assumption  about  the materials 
that  mi~ht be  employed  in reactor construction.  It has  be~n 
noted  that  there  is  no  indication  that  vanadium  alloys  CQUld  be 
made  available  on  the  scale  necessary  to  supply  basic  structural 
material  for  a  major  fusion  pro~ramme  (14)  and  neither ot  the 
two  commercial  reactor studies  have  proposed  their use.  An 
investi~ation of  a  wide  variety ot materials  for  possible  use  in 
limiter construction  as  part  of  the Startire project  revea~ed 
only  four  which  would  be  capable ot  withstandin~ adeQLa~eJ~  ~he 
stress conditions  assumed  to  be  confronted  bY  this  component: 
this  leaves little room  for  trade-off with  respect  to  the 
minimisation  of  problems  arising  from  activation.  For  the  bulk 
ot  the Starfire reactor structure,  austenitic stainless steel 
was  chosen. 
More  complex  structural  choices  were  made  in  ~he  DEMO  ~~~~~. 
Two  blanket  options  were  proposed,  one  involvin~ a  liquid  and 
the other  a  solid  lithium  br~eder.  The  first wall  tileb  ~h  the 
liquid  br~eder case  are  proposed  to  be  made  of  ~raphite  ?~.:ed 
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with  silicon-carbide/pyrolic  carbon  combination.  No  assessment 
of  the  activation profile of  this material  was  made.  For  the 
sold  breeder  case.  tungsten  wall  tiles.  attached  bacK  to  a 
copper  alloy  substrate  lined  with  nickel  alloy  (Inconel} 
coolant  tubes  is  ~roposed.  The  DEMO  study  ~roup concluded  that 
from  the  point  of  view  of  activation.  copper  and  tungsten  are 
acceptable materials  (althou~h this  is  not  entirely 
corroborated  by  the  NRPB  (15)).  However.  activation of  Inconel 
results  in  the  presence  of  lon~-lived cobalt  and  nickel 
radio-isotopes.  Nevertheless.  it was  concluded  that:  'Although 
the  choice  of  Inconel  is unsatisfactory  from  activation 
considerations  it has  been  selected  for  this  desi~n because  of 
its  good  thermal  and  mechanical  properties  at  elevated 
temperatures.'  (16) 
The  DEMO  text  continues:  'It is  believed  that  on  the  20  year 
timescale  for  DEMO  the  pro~ramme for  the  development  of  low-
activation  materials  will  have  produced  a  suitable material  from 
all  points  of  view.'  This  view  has  been  expressed  in  the  EEC 
funding  a~plication  (p.8)  and.  indeed.  in  papers  dealing with  the 
development  of  fusion  reactor design.  Whilst  it is clearly 
probable  that  systematic  study  of materials  is  likely to  reveal 
more  appropriate  alloys  from  all  points  of  view  for  the 
construction  of  fusion  reactors.  nevertheless.  without  reasonable 
knowledge  of  the  actual  working  conditions  of  the  first wall  and 
blanket  beyond  tener~y breakeven',  it could  equall~ be 
conjectured  that  the  ran~e of  materials  which  will  eventually 
prove  to  be  workable  is  extremely  restricted,  allowin~ little 
oDtion  for  choice  with  respect  to  activation  parameters.  There 
is  no  real  rationale  for  optimism. 
5.4.2  Solid  Waste  Management 
It  must  be  clear  from  the  fore~oin~  anal~sis that  an  individual 
commercial  fusicn  reactor  and  beyond  that  a  programme  of  fusion 
power  stations will  genei•ate  very  substantial  amounts  of  solid 
radioactive waste.  It is  clearly difficult at  this  stage  to  know 
just  how  much  this will  come  to.  The  ESECOM  study  (Table  6. 
Holdren  at  al,  OD  cit)  looked  at  a  ran~e of eight  reactor  types 
amon~st which  solid  radioactive waste  varied  over  plant  lifetime 
by  a  factor  of  six.  The  Starfire project  estimated  an  annual 
dischar~e of first wall  and  blanket  structural materials  alone  of 
75  metric  tone.  THE  NRPB  STUDY  ESTIMATED  FOR  A  FUSION  POWER 
PROGRAMME  TO  MEET  TOTAL  UK  ELECTRICITY  DEMAND  AT  CURRENT  LEVELS 
AN  ANNUAL  ARISING  OF  SOLID  WASTE,  ASSUMING  THE  USE  OF  STEEL,  OF 
10,000  TONS  (IN  THE  REGION  OF  1,250  CUBIC  METRES).  THIS  COMPARES 
WITH  ESTIMATED  TOTAL  UK  HIGH  AND  INTERMEDIATE  LEVEL  RADIOACTIVE 
WASTE  ARISING,  SINCE  THE  BEGINNING  FROM  ALL  SOURCES  TO  THE  YEAR 
2000  (IE  OVER  FORTY  YEARS)  OF  16a,ooo  TONS  (NRPB  'Livin~ with 
Radioactivity'). 
Some  consideration  has  ~one into  at  least  the  problem  of 
re~lacin~ first  wall  and  blanket  structures  on  a  regular basis. 
It is  clear that  if  they  do  materialise.  commercial  fusion 
~ower stations will  involve  ver~ substantial  production  and 
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processin~ facilities.  Efficient  remote  handling  equipment 
will  need  to  o~erate such  as  to  be  able  to  replace  reactor 
parts  and  especially first  wall  and  blanket  on  a  time  scale 
which  does  not  reduce  operation  time  to  an  unacceptable  level. 
Whilst  the  reactor hall would  contain  radiation  levels  that 
would  exclude  workers  during  operation,  for  24  hours  after 
shutdown  and  at  all  times  when  internal  reactor components  are 
being  replaced  (the  EEC  funding  a~plication (p.l9)  dismisses 
this  problem).  a  further  substantial  part  of  the  tacilit~­
termed  the  'hot cell'  - would  also  be  semi-permanent!~ closed  to 
human  access.  According  to  the  Starfire study,  the  hot  cell 
would  contain  the  following  activities: 
blanket  disposal; 
solid waste  pacKaging: 
holdup  treatment  of  non-tritiated wastes; 
remote  maintenance  of  activated  components: 
decontamination  of  non-activated  components  for  re-use; 
emer~ency tritium cleanup: 
wet  and  dry  stora~e of  activated  components. 
As  is  currently  the  case  with  nuclear  facilities,  it is generallY 
assumed  that  a  case  bY  case  decision will  be  made  with  respect  to 
the  di3posal  route  for  various  radioactive materials  and 
components  but  it has  been  conjectured  that  the  bulK  hi~h level 
waste  arising  from  first  wall  and  blanKet  replacement  will  be 
stored  in  ponds  on  site until  decommissioning  (17).  It must'be 
stressed  at  this  point  that  there  is  as  yet  practically  no 
experience  of  decommissioning  commercial  nuclear facilities  of 
any  kil1d.  THE  DECOMMISSIONING  OF  FUSION  FACILITIES,  WITH  THEIR 
MORE  COMPLICATED  REACTOR  ARRANGEMENT  AND  HOT  CELL  COMPLEX  AND 
ABOVE  ALL  THEIR  VERY  SUBSTANTIAL  INVENTORY  OF  HIGH  LEVEL  WASTE, 
PRESENTS  AN  AS  YET  UNASSESSABLE  SITUATION  (18).  The  fact  that 
this  may  be  less  problematic  than  the  decommissionin~ of  a 
com~arablY sized  fast  breede~ fission  station  is  no  consolation. 
The  NRPB  re~ort  analysed  the  options  for  final  disposal  of  the 
solid wastes  arising  onl~  from  first  wall  and  blanKet  replacement 
and  concluded  that  none  o~ the  materials  they  looKed  at  would  be 
suitable  for  shallow  burial  but  would  require either deep 
~eolo~ical or deep  ocean  burial.  GIVEN  CURRENT  PROBLEMS  IN 
FINDING  SUFFICIENT  DISPOSAL  SITES  FOR  THE  RELATIVELY  SMALL 
QUANTITIES  OF  INTERMEDIATE  LEVEL  WASTE  FROM  EXISTING  FISSION 
POWER  FACILITIES,  IT  IS  DIFFICULT  TO  ENVISAGE  WHERE  THE  MASSIVE 
RADIOACTIVE  ARISINGS  FROM  A  MAJOR  FUSION  ECONOMY  WOULD  BE  HOUSED. 
In  addition.  the  safe  transportation of  these  wastes  presents  a 
further  problem  of  great  ma~nitude. 
Reactor  Accident  Scenarios 
Although  some  thou~ht  nas  been  given  in  recent  fusion  reactor 
desi~n studies  to  avoidin~ obvious  sources  of  major  accident 
associated  with  the  reactor  and  related  plant,  few  structured 
attempts  have  been  made  to  analyse  possible  major  accident 
scena~ios.  NeverthAless,  some  analysis  is available  from  which 
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a  sketch  of  possible  accidents  can  be  drawn.  Whilst  there is 
little knowledge  of  the  burning  characteristics of  plasma within 
a  tokamak,  it is  generall~ contended  that  the  low  material  and 
ener~~  inventor~ of  the  plasma  excludes  the  possibilitV for  an 
explosive  accident  ori~inatin~ in  the vessel  (19).  A  plasma 
disruption  or  'dump'  can  certainl~ result  in  the  meltin~ or 
vapourisation  of  a  small  portion  of  the  first wall  if 
sufficiently  focussed,  as  is  demonstrated  b¥  events  in  existin~ 
reactors  (20)  and  a  further  disruption  event  has  led  on  one 
occasion  in  the  120  ton  JET  reactor vessel  bein~ impulsivel¥ 
lifted one  centimetre  into  the  air.  with  consequent  distortion 
of'  the  vessel. 
Major  energ~ forces  are.  however.  clustered  around  the outside 
of  the  reactor  and  acciden~s initiated  b¥  failures  here  could 
lead  to  a  sequence  of  events  (21).  A  localised  ener~~ dump  in 
the  current  drivin~ the  ma~nets or  a  breach  in  the  cr¥o~enic 
system  servin~ the  magnets  could  generate missiles  disruptinz 
0ther  systems  in  proximitY  to  the  reactor.  even  if an  actual 
breach  of  the  reactor  shield  itself were  unlikel~.  A  loss  of 
coolant  accident  is  possible  and  this  could,  as  discussed  in 
the  previous  subsection,  release  considerable quantities  of 
tritium  into  the  containment.  It would  also  expose  the  wall 
structures  to  the  effects  of  uncontrolled  radioactive 
after-heating  (to  guard  against  which  the Starfire reactor 
has  been  designed  with  a  dual  cooling  system).  The 
after-heatin6  in  a  fusion  reactor  is  not,  however,  as  severe  as 
in  a  fission  reactor.  so  that  a  'melt-down'  is  unlikely  to 
~assess  the  same  immediate  consequences  at  these  reactors.  Such 
an  event,  pa~ticularly if associated  with  a  ~lasma disruption, 
could  nevertheless  destroy  the  reactor  interior and  if 
associ~ted further  with  a  vessel  disruption,  would  contribute 
~i~nlficantly to  a  'maximum  accident  scenario'. 
THE  GREATEST  HA~ARD  LIES  IN  THE  USE  OF  LITHIUM.  ALTHOUGH  THE 
PROPOSAL  TO  USE  LITHIUM  AS  A  REACTOR  COOLANT  HAS  BEEN  SET  ASIDE 
IN  MORE  RECENT  DESIGNS,  IF  EVENTUALLY  LIQUID  LITHIUM  IS  USED  AS 
COOLANT  OR  BREEDER  THEN  A  MAJO~ HAZARD  REMAINS.  IF  THIS  MATERIAL 
IS  EXPOSED  TO  WATEF  COOLANT  OR  THROUGH  A  BREACH  OF  THE  REACTOR 
VESSEL  TO  AIR  OR  OTHER  SUBSTANCES  WITH  WHICH  IT  WILL  REACT,  IT 
WILL  BURN  WITH  AN  INTENSE  HEAT,  INITIATING  FURTHER  ACCIDENT 
EVENTS  AND  ITSELF  RELEASING  THE  TRITIUM  CONTAINED  IN  THE  BLANKET. 
IF  SUCH  A  SEQUENCE  IS  ASSOCIATED  WITH  A  BREACH  IN  THE 
CONTAINMENT,  THEN  A  CHEMICAL  FIRE  WHICU  RELEASES  A  SIGNIFICANT 
PROPORTION  OF  THE  RADIOACTIVE  INVENTORY  TO  THE  ATMOSPHERE.  ON  A 
SCALE  SIMILAR  TO  THAT  AT  CHERNOBYL.  CAN  BE  ENVISAGgo.  THE  LITHIUM 
BLANKET  IS  PROGRESSIVELY  BURNED  OUT,  VOLATILIZING  FIRST  WALL 
MATERIALS  WITH  THEIR  RADIOACTIVE  INVENTORY  AND  DISPERSING  THIS 
TOGETHER  WITH  THE  BLANKET  TRITIUM  INVENTORY  (22). 
It  was  po~~ted out  at  the  outset  of  this  subsection  that  the 
~roblem of  ~adioactivity overshadows  all other  ~otential hazard 
and  environmental  problems  arisin~ from  a  fusion  reactor or 
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Drogramme  of  fusion  power.  An  attempt  has  been  made  above. 
wherever  adequate  information  is  available  to  present 
quantitative  estimates  of  amounts  of  radioactive materials  that 
might  be  contained  in  a  reactor or  pro~ramme and  the  potential 
eor  their  bein~ released  into  the  human  environment.  This 
subsection  analyses  the  possible  radiological  effects of  these 
releases  on  three  categories  of  people:  operators  at  the  plant. 
the  general  public  livin~ in  the  vicinity  of  the  plant  or  in  the 
course  of  a  radioactive  plume  emer~ing from  a  plant  accident.  and 
finallY.  the  population  as  a  whole. 
5.5.1  Radiation  Hazards:  Conceptual  Issues 
First  it is  useful  to  say  something  conceptually  about  the 
problem  of  radiation.  Nuclear  radiation  is  generally held  to 
'~eaken  human  resistance  to  disease  and  more  specifically is  known 
to  te  a  direct  cause  of  ~~netic malrunction  and  cancer.  Much 
research  has  been  carried  out  particularly with  respect  to  the 
last  of  these  and  international  radiation  standards  are  related 
to  the  probability of  cancer  developing  as  a  consequence  of 
irradiation.  We  are  constantly  subjected  to  a  bacKground 
radiation  of  which,  on  average  in  the  UK.  some  13  per  cent  is  a 
conse":n.:ence  of  l'"luman  activity:  medical  applicattons.  fallout  from 
~uclear bomb  testa,  occupational  exposure  and  discharges  from 
''~cLear  installations. 
Alt~ough natural  back~round radiation  is  substantiallY greater 
thgn  ~he  arti~icial radiation  to  which  the  average  citizen  is 
subjected.  any  increase  in  radiation  as  a  consequence  of  human 
~ctivity is  expected  to  bring  with  it  an  increase  in  the  numbers 
Hho  will  die  of  cancer:  there  is  no  experimental  evidence  to 
indicate  that  no  matter  how  small  a  dose  of  radiation.  there  is 
not  3ome  rtsk  of  cancer  involved.  This  is  the  basic  assumption 
upon  which  international  radiation  standards  operate.  Any 
intervention  known  or  likely  to  increase  radiation  exposure  of 
people  is  therefore  to  be  kept  'as  low  as  reasonablY  achievable' 
(known  as  the  ALARA  princi~le). 
Analyses  of  the  impact  of  radiation  on  people,  predominantly 
1erived  from  the  consequences  of  the  atomic  bombs  at  Hiroshima 
and  Nagasaki,  have  led  to  the  adoption  of  limits,  beyond  which 
radiation  workers  and  the  ~eneral public  should  net  be  exposed. 
Based  upon  this  internationallY  reco~nised work.  the  UK  NRPB 
considered  that  it would  be  unacceptable  for  radiation workers  to 
have  a  chance  ~reater than  1  in  2000  per year of  developin~ 
cancer  or  for  a  member  of  the  ~eneral public  to  have  a  chance  of 
less  than  1  in  100,000.  Earlier analysis  sug~ested that  this 
would  mean  tha~  radiation  workers  should  not  be  subjected  to  a 
jcse  of  more  than  50  mSv  (mili-Sieverts)  per  year  and  that  no 
member  of  rne  general  publlc  should  be  subjected  to  a  dose  of 
more  than  1  mSv  per  ~ear  (Atom  1988  p2/J).  This  has  been  the 
desi~n basis  for  nuclear  facilities  until  now.  However.  new 
evidence  has  arisen  out  of  an  updat1.ng  of  analysis  of  the 
Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki  survivors,  that  is  leading  to  a  revision 
of  the  dose  limits.  If  the  chances  of  contracting cancer  are  to 
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be  maintained  as  be~ore,  it is  now  estimated  that  radiation 
workers  should  not  be  subjected  to  more  than  15  mSv  per  ~ear and 
no  members  of  the  ~eneral public  should  be  subjected  to  more  than 
0.5  mSv  per year.  IN  GENERAL  THIS  REANALYSIS  IS  CONCLUDING  THAT 
A  GIVEN  LEVEL  OF  RADIATION  DOSE  IS  SIGNIFICANTLY  MORE  LIKELY  TO 
INDUCE  CANCER  THAN  HAD  HITHERTO  BEEN  THOUGHT  AND  THE  UK  NRPB  IS 
DOWN-REVISING  ITS  MAXIMUM  DOSE  LIMITS  FOR  RADIATION  WORKERS  AND 
THE  GENERAL  PUBLIC. 
FinallY  in  this  discussion  of  the  conceptual  issues  relatin~ to 
radiation it is  necessary  to  relate  the  doses  received  b¥  people 
to  the  amounts  of  radioactivity  given  off  bY  radioactive 
~ubstances.  Each  radioactive  substance  possesses  a  distinct 
pattern  of  radiation which  includes  a  constant  rate of  decay  and 
a  spectrum of  forms  o~ radiation.  This  is given  a  general 
measure,  ex~ressed in  'Curies'  (althou~h these  are  bein~ 
re~laced  bY  a  new  measure.  termed  'Bequerels').  Two  sets of 
problems  arise  in  attempting  to  relate radiation  to  doses 
(3equerels  to  Sieverts). 
Firstly,  radioactive  isotopes  and  the  many  chemical  combinations 
into  which  they  enter  do  not  merely  possess  a  general  impact  on 
the  human  body,  but  affect  dif~erent organs  and  areas  of  the 
body  in  very  different  ways.  For  instance  radioactive  strontium 
migrates  into  bone  structures  and  is  a  potential  cause  of 
leukemia  whilst  radioactive  iodine  mi~rates  to  the  thYroid 
gland.  causin~ thyroid  cancer.  The  ran~e  o~  ~ossible effects of 
the  very  large  variety of  ~adioactive isotopes  is  there~ore 
difficult  to  ~eneralise and  in  many  cases  not  well  known. 
Secondly,  there  are  many  routes  which  radioactive  substances  can 
take  from  ~heir point  of  release  to  the  human  subject:  these 
include  .3imple  dispersion  via  air- or water  - substantiallY 
3.ffected  oy  weather  and  hYdraulic  conditions  - to  complex 
biological  ~ability and  con~entration chains.  Although 
quantitativ~ models  have  been  devised  and  are  a~plied to 
estimate  the  dispersion  o~ radioactive  subs~ances from  source 
and  the  levels  and  effect3  of  these  on  human  subjects  alon~ 
their  ~ath,  it  is  ~enerallY recognised  ~hat  these  are  no  more 
~han aids  to  the  '~rofessional  judgement  and  commonsense'  of 
those  working  in  the  field  (22). 
5.5.2  Radiation  Hazards  of  Fusion  Power:  Tritium 
Turning  now  to  the  Dotential  radiolo~ical  ~mpact of  fusion  powe~ 
facilities,  we  look  first  at  problems  associated with  the 
tri~ium fuel.  Tritium  possess  a  radioactivity of  10,000,000 
curies  (1.0  x  107  Ci)  per  ~ram.  Gaseous  tritium does  not  easily 
enter- the  human  organism,  although  it presents  a  problem  of  lun~ 
irradiation  ~hen breathed  in  with  air.  Combined  with  oxygen  to 
form  tritiated water,  tritium is  25,000  time  more  lethal, 
enterin•  the  body  through  ingestion  or  through  the  skin  and 
mi•rating  to  all  Qarts  of  the  body.  However,  it passes  through 
on  avera"e  in  ~en  days  (known  as  its  'biological  half'  lite'). 
Ten  curies  of  tr-itiated  water  - one  hundredth  of'  a  gram  - is 
likely  to  cause  earl~ death  in  about  50  per  cent  of  a  typical 
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population  (23):  tritium containment  is  thus  extremely 
important. 
In  subsection  a  above  it was  pointed  out  that  no  assess~ent has 
yet  been  made  of  possible worker  exposure  to  tritium inside  a 
fusion  power  plant.  There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  ~iven the 
facility with  which  the  ~as  mi~rates  through  structural 
materials.  and  the  relatively  large  tritium  inventor~ that  such 
plants  will  possess,  that  very  stringent  measures  will  need  to 
be  applied  to  keep  to  an  acceptable  level  the  amount  of  free 
tritium  ~as  in  the  plant  buildin~s. 
Assumptions  have  also  been  made  with  respect  to  the  routine 
release of  tritium  from  a  fusion  plant.  In  the  case of Starfire 
this  is  assumed  to  be  no  more  than  5,000  Ci  per year.  However, 
if  the  same  ratio of  tritium release  to  inventory  as  is 
demonstrated  by  the  Pickering  CANDU  plant  were  to  occur at  the 
Starfire plant,  then  this  would  sum  to  4,700  Ci  ~er day  (Hancox 
and  Redpath  pU).  A  number  of  estimates  have  been  made  of  the 
maximum  impact  on  members  of  the  public  from  regular  tritium 
releases  from  a  fusion  power  plant,  based  upon  a  series of 
different  assumptions.  The  results,  normalised  to  a  daily 
release  of  100  Ci,  ran~e from  a  low  of  16.8  usv  (micro-Sieverts  = 
thousandths  of  a  milli-Sievert)  (2U),  to  780  uSv  (25).  The  first 
cf  these  fi~ures represents  about  one  and  a  half  times  current 
average  back~round radiation  exposure  from  weapons  test  fallout; 
!he  latter figure  is  over  one  and  a  half  times  the  new 
recommended  maximum  dose  for  members  of  the  public  and  is clearly 
unacceDtable  according  to  that  standard.  Hcwever.  it must  be 
st~essed at  this  ~oint that  THE  AVAILABLE  LITERATURE  CURRENTLY 
ADDRESSES  ITSELF  TO  RELEASE  LIMITS  TO  BE  ACHIEVED.  AND  THERE  IS 
LITTLE  REAL  KNOWLEDGE  OF  WHETHER  THESE  WILL  ACTUALLY  BE 
ACHIEVABLE  IN  OPERATIONAL  FUSION  STATIONS. 
5. 5. 3  Radiation  Hazards  of  Fusion  Power:  Activation  Products 
Analysing  the  potential  impact  of  routine  releases  of  activation 
9roducts  resultin~ from  reactor wall  and  surrounding  atmospheric 
irradiation is altogether  more  problematic  because  the  choice  and 
mix  o~ materials  is  unclear  and  because  the  range  oe  activation 
products  resultin~ from  an~ one  of  these  choices  is  ~reat.  It 
has  been  ~enerallY contended  that  the  absence  of  verv  lon~-lived 
actinides  (radioactive  isotopes  of  heavy  atoms).  associated with 
fission  reactors.  reduces  the  radiological  risk.  Whilst  in 
principle  this  is  correct,  the  activation  products  from  a  fusion 
reactor  nevertheless  present  a  complex  lon~ term  handlin~ and 
storage  problem.  This  is  severely  underplayed  in  the  EEC  fundin~ 
~DPlication (p.8). 
Some  study  of  ~otential routine  releases  of  activation  products 
made  up  of  air  from  the  plant  buildin~s.  corrosion  products  from 
blanket  and  reacto~  ~oolant  and  storage  tank  leakage  has  been 
carried  out  for  the  Starfire  oroject  (26)  and  it has  been 
concluded  that,  under  a  ran~e of  assumptions,  the  collective 
dose  fo~ the  oopulation  within  an  80  kilometre  radius  of  the 
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~lant will  be  rou~hlY equal  to  that  associated with  tritium 
releases.  There  are  no  estimates  of  workforce  ex~osure to 
activation  ~roducts. 
The  bulk  of  radiation  from  activation will  be  tied  up  with  the 
reactor structures.  In  the  first  instance,  as  already  re~erred 
~o  in  subsection  4  above,  removal  and  on-site  stora~e  o~  ~irst 
wall  and  blanket  sections  and  also of  other  irradiated 
equi~ment which  might  need  replacement,  will  require  remote 
handlin~  ~rocedures to  ensure  complete  isolation  from  the  plant 
worKforce.  As  yet  there  is  no  more  than  a  conceptual  outline 
of  how  this  mi~ht be  achieved  and  hence  no  way  to  assess  the 
~ossible radiation  hazards  to  which  these  procedures  might 
subject  the  workforce.  Nor  has  any  analysis  been  carried out 
into  the  methods  and  associated  radiation  hazards  which 
decommissionin~ and  mass  solid waste  transportation might 
involve. 
The  NRPB  study  did.  however.  carry  out  a  detailed  analysis  for 
six  possible  structural materials  cf  the  potential  radiation 
hazard  from  various  ty~es of  waste  dis~osal site  (27).  These 
included  shallow  burial  in  either  simple  or  en~ineered 
(concrete  lined)  trench,  deep  geological  dis~osal or  dee~ ocean 
disposal.  Despite  the  leek  of  actinides  in  the  wastes  under 
consideration.  they still concluded  that  significant  leachin~ 
of  radioactive  isotopes  into  the  ground  water  system  could 
occur  before  their  radioactivity  had  sufficiently subsided. 
Furthermore,  accidents.  involving  boreholes  penetrating  the 
~aste or  excavation  for  building  foundations  takin~  ~lace, 
followin~  a  one  hundred  year  period  of  surveillance,  could  lead 
to  short  term  fata~ities.  In  the  case  of  dee~  ~eological 
burial,  they  concluded  that  leaching  was  unlikely ever  to  be  a 
p~oblem  bu~  that  boreholes  could  conceivably  lead  to  fatalities. 
Onl¥  ir.  the  case  of  deep  ocean  burial  did  they  cons~der both 
nydrological  problems  and  disturbance  due  to  human  activity  in 
the  future  to  pr-esent  no  Droolem.  The  NRPB  did  not  comment  on 
the  problem  of  finding  sufficient sites  to  store  the  amounts  of 
solid  ~vaate  ~hich  they  envi~a~ed  ~risin~  throu~h a  major  fission 
power- pro~ram.me. 
IN  THEIR  STUDY  OF  SOLID  WASTE  MANAGEMENT  FOR  ~USION REACTORS, 
THE  UK  NRPB  CONCLUDED  THAT  ONLY  DEEP  OCEAN  DISPOSAL  WOULD 
PRESENT  AN  ACCEPTABLY  LOW  HAZARD. 
A  further  potential  hazard  arising  from  activation,  that  has  been 
hi~hlighted by  a  number  of  studies  - includin~ the  ESECOM  study 
(Holdren  et  al,  o~ cit.  p42),  is  that  of  carbon  1~.  However,  the 
ma~nitude of  this  problem  is  currently little understood, 
althou~h 1t  is  ~enerally  rcco~nised that  ~his could  be  amon~st 
the  most  significant  sources  of  ~adiation to  the  general  public 
from  fusion  plants. 
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5. 5. u  Radiation  Hazards  of  Fusion  Power:  Major  Accidents 
As  noted  in  subsection  U  above,  little investigation  has  yet 
been  carried  out  into  t~pes of  accident  that  might  arise  in  a 
fusion  power  plant  and  the  e~fects which  these  mi~ht have.  One 
attempt  has  been  made  by  the  Swedish  nuclear  research  centre,  on 
the  simple  assumption  that  the  whole  tritium  inventor~ of  a 
fusion  station,  taken  as  U  K~ and  dispersed  in  the  form  of 
tritiated water,  to  assess  the  radiation effects  on  the 
surroundin~ population  (28).  If  the  release were  up  a  100  metre 
stack,  this  mi~ht be  restricted  to  a  maximum  dose  of  a8  mSv: 
however,  released  at  20  metres  hei~ht,  under  moderately  stable 
weather  conditions,  the  maximum  dose  could  be  as  hi~h as  5,000 
mSv. 
The  study  went  on  to  analyse  possible effects  to  an 
actual  Dopulation  assumin~ that  the  fusion  ~lant were  located 
at  Barseback  (site of  an  existin~ nuclear  power  station)  in 
southern  Sweden  about  25  Km  from  Copenhagen.  This  indicated 
that  no  more  than  ten  people  would  obtain  exposure  over  300  mSv 
of  which  two  would  obtain  exposure  over  500  mSv.  Accordin~ to 
this  scenario  there  would  be  no  early deaths  but  four  late 
canc~rs could  be  expected.  It was  stressed,  however,  that 
the  study  was  preliminary  and  'should  not  be  taken  too 
3eciously'.  Furt:her!Tiore,  no  consideration  was  given  to 
activation' isotopes  that  would  in  all  probability  be  associated 
with  any  mej~r accident  that  would  release  this  quantity of 
tritium. 
Kazimi  and  Sawdye  (29)  did  focus  upon  the  consequences  of  a  major 
release  of  activation  Droducts,  followin~ from  the  volatilization 
of  30  ~er cent  of  a  reactor wall  throu~h  a  lithium fire  and 
associated  with  a  containment  breach.  (The  EEC  funding 
SDPlication  (p.20)  denies  the  poasibilit~ of  such  an  accident 
scenario.)  They  noted  that  even  if 10  K~ of  tritium were  involved 
that  this  ·,.;ould  not  be  a  si.:nificant  factor  relative  to  the 
radiation effects  of  the  released  activation  products.  The  study 
did  not  attempt  to  estimate  actual  radiation  doses  in  the 
vicinity of  the  plant.  nor  the  rate of early deaths  and  late 
cancers  that  such  an  accident  mizht  induce,  but  compared  the 
accident  with  the  consequences  of  a  maximum  accident  in  a  li~ht 
water  fission  reactor.  Whilst  the  results  are  sensitive to  the 
particular materials  from  which  the  reactor  is  built,  on  those 
assumed  in  this  study  (two  alternative materials  were  looked  at) 
it waa  concluded  that  THE  RADIOLOGICAL  CONSEQUENCES  FROM  SUCH  AN 
ASSUMED  MAXIMUM  RELEASE  FROM  A  FUSION  REACTOR  ARE  SUBSTANTIALLY 
LESS  THAN  THOSE  THAT  WOULD  RESULT  FROM  A  WORST  LIGHT  WATER 
REACTOR  ACCIDENT.  As  light  water  fission  reactors  are  not  the 
only  alternative  to  satisfyin~ a  given  energy  need,  this  resu~t 
is  not  i~ itself Darticularly  helpful. 
The  ESECOM  3tudy  (Table  3,  Holdren  et  al.  op  cit)  also  made  great 
DlB.Y  of  'the  SllJ;~erior  characteristics  of  f•lsion  over  fast  breeder 
reactors  under  ac~ident comnditions.  However,  that  study 
approached  the  issue  from  another  angle.  For  each  of  the  eight 
f'qsion  reactcr  tyoee  looked  at,  the  study  ~enerated estimates  of 
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the  amount  of activation  products  in  the  ~irst wall  and  other 
structures  which  would  need  to  be  volatilised  and  dispersed  in 
order  to  ~enerate off-site early deaths  or severe  ~round 
contamination.  It found  that with  certain materials only  a  very 
small  percenta~e (less  than  5~)  of first wa1l  material dispersed 
under  accident  conditions  would  be  su~ficient to  cause earlv 
deaths,  and  even  smaller  amounts  (one  tenth of  a  percent)  could 
reeult  in extensive  ~round contamination. 
5.6  A  FRAMEWORK  FOR  ASSESSMENT 
This  ~nalysis has  attempted  to accomplish  various  tasks.  A 
brief outline of  existin~ favoured  fusion  technolo~iea has  been 
provided,  tosether with  conceptual  issues relatins to these. 
Attempts  which  have  so  far  been  made  to  define  and  analvse  the 
safety and  environmental  implications of  these  favoured 
technolo~ies have  then  been  outlined.  FinallY  some  of  the moat 
important  ~onclusions reached  bY  these  analyses  have  been 
hi~hli~hted and  some  further  implications  drawn.  It remains  to 
describe  the difficulties encountered  in  any  attempt  at this 
time  to  present  any  balanced  assessment  of safety and 
environmental  aspects  of  tusion  power  and  to  recommend  ways  in 
which  the  situation could  be  improved. 
There  is clearly  an  inherent difficulty in  assassins the  safet~ 
and  environmental  aspects  of  a  technolo~y as  ~et only partiallY 
developed.  In  one  analo~y it was  said  that  attemptinc  anv 
broader assessment  of  a  future  fusion  economy  is  like  expectin~ 
analysts  in  ~he first  decade  ot  this  century to  make  an 
assessment  of  commercial  aviation  in  the  1980s  based  on  the 
technolo~y of  their  a~e.  However,  ~iven the potential  severe 
safety  and  environmental  problema  that  could  emer~e from  fusion 
~ower  develo~ment and  ~iven the  possibility for  takinc decisions 
now  that  would  lead  to  very different  enercy  tutures,  it is vital 
tha~  a  hi~tllV structured  process  of  assessment  be  desicned  and 
implemented  at  this  s~a~e. 
Certainly,  the  safety  and  environmental  assessments  which  have  so 
far  been  carried out  into fusion  power  are very  ~racmentary and 
focus  onlY  on  a  va~y narrow  ranee  of  issues  - albeit  those  that 
immediately  appear  as  oroblematic.  A  f.ur~her problem with 
existinc material  is that it has  been  larcely  p~oduced by  the 
research  or~aniaations which  are  carryin~ out  the research  into 
fusion  power  and  which  necessarily  have  a  commitment  to its 
success  and  hence  a  possible propensity  to  exac~erate its 
potential  advanta~es and  de-emphasise  its potential  tailin~s.  The 
restriction of  co.nDarisons  of  fusion  power with  alternative 
enercy  technolo~ies to  other nuclear options  and  particularlY 
fast  breeder reactors  is  particularly problematic  in  that it 
~ives  the  impression  of  alternatives  in  a  situation where  these 
are  in  ~ractice similar  in  many  respects,  whereas  the  full  ran~e 
of  possible  future  technoloc!es  is  in  practice considerablY 
wider. 
There  are  two  areas  in  which  the  analysis  o~ future  ener~y 
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o~tions,  includin~ fusion  power,  in  terms  of  safet~ and 
environmental  effects  can  be  ~reatlY improved.  Firstly. 
proposals  can  be  subjected  to  a  comprehensive  probability 
analysis  of  accident  possibilities and  their consequences.  The 
Starfire project  involved  a  major  attempt  to  put  to~ether a 
comprehensive  scheme  which  could  be  subjected  to  an  a11-round 
economic,  safety and  environmental  analysis  and  the  US  ESECOM 
committee  has  initiated  a  more  comprehensive  approach  to  sa~ety, 
environmental  and  economic  evaluation of  fusion  technolo~ies. 
By  comparison,  the  work  so  tar published  on  the  DEMO  reactor is 
too  fra~mentary to  be  of  much  use  for  such  anal~sis and  no 
structure exists  to  look  into  the wider  implications of  fusion 
technolo~ies.  It was  nevertheless  commented  on  by  the Starfire 
team  that  the  primary  emphasis  of  that  study  had  been  on 
deterministic  (en~ineerin~} rather  than  probabilistic methods 
'due  mainly  to  the  timin~ involved'  (30).  There  was 
nevertheless  an  awareness  of  the  need  to  focus  in future  on 
~eneratin~ sufficient data  to  perform detailed probabilistic 
riak  assessment. 
Reference  has  been  made  above  to  a  few  attempts  that  have  been 
made  and  which  indicate  linea which  can  be  developed.  WE  WOULD 
RECOMMEND  THAT  ANY  FURTHER  FUNDING  OF  FUSION  POWER  TECHNOLOGIES 
SHOULD  SE  ACCOMPANIED  BY  FUNDING  FOR  STRUCTURED  PROBABILISTIC 
RISK  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  TECHNOLOGIES  UNDER  SCRUTINY.  These  studies 
should  be  provided  wi~h a  ~eneral structure that  is applicable  to 
a  variety  o~  non  fusion  technolo~ies that  could  potentially 
substitute  in  terms  of  ~uture  ener~y provision.  THEY  NEED  TO  BE 
CARRIED  OUT  BY  ORGANISATIONS  WHICH  DO  NOT  THEMSELVES  HAVE  A 
DIRECT  INTEREST  IN  THE  SUCCESS  OF  THE  PROJECT;  on  the  other hand 
the  results  of  these studies  should  be  incorporated  into  the 
overall  structure of  research  into  fusion  and  more  ~enerally into 
future  ener~y  technolo~y development  and  research.  Or~anisations 
carryin~ cut  the  basic  scientific  and  en~ineerin~ research  must 
have  as  part of  their remit  an  obli~ation to  supply  the risk 
assessors  with  adequate  information. 
The  situation with  re~ard to  environmental  analysis  is in  some 
ways  similar.  No  meanin~tul environmental  analysis  of  a 
potential fusion  power  station or  pro~ramme has yet  been 
carried out.  ClearlY  insufficient information  has  so  far  been 
made  available.  Nevertheless,  it is already quite clear that 
fission  plant  and  the  related materials,  transport  and  waste 
disposal  arran~ements,  will  have  very extensive  and  serious 
environmental  impacts  should  this  technolo~y become  widely 
applied. 
It is  necessary  to  develop  a  ~eneric framework  tor the  analysis 
of  the  environmental  (includin~ socio-economic)  impacts  of  fusion 
power  now.  The  UK  Department  oe  the  Environment's  'best 
practicable  environmental  option'  (BPEO)  frameworK  has  indicated 
the  ~ossibilities at  least  for  nuclear waste  disposal  options  and 
~he  NRPB  was  able  to  make  ~ood use  of  this  in  their assessment  of 
problema  associated  with  fusion  solid waste  disposal.  However, 
:··\  ... l 
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the  required  framework  must  extend  tnrou~hout the  ener~y supply  :~ 
system  to  include  ~he power  stations  and  reactors  and  it must  be 
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capable of  cross-comparison  not  merel~ between  nuclear options 
but  also  non  nuclear options  - in  particular  eners~ efticiency 
and  renewable  eners~ cptions. 
As  in  the  case of  risK  assessment,  THE  ENVIRONMENTAL  ASSESSMENT 
OF  FUSION  WITH  ALTERNATIVE  ENERGY  OPTIONS  MUST  BE  CARRIED  OUT  BY 
ORGANISATIONS  INDEPENDENT  OF  THE  RESEARCH  ORGANISATIONS 
DEVELOPING  THE  VARIOUS  TECHNOLOGIES.  But  it must  be  able both  to 
require sufficient  information  from  the research orsanisations 
and  its output  must  be  included  in  the  formulation  and 
development  of  the  research  pro~ramme itself.  It is only  throuch 
an  iterative development  of scientific and  ensineerinc research 
into  a  ran~e of  ener~v  technolo~ies that  includes  fusion 
technolo~ies in  s  way  that  is  full~  inte~rated with  probabilistic 
risk analysis  and  environmental  assessment  that  we  can  even  hope 
to  acproach  a  sociall~ optimal  solution  to what  are clearly soins 
to  be  difficult years  in  the  future  with  respect  to  our 
satisfyins our  ener~~ needs  adequately. 
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CHAPTER  SIX.  THE  ECONOMICS  OF  FUSION  AS  A  RESOURCE. 
6.1  Approachins  Fusion  Economics. 
6.1.1  Introduction. 
Can  the  economic•  ot  ~uaion be  rea11aticall~ discussed  when  it 
has  not yet  emer~ed trom  the Research  and  Development  atace' 
It is  uae~u~ to becin  bV  •~inc what  we  mean  when  we  apeak  o~ the 
"Economics  ot Pueion  Power".  There are  two  parta to the anawer. 
(1)  To  place  the  tuaion potential in the wider context 
ot  the  economv.  Thia  involves  cona1derat1on ot 
lone  term pricea,  capital marketa,  reaourcea,  etc. 
(2)  To  conatruct  a  micro-economic  model  tor  tuaion 
costa.  Thia  ia  specific to tuaion  and  taken tar 
anouch  lead•  to  number  crunchinc results. 
The  second  m~ not  be  poeeible.  but it it ia,  it ia  on1~ in  th~ 
wider  context  (1).  not  leaat because it aeta  the  aaaumptions  on 
which  the micro  stud~ ia made.  For  a  lone  term technolocv  theae 
assumption•  are more  important  than  the  number•  that emerce. 
Indeed  unleaa  the  assumption•  are made  clear,  the reaulta mav  be 
mialeadinc.  and  even  11ke1V  to  damace  the  Communit~'• health! 
While  the  Commission  haa  done  nothinc about  part  (1),  it haa 
produced.  •omewhat  perver•elv.  hichl~ numerate  •tatement• about 
part  (2).  WHATEVER  THE  COMPULSION  THAT  LIES  BEHIND  SUCH  AN 
EXERCISE  WE  RECOMMEND  THAT  THE  FIRST  CONSIDERATION  SHOULD  BB 
GIVEN  TO  THE  BASIC  QUESTIONS  OF  BOW  THE  TOPIC  OP  FUSION  ECONOMICS 
SHOULD  BE  APPROACHED. 
The  expert  ~roup qualitv their numerate  atatamenta  b~ •avinca 
"The  reeulta  ~iven above  indicate that  ~eneratinc 
cost  must  be  used with  •xtreme  caution  aa  a 
measure  o~ ruture worth  ot  ~uaion power  trom  D-T 
driven  Tokamak•···  It ia too ear1v  to  draw  hard 
and  fast  conclusion•  trom  this  an&l¥•1•." 
The~ add  that it will  not  be  before  the  conclusion ot  NET  (around 
2010}  that  enou~h ia  known  about  ~uaion co•ta.  Klaewhere  thcv 
have  caat  doubt  on  that,  becau••  MBT  will  dit~er in important 
reapecta  troa the  Demonatrat1on  plan~. 
6.1.2 uncertainty. 
THE  KEY  ISSUE  IS  BOW  TO  DEAL  WITH  UNCERTAINTY.  APPRAISAL  OF 
LONG-TERM  INVESTMENT  PROJECTS  IN  THE  PUBLIC  SECTOR  CONFRONT  THIS 
PROBLEM  BY  THE  USE  OF  DIFFERENT  METHODS.  RISK  CAN  BE  DEFINED  IN 
TERMS  OF  STATISTICAL  PROBABILITY.  UNCERTAINTY  CANNOT  BB  DEFINED 
THIS  WAY  AND  THE  USE  OF  SCENARIOS  IS  NECESSARY,  WITH 
PROBABILITIES  BEING  ATTACHED  TO  THE  RESULTS. 
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1.  Settins ot the discount  rate 
2.  The  use  ot Cost/Benefit  ana~vsia 
3.  Seneitivitiea 
u.  Scenarios 
5.  Probabilities 
The  diacount  rate ia the moat  speci~ic and  moat  sensitive.  Coat 
benetit analvaie  hae  the advantace  that it vielda onlv  a  eincle 
~icure,  and  thia dependa  on  the aaeumptions  used,  the  qu~it~ ot 
the data,  the diacount rate,  and  the  time  apan. 
Sene1tiv1t1ea  are  uaed  to  ahow  a  variation around  a  ~~mited 
number ot valuea.  The¥  reduce  the uncertaintv.  In inveataent 
apprai•ale,  the discount rate will  be  the moat  important  economd~ 
variable. 
A  probabilitv di•tribution around  a  value providea  '~udaement'  aa 
to  how  cood  the value ia.  Thev  aeaiat  the deciaion-m&ker, 
especiallv with  lone  term projecta.  It can  help decieion-makera 
it the  expert  commit•  himsel~ in  thia wav  (which  he  mav  not want 
to  do  because it he  ia  proven  to  be  varv wronc.  it damaeea  not 
onlv his  health  but  hie  reputation!). 
The  usa  o~ auch  methods  tor  ot~eettinc uncert&intv depends  verv 
much  on  the  qualitv ot  the data.  I~ it ie  known  that  the data ia 
'aott'  then it ia more  ~portant to  uae  aen~ivitiea etc.  and 
eschew  ainsle dimensional  aolutiona.  Untortunatel~ the 
Commission'•  research  compound•  both errore.  The  data ie a 
mixture with  much  more  'so~t'  than  'hard'  data.  To  use  the 
Oor~man metaphor  thi•  produce•  a  "rabbit-and-horae stew 
situation."  Some  reeo~nition  o~ the  ~i•k• involved,  in  re~~~nc 
upon  auch  data,  and  the application  o~ recocniaed  technique•  ~or 
r~ducin~ uncertaint~.  ahould  have  recommended  them•elvea  to  the 
Commi•aion'•  re•earch•r•  ae  essential. 
DECISION-MAKERS,  CONFRONTED  WITH  LONG-TERM  PROJECTS  OUGHT  NOT  TO 
ACCEPT  SINGLE  FIGURE  SOLUTIONS.  (To  do  so  make•  them  hoetace  to 
the expert  who  not  onl~ aeta  the  aesumptiona,  but  attachea  va~uee 
to  th•m).  A  RANGE  OF  OPTIONS  SHOULD  BE  REGARDED  AS  A  ~RIMAL WAY 
OF  OVERCOMING  THIS  PROBLEM. 
The  application ot  the  above  expedient• to  ~rapple w~th the 
e~rect• ot  lone  term  technolociea  ia weakest  in the appraiaa1  o~ 
environmental  tactora.  Our  economic  ·~•tem is ill-matched  ~or 
apprai•al ot ecolocical evatem.,  both  in  t~e and  in peroeptiona 
ot what  risk•  a~beinc run.  Diecount  ratea  can  hard1V  be 
applied,  and  oo•t  benefit analv•1•  become•  arbitrar.v in •ettinc 
ticuree  to  environmental  damace.  What  then  can  be  done~ 
Firstlv,  a  structu~e tor appraieal  o~ environmental  impacte  is 
needed  to undertake  periodic riak  ana1~aea to aasesa  the  problem. 
Secondlv.  a  method  o~ ••••••ment  which  allow•  tor dialocue 
between  specialist and  non-apecia1i•t ie  needed.  A  non-numerate 
matrix which  simply  put• •core• asain•t issues ia  a  poe•ible 
atartin~ point.  Thirdl~.  statement•  that  ~uaion baa  onl¥  a 
•moderate•  env1ronmenta1  impact  (the Codmiaeion'• description) 
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ou~ht to  be  eschewed.  Such  normative  statements are perhap• 
meant  to  be  reaeaurin~.  but  the~ in  tact onlv arouae  concern  that 
complacanc~ rules  where  science oucht  to prevail. 
6.2  Macro  Economic  Factors. 
6.2.1  Ener~ Markets. 
The  standard scenario  ~or the introduction of  fuaion  poaita that 
bV  the  time it has  arrived at  the market,  the market will be 
reaav to receive it.  This  juxtapoaition of  aupplv and  d ..  and.  it 
is eucceated,  will  come  about  aa  a  reault of  a  combination of 
market  tactora operatinc in the mdddle  of  the next  centurvs 
a)  Fo••il  ~uela  as  the  m~n enercv  aupplv will be 
tailinc,  and  tuaion rather than other technolociea 
will  be  preferred as  the replacement  tor them. 
b)  The  demand  tor  ener~ will  be  rieinc. 
c)  The  share ot the market  taken  bV  electricitv will 
be  risin~. 
d)  There  wi1l  be  riainc market  prices  which  will 
orin~ benetita  to  in~eetore  in  tueion,  autticient 
to  justi~¥ the  hi~h capital coat. 
Such  a  •cen•rio ta  poaaible.  ••  indeed  are  those  which  pose  a  low 
~rowth in  aner~ demano  and  lower prices.  It is hardlV possible 
to  aav  which will  ~revailr  nence  the  need  tor a  ran~a o~ 
scenarios.  As  we  don't  know  wnich  is the moat  probable.  we  can 
replace  that  Queation with  another,  "Which  would  be  preferab1e9" 
This  ia  a  QU~sticn  t~at can  be  debated  and  answered  accordinc  to 
what  ~oint  Q~ view  ia held.  We  contribute  onl~ the  followinca 
(1)  A  riein~ re~l coat.  matched  b~ a  rise in  demand  and  prices 
may  otter  return~ to  juatit~ the  inveetment  in tusion.  or  an~ 
other  technolo~v.  But  riainc real  enerc~ prices are not 
desirable  ~or two  reasons; 
(a)  Hishsr  enerCY  price•  are  &aeociated  with 
detlationarv  ettecte  and  reduced national  income. 
This  wsa  domonat~ated  in  the  aecond  h&lt  o~ the 
1970'•  tollowinc  the ri•o in world oil prices. 
(b)  Hich  pric~• and  rate• ot  return  involve  a  creater 
decree  of  ~isk  ~or the  enercv sector ae  a  whole it 
the~ are  hicher  than  the rate  of  return  in  the 
eeono~  ~enerallv,  and/or  thev  rise more  rapidlv 
than  the  n&tiona1  income.  THE  RISK  BEING  THAT 
THERE  WILL  BE  OVER-INVESTMENT  IN  THE  ENERGY 
SECTOR,  YOLLOWED  BY  A  LOSS  OF  DEMAND,  LEAVING 
SURPLUS  CAPACITY  IN  THE  SYST~M.  THE  CONSUMER 
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MEETS  THE  COST.  EXAMPLES  OF  THIS  HAPPENING  IN  THE 
RECENT  PAST  ARE  ELECTRICITY  SUPPLY  IN  THE  UK  AND 
FRANCE. 
(2)  The  capital  requirement  tor  a  aicni~icant tuaion  auppl~ w111 
be  hish.  Hicher  than  anvthinc vet  contemplated.  Ten  reactora, 
would  cost  (in  1985  price•)  accordinc  to our aensivititv 
analvsia,  not  leas  than  *50 billion  (aee ticure S.2,  Paae S-3). 
To  thia muat  be  added  an  equivalent  sum  to brine tuaion  to the 
market  as  a  reliable and  competitive  technolocv.  Prom where wil1 
this  capit~ requirement  be  met~  The  mone~ market,  or the 
covernment{a)?  Ir the market  1• open  and  competitive then it 
will  be  rea1iaed  throuch  transfer  o~ the  technolocv  ~rom the 
public  to  the private aector.  This is the aasumption  in the OTA 
report,  and it ia con•iatent with  the  economic  development  in tbe 
Eurooean  Community.  It 1• not  eaav  to enviaace  how  the technolocv 
transfer will  happen~  It  ~apital rationinc  {which  mav  be more 
aevere  than  today  because ot the risinc level ot inveatment  in 
comp~ex  technolo~iea),  prealudea  auch  a  transfer throuch  the 
market  mechanism.  then will  the public sector tund  the crowth ot 
fusion?  Thi•  is  the moat  likel~ option,  unleaa  a  hich rate  o~ 
return  can  be  secured  tor tuaion,  to  compensate  tor the verv  lone 
time  ~eriod before  the  benefits  show  in the  power utilitiea 
bottom  line  (a  pro~ramme ot  ten  reactors with  a  new  one  atarted 
ava~y two  years  reQuires  40  veara  ie.  bv  the  ~ear• 2090  (aee 
fi~ure S.2.  pe.~$ B-3).  There  mav  be  political resistance to  the 
public  sector takinc all the riak.  Conaumere  perc~~ve that in a 
mixed  public/private enterpriae electricitv supplv structure, 
that  tnev  mav  be  pavinc hicher prices  (or  taxea)  inatead ot 
enjoyin~ the  benetita  o~ homoceneoua  •upply industrv where  pricea 
ar~ transparent  and  contain  no  hidden  subeidV. 
(3)  Capital markats  have  moved  to  a  creater decree  o~ freedom  in 
the  laat decade,  eapeciallv with the  crowth  ot international 
capital  move~enta.  It tollowa  that  the marcir.al cost ot capital. 
will  move  closer  to  the real discount rate.  In  such  a  context 
hi~h coat  lone  term projects will find  capital verv competitive. 
Thia  is  alrea~ happeninc.  The  affect  on  anercv investment  could 
lead  to major chanee•  in perception•  o~ profit and  loae.  Sm~ler 
sc&le  technolo~iea with  tront capital loadinc,  and returninc 
benefit• within  a  short  time,  could  look more  attractive both  to 
the  inveator  an~ the  consumer.  Thia  poaaible trend ia a1readV 
obaervable  in  the  USA. 
The  situation tor  lone  term  RD&D  will not  be  unaffected  bV  the 
~han~inc economic  environment.  BiatoricalLv.  RO&D  expenditures 
on  nuclear power.  t1se1on  and  tuaion  have  been  decided at the 
political level.  But  the abilitv to enter competitive  market~ is 
likel~ to  be  taken  into account  in  the future. 
6.2.2  The  Role  of  Puaion  in  Ener~~ Suppl~. 
The  view  taken  for  fusion  supply  in  the  Commission's 
documentation  is that it will  procreesivelv subetitute fission 
and  coal  in  alectricity  ~eneration.  The  basis ot  ~ubatitution 
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will depend  upon  the  movement  ot  tue~ prices which will reach  a 
•breakeven'  point  which  can  be  defined as  the point  w~en the coat 
o~ uranium  and  coal  ia  h~ch enouch  to ottaet the hicher capital 
costa ot tuaion.  We  have  already drawn  attention to the  -~~ecte 
on  national  income  ot increasea.in the  rea~ cost ot enercv.  In 
the  micro-economic  anal~sis later we  ahow  the  improbabil~it~ o~ 
such  a  scenario  in  terms ot relative  tue~ pricea.  A third 
element  ot this scenario is the •ize and  chance  in shape  o~ the 
electric1t~ market  itaelt. 
Aa  a  primar~ fuel,  fusion  is not  directl~ acceaeible to the 
consumer  in  the manner ot fossil  tuels or aome  renewable 
technolociee.  It will onlv increase ita ahare of the market  bV 
aubatitutinc tor other tuela.  The  larceat sector,  bv  uae,  1e 
•pace heatins.  and  the  second ia tran•port.  Electricitv'• share 
ot  the  latter 1•  ver~ small,  and  in  the  termer the price 
difterenti&l  ia  a  conaiderable barrier to penetration. 
Nevertheless  the  Community  view  ie  that  the electricitv d ..  and 
will  ~row more  rapidl~ than  that ot  an~ other fuel.  Thev  have 
estimated  a  40%  ~rowth over  a  15  vear period to the end  o~ the 
centur~  (CEC  1986b),  and  an  increase in market  •hare  b~  3-4~. 
This  ~rowth ia  to  take  place verv  lar~elv in  the residential and 
tertiarv aector.  Thia  pre•umea  a  larce increaae in the 
1 spec1~1c'  u•e  ot  elactricit~ (appliancea,  electronic equipment, 
electric motor•.  etc.).  Expeatation  o~ a  larce increaae within  a 
ain~le aector ot  demand  muat  be  open  to  the risk that,  ••  a 
forecast.  it will  ~ail,  leadins to  aurplue  capacit¥  and  hicher 
';)rices. 
Projected  £s  a  lon~  term  demand,  thia  ~vpe ot torecaat would  mean 
that  b:,r  the  lllid(11o  of  the  next  centur~  ftlect:r.-icit~ uould  be 
ra1.ein~ its  '=.&rk.~t  ~tharo  !'rom  aomethinc like 15" to  ~0~.  It i.e 
in  •ucn  a  c~nte~t that  ~uaion is eeen  to be  a  market  entrant. 
ON  THE  SUPPLY  SIDi!,  ALMOST  ALL  OP'  THE  INCREASED  GENER~.TION  COMES 
FROM  NUCLEAR  FISSION  - PROM  275TWh  IN  1983  TO  792TWh  IN  2000, 
INCREASING  !'TS  SfiAHE  OF  StJPPt.V  'P'ROM  22"  TO  al.3"•  AND  DISPLACING 
COAL  AS  MARKZT  LEADER.  FALLING  PROM  34~ TO  32~  (CEC  1986}. 
OVERALL,  WH!LE  THIS  SCENARIO  IS  POSSIBLE  WE  FINO  IT  IMPLAUSIBLE. 
WE  AGREE  WITH  THB  OTA  REPORT  WHKRE  THEY  ARGUE  CONVINCINGLY  THAT 
AN  INCREASE  IN  THE  DE~AND FOR  ELECTRICITY  DOES  NOT  OP  ITSELP  OPEN 
THE  DOOR  TO  FUSION  TEC~NOLOGY. 
"Economic•  and  acceptab.!.lity  rather  than  total 
d&m&nd  will determine  tha  mix  o~  technolociee  ••• 
Ir  ~uaion  proves  ~nferior to ita competitors.  it 
mav  not  be  ueed  ev~n &t  ver~ hich  demand  levels  ••• 
~hould fusion  te~hnolo~  prove  tavourable,  rapid 
&rowth  in  demand  would  tacilitate  its 
1.ntrodttct1on...  NEV!:RTHELl!SS  DEMAND  ALONE  CANNOT 
TURN  AN  UNATTRACTIVE  TECHNOLOGY  INTO  AN  ATTRACTIVE 
ONE."  (Our  emphaa1e]. 
(OTA  1987) 
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(1)  At  the  •ame  time  as  projectinc the  crowth  o~ electricitv 
demand,  the  Community  anticipate•  a  20~ improvement  in 
etticiencv.  which  will exert  a  downward  preaaure on  demand.  The 
two  projection•  do  not  appear  to be mutua11¥  conaiatent,  except 
in  conditione  o~ hiah  economic  crowth. 
(2)  The  principal competitors in  the heatinc market will remain, 
as  thev are  tod~. oil.  caa  and  coal.  They will remain 
competitive well  into the next  century.  Aasumptiona  about  larse 
price ri•••·  even it they are  taken  to  be  realistic,  cut botb 
way•  beeauae  ~oaail tuela  are the main  aourcea  ot electricity 
a:eneration. 
(3)  The  projected  crowth  o~ nuclear  power  ia unrealiatic. 
A  possible acenario ia baaed  on  the consistent development  o~ 
tiaaion  power  to  be  tollowed  up  by  ~aat reactore,  and  then  b¥ 
tuaion.  A•  technolociea  .  -- the~ have  a  lot in  common.  But  the 
di•placament  ot tiaaion on  economic  srounda  looka  improbable 
unless  its decline  in  ~rowth ia reversed.  The  commit~nt:· to 
tast  reactor  technolo~ haa  become  increaainslv atretched into 
the  lon~er term.  lar~elv aa  a  result  o~ the  alow  down  in the 
therma~ reactor  ~ro~r&mme.  out  alao  beeause  of  problema  with  the 
operation,  &atetv  and  con•truetion coat  o~ taet reaetora,  which 
have  csuaad  th•  aconomica  to deteriorate.  It is  dit~1cult to be 
(:ert.r.in  &bout  tne  ruture  o~ ta•t breeders,  except  that  the¥ are 
unlikell'  to  be  •ii:nit'ic:an  t  until the  mi·cjdle  ot the next  centur)'  -
which  ~akee them  competitive with  tusion.  Aa  thev  have  a 
consider~ble resources  baae,  matchinc  ecenarioa tor  ~aat reactor 
and  tusion  ~ower  tc~ether ia  prob1ematical  on  economic  crounda. 
~hose institutions which  invest  in  tusion  RD&D  are unliklev 
therefore  to  ~avour fast  ~actor proarammea.  In  takinc such  a 
view  they  wi~l.  place  the  eaphaaia  on  the environmental 
aup~riori~~ ot th•  tuaion reactor.  Deciaion-makera will not  ~~nd 
it easd  to a••••• thi•  trade  ot~ w~thout the aid ot  a 
~oph1at1eatad modal.  Overa~l we  share  the view ot  IIASA  and  OTA 
that  fusion  would  not  benefit  bV  beins hurried into the 
market.  The  sacond  ha~t ot  the  next  centurv ia more  like1V  and 
it could  be  later than  that. 
6.2.3 Concluaiona. 
Amid  the  many  uneertaintiea  about  the  economic•  ot fusion.  it 
l  . 
I 
I 
[ 
r 
l 
I 
[. 
&ppeara  that  the  bi~~eat hurdle  that  1 t  Will have  tO  face  Will  be  the  f  .. 
var~ larce investment  requirement.  Costa ot $2-3 billion are  l 
beinc anticipated  eor exp$rimental  reactora.  The  European  and 
American  p~o~r&~es to date  have  coat  more  than  $8  billion and 
world-wide  the  RD&D  costa  oould  be  twice as  much  as  that. 
Before  a  demonst~ation atase  is  reached  in  any  one  prosramme  (ie. 
either  the  A~erlc&n or  the  European,  an  estimated  $20  billion 
will  have  been  apent.  Before  tull~ commercial  plant  ia operatinc 
the  ficure  could  be  $50  billion  (dependins  on  the  number ot 
prototvpe  reactors)  and  not  less  than  $AO  billion.  Will  these 
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sums  ever  be  recovered  in  the  commercial  phaae'1  In our 
anal~t1ca1  stud~ we  aseume  a  ro~altv p~ent ~or the t1r•t ten 
~ears of operation  on  a  10  reactor  procramme,  attar which it 1a 
assumed  that  the  procramme  1• makinc  a  protit.  Thia will  be 
torty yeara  a~ter the  ~!rat station haa  been started and  poaaibl~ 
atter an  expenditure.  in  total,  includinc the  RD&D  atace,  ot  $100 
billion. 
This  capital  burden  rai•••  two  major queationa,  one  pol1t1ca1, 
one  economics 
(1)  Will  industrial aocietiea  be  able and  willinc  ~o 
inveat  in  ~uaion'1 
(2)  What  constrai.nt  wil.l.  euch  hi.ch  inve•tment  costa 
have  on  the  price  o~ electricitv ~n the  tuture'1 
Sefvrtl  d€cJ.•ion--makel  ...  a.newer  the political question  they m~ 
want  tc  h&ve  a  r~sponae to  queation  (2).  Brietlv our view  ia  aa 
i'oll<;.wiS z 
We  cannot  "red:!.~t  the  ma.r~inal coat  o~ tuaion  ceneration,  which 
will  d~termine its  competitiv~nesa in  the market.  But  the coat 
atructure  a•  1 t  r:as  been  presented  to  us  in  the  Commiaaion' a 
documentation  ia  so  heavilv capital  loaded  that we  ••• real 
d1fticu1ties  tor  tusion  in  the  market.  Given  that eap1ta1  costa 
once  e~ont sre  sunk  co•t•,  it ia  the variable or operatinc coat• 
which  will  influence  the  market  p~ic:o at  the marcin. 
Flexibilitv in  re8pondins  to  ~~~Kat condition•  wi~l depand  on  the 
followin~  ~~e~ct~: 
F1rtt  t :t .,  f  •;)n  t1..l t!l  ~ricee.  SECAUSX  JPUSION  l"UEL 
·~:"~S"!'S  ,.:.  RE  './ERV  '...OW1  THERE  WILL  'aE  MO  G~~INS  PROH 
.·~  ~ LLTl'f(l  r~~-~!...  GOST.  T\EJ...ATIVE  \OVAPJ'!'/\GE  FOR  FUSION 
.'.f'.~ST  Q~?TJ:~O  ~OT ON  P'I'.LL.:~  1N  ITS  PUEt.  COSTS,  EUT  ON 
F ISSS  ~'. N  ::H')3.F.  CF'  COAL·  Af!O  FIESIO!'I. 
s.,("!or,dl~',  on  maint~nanct!t  eost~.  T~3ae are  aleo 
r~c~~~ente~ ae  b~in~ eo  low  that  thev  can  onlv 
move  'Jt;·o:..~"rd~  whJ.ch  ~~  1~  wee.k·cn  the  raa.rket 
~oftition ot  ~uaion. 
~hi:r.dl.o~, 
unt'ert.ttirt 
a~~ilabilt~~  o~ plant.  Thi•  1~  tha  m~at 
v~riabl~  or  a11  (we  di2~use  it  in 
Ae  avnilabi~1t~  ralls,  ~~it costa  rh.l'lp't<t.H'  "7). 
riae  Quickly. 
?ou~thlv.  the  economic  e~~iciencv with  which  the 
C·l.tnt  -~:;-.  .,rates.  ie.  the  load  t'actor.  On  this  we 
t~.a·.,.ra  nn  dR.ta.  end  thersf'ore  we  tak~  the 
BJ1L:Ll.$bi1.it.y  f't~ur~a  .-:Jr.  tl"!e  Com.miasion  and  subject 
t~em  to  ~0n~it1vitiea.  This  ~akea  tusion  power 
~~st~  hl~hly volatile. 
To  oe  i1lfLuc~t1a1 in  ~~duein~ tusion  ccat~  the  combined  effect of 
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theae  variable costa  must  aaeume  major  price shitta.  As  we  ahow 
later auch  shifts will certainlv  be  upwards  and  thev  cou1d  be 
~i~nificant.  As  a  proportion ot  tota~ coata,  thev  could  be 
important  in  a  competitive market. 
6.3  Resource  Coats. 
6.3.1  Introduction. 
Yuaion  is  a  tinite enercv  resource.  In order to  ~uati~v 
deve1opment,  the  resource  baae  ahould  be  adequate  to achieve  a 
tlow ot revenuea,  diacoun~d at  the market  rate to ahow  a 
positive value.  Thia  would  include  the coat ot buildinc &11  the 
plant  required for  the  tuel cvcle,  the  diapoa~ ot waate  and 
decommiaaionins.  The  time  horizion  ~or a  positive net  preaent 
value  to  be  realised would  extend  into the  22nd  centurv,  and  the 
reaour~e b&ae  ou~ht to  be  adequate  tor that. 
What  woul~ be  the  limitinc factora?  Use  ot critic&l  path 
anal~ala ml•ht  ehow  tham  to  be  in  one  ot  a  number  ot areaa which 
we  c&n  ·:Jnly  conjecture at  the  IDOment. 
(a)  M~~eri•l•  this  will  depend  on  encineerinc 
trade-ot!a.  aer~llium  in  partieu~ar ia in acarce 
~u~plv (aee  below). 
{b)  Environmental  - the  extraction  o~  lithium  (and 
posaibl~  deuterium  )~ill  involve  environmental 
costa.  Likewiae  the  disposal  ot rele&eea  from 
&'ewer  •tat1.ona. 
( c )  ;,.;,i.sta  diepoea~  an  outline 
v~o~~~• ia  required  to eatimate 
epan  involved will  be  important. 
si~~itican~ costa. 
6.3.2  The  Tritium Fuel  C~cle. 
(a)  Tritium. 
waate  manacement 
thia.  The  t1.•e 
There  will  be 
The  tuaion  reactor has  a  verv  complex  tuel  c~cle.  Tritium  ia 
only  naturall~ available  in  ~inute Quantities,  the  principle~ 
1: ... 
~~~ 
L. 
I 
~ 
' 
. 
r 
l. 
( 
r 
current  source ot tritium is that  made  tor use  in nuclear  bomb 
tri~cera.  Lithi~ hae  to  ~e mined  •nd purified and  the  Lithium 6  l 
isotope  haa  to  be  enriched  (in  DZMO  to  30-SO~.  in  a  Prototvpe 
Commerical  Sized  Reactor  (PCSR-K)  to  90%}  to  enhance  the breedinc 
ratio.  It  h~•  then  to  be  inatalled in  a  breedinc blanket with  a 
neutron  br••d~r tor  oonvereion  into  tritium.  The  tritium haa 
then  to  be  extracted,  purified,  and  atcred  tor injection into the 
rea..: tor. 
Clearl:,r  a  fusion  ;.;>ower  prozramme  would  require  a  la.r~e enouch 
tritium stock  to  Allow  ~or the  fue~1~nc of  new  atationa aa  the¥ 
come  on-line.  We  have  ~ound that  due  to various  con•trainte,  it 
6-8 ' 
Chapter Six  The  Economics  o~ Fuaion.aa  a  Resource  } 
\ 
\ 
is  ver~ hard  to  desi~n a  tusion reactor with  an  adequate breedinc 
ratio.  Variables  such  as  the  breedins sain,  out-ot-reaoto~-time, 
tritium decay  loss  and  the initia1 size ot the tritium inventorv 
will all  e~tect the potentia1 size ot the  prosramme.  Potential 
problema  with  the  fueion  fuel  cvcle  can beet  be  underatood  bV 
comparison  the  PBR  tue1  cvc1e  (see Appendix 1). 
(b)  Lithium Re•erves. 
There  is  no  conaensu•  on  the  extent ot  li~hium reaourcea. 
Pre•entl~.  lithium costa  around  $55/ka.  It ia estimated that 
p~ices will  nave  to riae bV  a  tactor ot three betore adequate 
re•ervea are economicallv recoverable.  Eatimatea ot reaourcea 
vary  between  5  and  71  billion kc  ((Hammond  1976),  (Holdren 1978), 
(Ca.m.eron  1979)). 
!t is al•o hard  to  tind  an~  de~inite tisurea on  the  amount  ot 
lithium  a.  tueion  reactor mia;ht  uae.  Thia  ia  not  aurpriainc,  the 
comQlexitv  ot  the  tuaion  procesa  and  the larce areas ot unknown• 
involved  preclude  any  accurate  eetimatee  o~ resource or financial 
coats.  The  main  areaa ot uncertaintv  that  we  can  identitv are 
t~\e  future  ..:oat  ot  lithium,  the  de&;ree  ot enrichment,  aa  well  aa 
~he ef!icienc¥ and  coat  of  the  enrichment  proceaa.  Once  in the 
re&~~or the  lithium will be  ueed  to breed tritium and  obviouslv 
~he  gffic1enc~ ot  the  tritium cycle has  implications  tor the 
littiium requirement•  ot  a  reactor.  Particularlv,  what  loeaea 
~ill be  involvdd  in  tritium  puri~i~ation and  storace and  how  w111 
the  :~itium b~ out  of  the reactor  (this 1•  important  aa  loaaaa 
-r.!'\ro'l~h  deco.v  4i.~"e  hl~h)?  A ~ceptin~ that  there ie  11 ttle point in 
t:;.  .. yin~ to  ..l.SSi~~tn  too  U1UCh  &CCUr&c:,r  to  an~ f'icurea,  CiVen  the 
1.ave~ ot  un-:  .. tttainty,  the table  b-alow  calculates  an  optimietic 
~nd a  oe~G:imiatic eatimate  o~  th-e  number  of'  re&ctors  that  coulc:t 
{"Je  ~-.l~ Ll ~d  'b¥'  the  known  l:.:..nd-b&.sad  raoource•  ot  11  thium,  civen 
diff~r~~t  's~u~ption• abcut  kev  var!~bles; 
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Table  6.3.2  Eatimatea  of  Lithium Resource  Baee  tor Fusion 
Reactors. 
-----------------------------------------------------············  Variables 
World  Reeerve•  (land) 
(3x  current  price) 
current  price) 
Lithium  6 
enrichment 
level 
Lithium burnt 
durin~ reactor 
lifetime 
Number  of  1.2GW 
reactors 
Pe••1m1tt1c 
5.2 
(IIASA  1977) 
1380 
U'WMAK  I·'S 
310 
Optim1tt1c 
71.3 
(Brandt  1988) 
100 
STARP'IRJ:4 
176.000 
Unitt 
million 
tonne• 
tonne•/ 
1.2GW 
reactor 
----------------------------------------------------------------- (Sptt&Z'S  1985&) 
(Cooke  et al  1985) 
{Cameron  1979) 
(CEC  1987b) 
A  number  ot  QU&11t1cations  need  to  be  made  about  the  ticuree 
derived  above.  Firatl¥.  the  astimatea  Are  derived  limpl~ b~ 
taxin~  th.a  lnoat  optim.iatic  and  pesaimistic  assumptions  trom 
different  reactor deaicn•  and  therefore do  not  repre1ent  anv 
actual  reactor.  It tollowa  therefore,  that  the  two  tiaure• 
r~orea~nt l!mite  on  current  desisna  and  will  probabl~ 
overestimate  or  underestimate  the most  likel~ actual.  ticure·.  It 
~l3o needa  to  be  point@d  out  that  no  account  is  taken  tor other 
'.J~I'!I•  ot  lithium.  P'uaion  reactor•  are ...  sumed  to  be  the onlv 
users  ot  lithium. 
There  ~r~  two  atrikina reault•  in  the  table.  Firstl~.  there is a 
hu~e  ran~e between  optimism  and  pe•aimi•m,  and  ~et both  ticuree 
were  derived  from  the  research  pro~r&mme'a own  data.  The 
optimistic ••timate auaceat  there  could  be  enouch  lithium to 
auppl~  electricit~ to  OECD  countries  on  low  eat1matea  tor the 
¥ear  2000  (IEA  1982)  tor  approximatel~ 3,800 veara.  The 
v•••imistic tiaure •uaceata  that total world  lithium resources 
are  not  enouch  to  tuel  a  tuaion  pro~ramme tor more  than  a  tew 
~eara.  Whatever  the actual depletion retea are,  eomewhere  in 
between  these  two  ticurea  we  have  to accept  that  land-ba•ed 
lithium reeourc••  are  not  sutticient  to  ~uatif~ statement•  that  a 
fusion  reactor  pro~ramme would  be  baaed  on  an  ttpracticall~ 
inexnauetibla  tuel"  (p4,  CEC(87)  302). 
The  only  baaia  ot  euch  claima  ia  on  the  assumption  that  lithium 
can  be  recovered  trom  the  sea where  the  concentration ie 0.17 
~arta per million  b~  wei~ht  (IIASA  1977).  Because  the  oceana  are 
so  t"1 1 1~e.  tt.en  there  are  lar~e lithium reserves  (2UO  billion 
tonnes).  Hawevor.  althou~h  nothin~ is  known  about  lithium 
recover~'·  the  low  concentration ot  lithium means  that  the 
environmental  and  recovery  coste  would  be  larse  and  therefore  we 
take  the  view  that  ~ea-baaed lithium  cannot  be  treated  aa  a 
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resource  under  present  toreaeeable acenarioa. 
It mu•t  also be  conaidered  that lithium ia not  without 
&lternative  uaea.  In  1974,  5  million ks were  produced worldwide 
for  about  a  dozen  ditterent  commercial  applications. 
Lithium-Aluminium allova  are  now  comins into uee tor  aircra~t 
manufacture.  Similarlv.  there mav  be  aicni~icant alternative 
uses  in  the  future it Lithium-Sulphur batteries prove  aucceaatul. 
The  Enercv  Reaeareh  and  Developemnt  Adminiatration  (ERDA) 
observes: 
"planner•  pro~ect 
cara  containins  a 
lithium misht  be 
centur~.  Utilitv 
1000  units  capable 
power  each  - micht 
ot  lithium. •• 
that  20  million urban electric 
total  ot  270  million  kc  ot 
on  the  road  b¥  the  end ot the 
electric atorace  - a  pro~ected 
ot  deliverinc  100  MWhra  ot 
require  about  twice  that amount 
(H&IIIDlond  1976) 
Also,  current  rea~~or de•icn  studies  tend  to  include beryllium aa 
a  nsutron  iH-\>ISedar,  .».nd  tuo~st'«!n wall  tile'a  ( IAEA  1985)  which are 
c:hamselvea  ,iSC&r~e  •nd  ikXpeneiva  resources.  Bervllium· will  be 
needed  in  la~~e Quantitiea  (approx  52  tonnea  in  the  STARFIRB 
b~anket).  It will n••d to  be  reproceseed  to  reduce depletion 
r~tea and  even  allowin~ tor reproces•inc.  THE  IIASA  STUDY  (IIASA 
1. '171)  PREDICTED  1'HAT  P'OR  A  PROGRAMME  OF  100  1GW  FUSION  RB~CTORS 
·~· ;-I~Pl!  WOULD  BE:  ENOUGH  B!RYLLIUM  FOR  1.  A  YEARS!  A  UNIVERSITY  OF 
~I~SGONSIN  S'.fUDY  ON  P'USION  PROGRAMME  RESOURCE  IMPLICATIONS 
(G.&meron  191~)  SHOWS  'l'HAT  FOR  A  300GW  US  REAC'l"OR  ECONOMY,  THE 
~ESOURCt!:S  ('"~?'  BERYLLIUM,  VANADIUM.  AJID  TUNGSTEN  WOULD  OPERATE  AS  A 
8:!VERE  CONSTRAINT  ON  ·rHE  LIP'!TIME  OF  THJ!:  PROGRAMME  UNLESS  MORE 
ABUNDANT  A NO  CHEAPER  MA'rERIALS  WERE  DISCOVERED. 
We  c&n  tind  ver~ little evidence  of  the  appreciation bv  the 
Commission  o~ the aerioua  implications of  materi~a constraint• 
for  a  .fusion  pros;:ramme.  Thia  in our view underlines  the  lack ot 
~  adequate  mana~ement atratecv capabl•  o~ dealinc with critical 
~roblem ar~as,.  The  Technical  Planrinc Activitv Report  (US  DOE 
1987)  develope  an  intere•tins wav  of modellinc the material• 
problem.  In  their overview they  aava 
~THE  ULTIMATE  ECONOMICS  AND  ACCEPTABILXTY  OP 
FUSION  ENERGY,  AS  WITH  MOST  OTHER  ~NERGY SOURCES, 
HILL  DEPEND  TO  A  k~RGE F.XTENT  ON  THK  LIMITATIONS 
OF  MATERIALS  P'OR  THE  VARIOUS  COMPONENTS." 
The  TPA  r~~~rt  e~amine• in detail  the relative importance  and 
potential  1mp4ct  ot each  technical  iaaue.  in  the  licht  o~ the 
overall objective which  ie  to develop  new  or  improved material• 
"that will  enhance  the  economnic  and  enviromental  attractivnesa 
o~ fuslon  aa  an  ener~y source."  From  thia  the  TPA  develope  a 
rua.teris.lR  t:r·Oi:r&mme  !Jtrate.r:l.  ~See Appendix  One  tor t'urther 
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discussion  o~ this  and  historical  backsround  o~ the  US  ~ueion 
pro.-cramme). 
The  coat  ot materials irradiation teat  taci~it¥ ia eatimated at 
t150-S250  million to build.  Work  on  auch  a  tac111tv waa 
abandoned  becauae ot the coat. 
6.l  P'uel  eoata. 
As  di•cuaaad  in 6.3.2.  there ia  a  deal ot  uncertaint~ concernins 
the  possible tuel  coat•.  Adoptins  the methodolocv  uaed  above  o~ 
~akin~ optimiatic  and  peaaimiatic  aaaumptiona  about  reactor 
deai~n and  operation  (and acain isnorinc deuterium co•ta),  we 
darive  the  table  below• 
Table  6.1!  .estimate~ ot  Fuel  Co•t  Element  ot Fusion  Power 
Ele~tricitv Generation. 
--·---G-MW·---~------------------------------------------------- Variables 
Prtce  ot 
n s. t u t' a. l  '  ... i 
Li  6  anrichmenr.t 
Li  tl'": 11Jm  bnrn-·uw 
rat:4!  t':.:1r  1.2<JW 
.r.!' act  ol~ 
Fuel  cost 
P!!fimiatic 
tl65/kre 
90" 
PCSR-E 
1380 
u·WMAK  I 
14.05 
Optimistic 
$55/kr 
30" 
DEMO 
100 
STARP'IRE 
0.112 
Unitt 
tonne• 
mill.  a/kWh 
as~~•••••~•¥•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
curren~ US  pric•  o~  99.9~ producer•  in~ot 
'3)(cur~ent  price ie u•uallv  coneic1ore.ct  necesa~ to make  l.i  t"ium 
:-:~c<!uotion  autt'1c1ent:J.v  protitable to  a~l~w adequate  aupp~. 
~;,.,e  p.a..,.e  t.~£  ~or rei'erence•. 
Some  oroviso8  need  to  be  add•d  to  the  above  table.  P'iratJ.v.  both 
the  opti~istic  ~~d tha  ~ea•imiatia  ti~ures have  some  c~mmon 
~Baumptiona which  ~rr on  the optimistic  aides 
1.  Whilst  account  ie  taken  o~  the  amount  ot natural 
lithium needed  tor •nrichment,  the coata  o~ •ucb  a 
proceaa  ia  auaumed  to  be  ZERO.  In  realit~  the 
coats of  enrichment  mav  do•inate  the  price ot 
lithium  but  there are  •imply  no  ~icurea available 
on  vossiole coat. 
2.  No  account  ia  t•k~n  o~. po~eible 1ithium 1oaaea  in 
the  enrichm•nt  proeeaa.  100%  etficienov  ia 
~s~Jumed. 
3.  The  reactora  are  aaaumed  to  have  an  ava.ilabilit)' 
o~  '75-80X 
a.  It  i0  ~enerall~  ~ccepted  ~h~t the  price  o~ lithium 
h8d  t:">  r•iee  f;.._.r  a.n  a.dflQUil.te  £upplv.  ao  the  current 
~r1ce  1~  u~~~ll¥ aeeumed  to  treb1e.  whereas  we 
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have  assumed  theee ia  adequate  aupplv at current 
prices  in  the optimiatic  ca1cu1at1on. 
Ot  course  the  ticuree  are approximate  and  there mav  be 
incompatabilities  between  the various variables chosen  which  mean 
the  data has  a  pesaimiatic element.  Nevertheless,  it must  be  the 
case  this is inaicniticant  compared  to  the  above mentioned bia• 
in  tavour ot optimism. 
A~ain.  we  muat  point out that the  two  results are within limits 
that are unrealistic,  particular!~ the optimistic one  tor the 
reasons  listed above.  Th.V  show  how  with different and  ~et.  b~ 
themaelve•  realiatic assumptions,  the  tue1  co•t element  o~ the 
coat  per  kWh  can escalate.  Addinc to the  ineacapab1V  hich 
capital coat,  the  reault could  be  to  make  coats even  leas 
at~ractive than  thev misht  otherwiae  be. 
~uel coeta  mav  varv over  a  wide  ranee,  dependinc  on  the 
a•sumptiona  made  about  the  resource  base tor tuaion  power.  It 
the  ~er•iatent biaa  to optimistic  judcementa  1•  allowed tor,  then 
the  effect ot  tuel  resources will  be  an  upwards  preaaure on 
varlble cost•,  and  a  weakeninc ot market  power. 
WE  ri\UST  CONCLl1!>!  THAT  THERE  IS  LITTLE  JUSTIP'ICATIOM  FOR  TREATING 
rU~L  ~OSTS AS  NEGLIGIBLE.  A  LONG-TERM  FUEL  PRICE  MODEL  IS 
RECO~~ENDED TO  GAIN  A  BETTER  UNDERSTANDING  OF  THESE  SENSITIVE 
A~gAs. 
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CHAPTER  SEVEN.  THE  COST  SENSITIVITY  0~ FUSION  POWER. 
7.1  Sensitivities. 
7.1.1  Introduction. 
We  be~in this critique ot  the Commission's  expert  ~roup report 
COM(87)  302  on  the  economics  or  tusion with  a  cenera1  comment  on 
the  method  that is  deplo~ed. 
The  economic  atu~ in  COM(87)  302  produces  apeci~ic coat  ticurea 
(levellised  ~eneration coats diacounted  to  an  unspecified date in 
the  21st  century)  tor the  tenth ot  a  series ot fusion  reactora. 
The  castine is based  on  conceptualised desicns  that  have  emeraed 
trom  within  the  tusion  laboratories.  These  ticurea  have  not  been 
tested.  and  aa  the  authors  themselves  aav,  the~ are  verv 
1.1ncertain  and  a.re  to  be  treated with  caution.  In  actua1  tact 
caution  has  been  thrown  to  the  wind.  TO  DERIVE  SPECIFIC  COSTS 
FOR  ~LECTRICITY GENERATION  FROM  CONCEPTUALISED  DESIGNS,  USING  ANY 
~~UMBER  OP"  UNTESTABLE  ASSUMPTIONS,  IS  THE  TYPE  OP'  P'OR:!CASTING  THAT 
?ELL  :NTO  DISREPUTE  SOME  YEARS  AGO.  AND  OUGHT  NOT  TO  BE  REVIVED, 
LEAST  OF  ALL  rOR  A  TECHNOLOGY  WHERE  UNCERTAINTY  PLAYS  SUCH  A 
"1A.;'·)R  PART  IN  ESTI:iATING  ITS  FUTURE. 
fha  value  of  the  cost  researeh  emanatin~ from  the  Fusion 
~s-:  .. 'lbl1ah:.nents  is  further  undermined  b~ their attempts  to  marr~ 
-~oat  estimates  with  ener~ account  in~.  The  latter ia expressed 
.in  emerit;:;  '/&lues  ( ie.  the  e1ner~ content  of  the materials 
involved  11vid~d by  the  ener~y output).  The  r~ault ia said  to 
?rovicte  a  comparative  baaia  of  the  etticiencv ot  tusion  ae 
~ompared with  tiasion  power  stations.  The  advanta~es claimed tor 
!:his  method  are  -chat  (&)  nit  ia not  influenced  b~ relative waee 
~.nd  ;'rice  chan~ea".  b)  1 t  "ia  a.n  easilY understood  and  convenient 
measure  of  th~ va.1ue  ot  a  project".  Neither of  these  claims  hold 
water"  Understandin~ the  movements  of  ener~ prices  and  coats is 
aGsential  to  the  art  o~ economic  evaluation.  To  a~ that  puttinc 
thf:Hn  to  one  •ide is e8.aier,  mi~ht be  analRoua  to  auspendina  the 
laws  of  ~avit¥ because  thev  complicate our understandina ol  the 
movements  ot  bodies  in  and  out  ot  the earth's  atmosphere.  Aa  ~or 
bein~ more  easily understood,  that  cannot  be  true.  Enercv 
accountin~ has  ~ained no  curr~nc~.  Firatl~.  becauae it ia 
~xtreme.ly di.ttic,Jl  t  to  find  an~ cone is  tent  w~ ot meaaurinc  the 
ener~ content  o~ materials,  and  no  wav  ot meaaurina  the enercv 
content  of  labour.  Secondly,  even it it could  overcome  this 
difficulty the results are  o~ no  value  to economic  ••••••ment. 
The  value ot  a  commodit~ can  onlv  be  determined  in  a  manner 
coneistent with  the  W&V  other commodities  are aaaeaaed.  That  can 
onl~ be  in  t~rma ot  current  or  constant  pricea. 
In  ~rder to  come  to  a  happy  conclusion  on  unit  coats  the expert 
•rou~  then  applv  ener~ accountin~ to  conventional  coat  data.  A 
SHOT  GUN  MARRIAGE  OF  TWO  S~TS OP  DATA,  BOTH  OP  POOR  QUALITY,  AND 
INHERENTLY  INCOMPATIBLE,  IS  HARDLY  GOING  TO  LAST.  WHAT  IT  DOES 
DO  E~FECTIVULY IS  TO  D~ONSTRATE THE  UNIQUE  DETACHMENT  OP  FUSION 
TECHNOLOGY  FROM  WHAT  IS  HAPPENING  IN  THE  WORLD  AROUND  IT.  Thie 
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should  be  seen  a..e  diaturbir  • .t.  Giv.en  the  very  lon~ lead  times  tor 
?usion  technolo~¥.  and  the  uncertainties  that  surround it,  it is 
necessary  tc  bd  exceptional]  y  ·'!t'l..~eftt"1 .  t!"\  a;>plying:  economic  and 
a~c.!..al  critieria to  eval'.l&l:~.nit  j  .s  ."~c.tentit'\1.  It would  have  been 
be~~er to  a~ply  e~~&bllsh~c  n-~thoda  or  3V~luat1on,  tor  then  the 
results would  be  aomparabl~ with  those  of  alternative enersy 
,;:9.ths. 
WE  CONCLUDED  NOTWITHSTANDIN~ OUR  CRITICISMS  OF  THE  METHODS  USED 
T~AT WE  WOULD  "gE  Z'XP!:CTED  BY  STOA  ANt":  THE  lttTROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  TO 
3IV:S:  A  JUDGFMEN'r  CHI  TH-~  FIGURES  OFFERED  TO  THEM  BY  THE 
':::JMMISSIO~;.  Wl:  HAVi.!:  '::'A-'.!-~  ~ .·(.1RE  DONE  A  t1Z:i'!SITIVITY  TEST  IN  ORDER 
.. 0  SF.E  HOW  PI..1D 1JST  TP'"E..  !'  P.~..£ 
Th~  &3sumptio~s  u~~~  b~ the  expert  z~~u;  ~el&te to  three 
conc~;)~ua.l  ,~eai ·..:nd.  1'he  rarere:-''~'P!  Toka.m&k  case  appears  to  be  to 
the  Allieric&n  Star~:c~ atudv.  (l~  p~oJuc~a  ch~ lowest  output 
::-::-at-~}.  1':1i~.  ~-~;:,r)·.;  '.'4i.=~·  ~;iu)  :J....:.n··;'::-tlA!De.k  =~A:<...1  stud~.  are  both 
;;ak.Fcn  1 :J  ... r.e  t:•.H':.  t~1  or  ~  zJ.o..L-J ·lll  to  n-r:r-i.:Al  at  what  is  intended  to 
be  a  a-~ttle·l  dy  ... r!  .>r.tcdl.  The  PC~:R-1~:  ia  :-;.  ~rot~t~pe reactor which 
we  3.:3~'..lll'H:t  •  .  ..,c\...:.~  ·::orr.gat-..:.r.;1  L1  tL:1e  t·::.  th.c;  demonstration  sta~e. 
We  ~ave  thereto~c  t~a~k~~  the  ~0nts of  ~hdse  three reactors,  aa 
heat:  ae  ~.v€:.  ;::·  ..  :  ~r~.:-.u  tc.H  A-·0~.(.  1:0  COM(87)  302.  We  have  subjected 
t:r  .  .-:::,~  to  -~etl.~Ji1:'i·.'it:i.·.s.  --;-_;::,  t~·:o;.~r~::.;.<.:  sE.:~:.:ITl'':.TES  THAT  WE  HAVE 
-~s~o  A?E  iN  \i..i...  '.,.~~:-E~  LESS  ~-.\VCtJRA:::LE,  ~!"!  ·_~::_m··1S  OF  OUTPUT  COSTS 
TO  f'iOSE  ":'P.:E  :;'~ !_.._<.'f  (:HC~i?- 'C•y  <!<...~Jn~  th,U!l  ·,.J--.:.  teat  their 
::·",_;  ..... _;,stneat:2  -!i\~::!i.:.Jt  '.-lf'd.t  '•·H:'  ~_.u  ·,;~  -.;",  :·e  c~•·('c  --~;r;>ttmi..stic 
o.:S~\.!nPti~)r.u.  ~.~~  .!o  LOt:  c] 1-L,,  -;;.~·.':.  c.iH•  aasunl,)tions  are 
.-;;..•r.tra:::..  t.~sr:i:a.:..tf•8  b,..H~AL'.  ~-·  ~.-..-.,  })....,·.  -.  :l<j,d.  neither  th~  time  or  the 
·.L"ta  to  ex:>ic·:·e  a  fu: l  :.~~n  .  .;-3  of  OL~t  l.(.:,r-;  ..  "'\.  hc>·H~~·-;er  ~t  a.re  quite 
.:?.U:'e  that  OUI"  eccno~,~C  ·<~t11,J..,•~;;..t<';fj  .!:.t"\.1  ,'J~.:;.x•·~  l.._~&ll6'•;_t-::;  and  Will  be 
:uur-e  br·o&dl:.;  ~c·-=~  .. · .. .r  .. ble  t;O  -2J1.t.lC't.,  :c:.t)f  aup;;;:·.~- '..l'tili\·ies. 
1:''\t•,:·  ..  ?  .~.t~·:=·~.":"t.P':it::"::·ig  that:  are  th~ 
;·J,.  ..  v:  t.~i·1e  o~ot<.•t:,rpo  Pt:SR··.i!:  to 
7, l. lB. 
( 1)  7)'.{'  ..  :.c ..  :~·-~·  -~c;; -:.3  '-'~  '  r,r.i..·  ·~c--:.t:  ::C\~·-ltjl~l.  bec~use  ~here 
Y"'"'J  r.·  .....  en;;~_n-.:!"·P·.l..n;.·  ,-.,r~.:,:'  ·:  ;_- 1 'l:.'  :.1  -n;P.~P.-:_ca,  ana  there  e.1.•e  no 
--,  -:-:c.\:o:,;"\..?!·l  -~(:  :--::c. .. --~.  :.:  V'·.--'  r,  W<':l:"·e!  t;)  ~e reij;.srded  ae  likely 
·~"'t·.'i  n•.  ,  ·.c.~.·-·  t~.).-;J.  _,~,  --- '  .,  };e  ~~oun<.!  L'·  ~  ~~i·1g  !lhea.d  with 
:..·.c :..''"'··  ·~:-,·,  ,  .. . y  .... -'t  ··'- -•:  ..  !1<1  :..  .  <:.~~~··.:.  t··jifi  ad  an 
' 2  \ 
r'!  t:'\io:· ..  ·~·-·  ~1\.:.."'·L  ·~·-,~·:.."".'-v  ,,•-:ich  ~";hd~  i~a.ll  r-~.l.J.tl.'fe  to  PCSR-E 
11·1  s  r:-·,.J~,~~.!:  ,_.._.;  "'r;-.,;dlr.~e.::  ...  c·.riv-7!r•  h~n-e.fits.  '~h.a  result is 
Ae  s;::·esented  we 
·.H.ven  c.·.s  -&conomi.c 
I 
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aenaitivites  o~ CES,  (Centre  ~or  Ener~~ Studies).  ~ueion 
costa  riae  and  it remain•  as  todav,  at be•t  2-3  times  the 
coat  o~ ita  competitors. 
To  repeat,  we  do  not  claim  the results to  be  central estimates  -
the  uncertainties,  especially on  capital coat  account,  are still 
so  l&r~e that all  ti~ures have  to  be  treated with caution.  What 
ti~ure 7.1  ehowa  is that  subject  to  a  tairl~ conventional  economic 
teat,  the expert  ~roups predictions are not at all convincins. 
They  sive  a  too  aansuine  view ot the  tuture. 
Table  7.1.1  Economic  Sensitivities- Aa•umptiona  (tor tenth ot  a 
series). 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ras.ctor  Li.fetime 
Availability 
Load  P'actor1 
R&D  costa  (approx  to  2010)~ 
Construction  ~ime 
Di scc•Jnt  Ratr 
Clrculatin~ power  losses~ 
Decommissionin~ costs 
COM(87)  302 
25vra. 
6,600Hra 
not  al.lowed  ~or 
not  allowed  ~or 
6  years 
S" 
20" ot capital 
C!:S 
the  aame 
A-5000Hra  band 
65" 
$20bil1ion 
10 veara 
10" 
around  20" 
the  same 
--------·---··-------------c;;.;o;;..;:;;;a....;t;._,.  __________________  _ 
1  The  Load  factor  is  not  ~1ven  b~ the expert  ~roup.  It is 
possible  that  they  re~ard it (incorrectly  )  as  equal  to 
the  availability. 
2  These  are  not  included  by  the  expert  ~roup  (incorrectl~). 
Presumably  they  are  re~arded as  an  external  bene~it,  a 
~ocia~ ccst  or  a  hidden  subaidv,  accordinc  to which  view 
1..!i  taken. 
'!he  hi~heat rea..l  ra.te  o~ .r:'eturn  on  Community  R&D  projects 
'-'~ill  bo  <:lose  to  25"  (short  term).  ( P'or  lone  term larce 
scale  p~ojects  th~  ran~e is  5-15%).  We  choose  10%  as  a 
median  fia;ure. 
We  can  find  no  allowance  ~o~ tnis in tne expert  croups 
data.  We  assume  that  they  are ueinc cross output  tisurea. 
Givan  the  exceptionallv  hi~h power  coneumption  on  site 
this  amounts  to  a  major distortion. 
·----------~-----------------------------------------------------
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F13ur~ 7J  hsia"'  Po~.Je.- Co$1",  tv  U:_~ l'1.J- 2L~r  C~.~  ..  ~~ 
Ct.c..., .. f  .. fi.,e  Effee.t of  CE5  SU\Sit,  •.  ;tc~ On (OM (87) 302  D._t~. 
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En~ineerin~ Senaitivitea. 
From  tic 8  it will  be  seen  that we  aaaume  that  PCSR-B  operate• at 
the  hi~h end ot the  ranee,  and  the  tenth ot the aerie• at the 
optimum  ~evela  ~iven in the report ot  the expert croup. 
All  these  paramatera  are  presented aa  linear.  Thia 1• a 
aimplitication.  Relative to the  coarse  qualit~ ot the model  •• a 
whole  thia doea  not  amount  to  a  aerioua diatortion. 
7.1.4 Generation  Coate. 
Two  ••t• of reaulta are civen.  The  difference• are not creat 
(the~ arise from different annual  capital charcea ie.  rat••  o~ 
amortisation)  and  th~ are  ahown  in the table below. 
Table  7.1.~A Generation coeta  (milla/kWh). 
----------------------------------------------------------------- STARFIRB  PCSR-B  MARS  PWR  COAL 
10th  reactor  1  onl¥ 10th reactor  (France)  (Ital¥) 
Capital  charce  30.4U-25.9  70.6  10  6.9 
0p.  & Maint.  4.66-3.3  15.0  3.31-4.0  2.8 
o.oo-o.4  o.z  0.36-0.5  5  24.6 
Total  35.15-29.2  86.4  46.2~-40.7  19  34.4 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
It is not  clear  how  these  ~icurea are  calculated.  The  moat 
important  is  the capital coat.  The  encineerinc baaed 
~eneitivitiea have  the  e~tect of  redueinc these  coete 
dramatic~ll~ and  unirormlv durinc series production.  The  coat 
tor  the  10th of  &  seriea  (Mare  and  Star~ire) are siven  above.  and 
thev  are  tr~atad •• lif•time ceneration  eoate  and  comparable with 
tho•e  ~or  PWRe  or coal  ~eneratj.on.  The  latter therefore  occup~ 
the  competitlvo  price area  ~ainet which  ~usion has  to  compete. 
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TABLE  7.1.4-B  Generatin"  Cos'ts.  f'o~  f\u:J1cn  t.:'}wer  (m.il.la/kWh) 
------------------·----------=~--------·~------------------------ PC~  ~--..;:;K:__ ~TAR  YI  RS ___  __;.K~4...;.:R:.:.:S=----..::.PW..-...,;:.R~--C::.;O:=.~Ar.~;L.__ 
Ca;;.ital  costs  "'10,6  10-34 
66.4  2.L;t  ____  _  ~0.7  19-53 
1  Diacounte~  (  -._.o~:  . 1 :  . . 3  't 1  5~. 8 
2  ~ona"::ructic!'l  t92  f  :~  ;  9iJ  • 9 
3  Ci:-cul&tin~ 
loesas  (20%)  -;:  ... o  2~  - 118.6 
~  .4. ·:?!!. :..1 a b i  :l  '- : ~ 
6. 6vor.rs  3:3.  :..:8. 6 
5,000h::"ii  2~0  ::3  t'  156. 5 
4i  j  .')OOhr&  3'"'.1"'1 
~  - :.!J..2  :.-?s.7 
5  H~L'  Hc~:al  t;y·  .:.2  ...  12 
6  :  ecomm.ia;,, i  ~  ;-~  ~- ~~  2 
7 :- ~  -=a:..:::l:..-. ___  ----·  ...... -·  •.  ·.;.. _____  -"~·  2  ____  ------~-2;;o,.;.;;.t_i.lo.,..;;..  ....  9 ___________  _ 
""  ,_,..,  .....  _,.  •  ~  1111'  a  •  ~  •  ~  ., a  "Ct.- ~  m  .,- · . ~  ~ .  ...,  .....  w  r:.  .1/1  Mf  .- .....  ~.J.  ,  ..._.  w  ..- w  'i..  •  ..-...,. "" ..a  •  y  ~ a  '""'- •  w  •  •  •  .._  •  •  •  a  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
/.2.2 
con~~r-·t>..~t :.cr. 
-:ucl~9.r  ,) ..  -· ...... :·~·  9L.,1 
.~d cost  O'.  ...... r\.:·'  ..  1'. 
.-, 
•,) 
••  £..  ~  ~ "'·t' 1 t a.:  -.:  :J  ~.3  ~  8  fAll 
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diatortion in the capita1 market.  A  rate  o~  10~ reducee  the 
discrimation  aaainst other enercv projecta,  and it aleo aicnala 
to  the  tu•ion  induetr~ that  eavinaa will  be  expected  in tbe 
operation ot plant  to ott•et the hicher coat ot inveetaent. 
7.2.3 Capital Coat  Undereatimation. 
What  doe•  the exo•rience ot  the  ~ueion procramae  eo  tar tell ua 
about  co•ta?  Firetl~.  capita1  coate  are coins to be hicb, 
relative to coa1 or tiaeion.  It baa  been  reported that tbe 
capital co•t• for  NET  are expected  to be at leaat  twice tbe  £450 
~illion eo•t ot  JET  (Norman  1987).  The  US  Enaineerinc  ~eat 
Reactor  {ETR)  ia expected  to coat  •3 billion to build  (US  DOB 
1987).  A  commercial demonatration  reactor can  be expected to 
cost  con•iderabl~ more.  A  major queation ia whether  aubaequent 
reactor capital coat• will eacalate or diminieh.  Declininc 
reactor coat•  appear to be  one  o~ toundatione of  the arcuaent• 
tor  the  Commiaeion'•  economic  case  (CEC  1987b),  baaed  on  the 
assumption  that  once  the  technolo~ is eatabliahed ••rial 
buildinc will lead  to reduced  coete.  There  are,  however,  re ..  on• 
to  doubt  the  validit~ of  thi• arcument. 
EXPERI&NCE  WITH  FUSION'S  CLOSEST  TECHNOLOGICAL  RELATIVES  IN  THE 
THERMAL  FISSION  PROGRAMME  AND  THE  FAST  REACTOR  PROGRAMMES  SUGGEST 
STRONGLY  THAT  CAPITAL  COSTS  HAVE  HISTORICALLY  UNDKRGONB 
ESCALATION  IN  THE  FACE  OF  PREDICTED  COST  DECREASES. 
An~l¥sia of  coat  ~rowth in  "A  Review  o~ Coat  Eetimation  in  New 
-rachnologieal  Implications  ~or Ener~ Proce••  Planta"  publiehed 
b~  the  RAND  Corporation  (RAND  1979)  identities the major areas 
~here estimation error occurs; 
t)  ~lsnt  ~nd proces•  uneertaintv, 
3)  ~roje~t orcanization. 
~)  QXocenoue  e~tecte on  eoa~.  and 
5)  the  ettect  o~  chan~inc environmental,  health,  and 
••t•t~  reculations  en  ••timation  accuracv  and 
plant  performance 
There  appe~· to  b~ no  reasons  to •••ume  that the  ~ueion procramme 
will be  immune  ~rom ~tV ot  theae  tactore which  contribute to co•t 
undere•timat1on. 
The  two  seta of  ticurea  in  a  atu~ made  bv  the  RAND  Corporation 
obtained  for  the  tvpe of  plant  that are  cloeel~ related to 
tusion,  ahow  a  atronc  tandencv  to undere•timate  the  capita1 
coat•.  ANY  FEASIBILITY  STUDY  WHICH  DOES  NOT  TAKE  INTO  ACCOUNT 
THE  STRONG  POSSI~ILXTY OP  INITIAL  AND  SERIES  CAPITAL  COST 
UNDERESTIMATION  CANNOT  BE  REGARDED  AS  CREDIBLE. 
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Table  7.2.3.  Summarv  ot  cc.:.st  Escalation  i.n  l.arse  Plants. 
-----·---------------------------------~------------------------- Mean  ot Actual  ~o  Sample  Standard 
It  ..ems  Estimated  -----=E.;::;s...;:·t;..:i..::m::.:a.=-t=Q..;::d::-.oC::.~o=•..;::;t ____  ----=s~=i:::.:z::..;e:.-----=D~..;e.,y...,.i_a  ....  tr.~i..,o.,n~~.~..._ 
Major  construction  2.18  12 
~ner~Y procees  plsnta  10 
----------------------------------------------------------------- (RAND  1979) 
"fhe  cost  stereotvpe that is emersinc  to~ t'uaion  power  is one 
which  aharee  a  l.ot  with  the  P'aet  Ilr-oeder  coat'  atereot~pe. 
Brie~lv.  the  PBR  coat  atere~~v~e id  that capital coats will be 
hish  but  the •mall  ~uel costa  wi~l more  than  o~taet such hiah 
coats.  The  tu~ion programme  co•t  atereot~pe ia  an  exacaeration 
of  tha  FBR  etereot~P• (see Appendix 3).  Capital costa will much 
hi~her and  th8  ~uel  ~oats  m~ch  Jow~r.  The  problem with  such  a 
co•t  5tereot~pe.  as  w~ h&V4  a1r~adv indicated.  is  ~hat it tends 
to  l~ad ta  a  ne~!ect  o~ the  tuei  c~cle co•ta,  aasuminc  the¥  will 
be  neQ:~iQ:!b  la.  ;~hil.e  :1 ~  1• pcsuible  that  th8l' will be  iDlportant 
in  aettin~ ~arcinal pricee.  At  th~ come  t~e. becauae capital 
cost  are  high,  b~th  ab•olut~lv  ~nd  r~lat1vel~.  to  co&l  or tiaaion 
plant,  onlY  the  ~ssuruption  o~ mayaive  ec~nornies of scala will 
reduce  the total coat  to anythine  like  a  competitive  level.  The 
result,  uven  ir it is  tak~~l  to  be  c~edibla.  leaves  a  coat 
a~ructure  tha~ is  ~i~hl~ vulnerable  to  rh~~~~a over  time  and 
1~\  t' 1 tD!Ki n 1 <H  ir.  ..  ~ .  ....,s ~··c ru.i.a  to  it:l~r~ at  Pore~•. 
Power  denait.:~  i~  th.:>J  .c·~.tin  ot·  ;  ::·•.l<t"':'"  I,Jl"Oduced,  "to  the  volume  ot 
the  reacto~.  It  &~fac~a  et~1~1~~cy  •nd  has  C&Dital  coet 
i~pl.ic  ... tionfj.  .;:  ..  ~.  t1~otuth  t!'H;X'-"'  .!n  .::·~····• •:")\HllV  no  linear relationship 
bet'-'l~G!'\  o·:)w~  ..  '·  ·,~·,HF~i.. .;""  ~-~·~d  ·~·""·"}  ·::~..i.  -~·:">at  .nd  ei:~tc!enc:~,  it 1a 
(l-e''9r'th~.l  ~·~.~  ...  ~.:.tt'ld  ~a  ~l  .:.  l··-=  :f.~~·,y; .~ .....  L.!fli?~.CJ.~ll.v  'Hh.t.li  COILP&rinc 
'l!llMil&r  f>}~~-n·":•  .v;,;,,:::·"  or.a  :.l"~~  ~.,In  4n~..!  rus!.f'~r\.  Po\<'ler  den•.itv  et't'ecte 
th~t'•'l~l  ·,$:.;·!'·~-~1()•~<;·;  t.~·c:..:.il£1~  •f.,.e·~~..;!.~  cc.-1V4u~·£:i.J~  ~~.n  be  e.arried out 
1.:1C:'t«  'lt'~i..!i<or;"lt~.:;.  !  ';  t~·  ,._  ~  .. ~  ;  i_nl<- th!.it  k~.n~ of  ,:alculation 
'lireetl~:  t;t'..  C.:"·.it,  ~Y..<'::  ~(");:,•  .·.;  ..  ·.,..;.."c-.t.~.v~  I;-lrt~fi£'~«  it quite useful. 
?ower  d.~r.~~.·:~  .:·-a.fl,' .  .!i.  -f  ...  -~-.•• ·_.·•.  (;CI!f'HI  th.i::"~u~h  t.hf)  !''.:tlat1onah1p 
oe'twae:r.  t:·:~t"  ~~:?..<!.'  ·-"'~  .1'\1  .....  t:<.~,,~,.r·r•  ~--:;:;.."'t.H.;t  ..  ~r~  l'.f~r'.  ~ha PO\oJ.tt:r  it 
~rodue'lle.  lt'  :-";1~  !,,.,,:  two  ·~,·!'·i•<""l.'·':'i.':.:.',  bC'.n·:1  r·.a.::'le  <;.t  oi~ilarlv 
~ri·~ec1  mat""ri~la  ~~:  t.-~~.:n1_:  ~r  (,;:(  •  .at"\..,·..:.~.:·.·.:,:~.  i .. .t"' l'!.  -h..,  Gaa:"tto  ~t~tput  and 
..  4 
\~  '. ~  ..  .  •  ..  ~. i: 
......r.  Unl"EL!'.!.fOJ,"H'lh  ~ e  • ~~.'.'!:~iT,  •llS! ',: i  ~:•• . ; -~  "..' ':.,1 
would  cct'!t  n3·.  :."~ •r  :.w.•  -~  .. g  -:.a  \···~,.: · 
;,;o  tr,e  ~, .... J.,;.r:c·.J  ·.:~  ..  ).-.  \  ·;.  :..r</. ·  --~ 
<.:;~,cr.;;~!.'"'iP~  OV<!!?.•~.-.l  . .l.  ...:.:.,.~J.  ~~1  !.\· ., ' 
.e:·t.!.·  <t,.: .. .:··  ..  :  t~u~  large~ re6ctor 
~  ·;~.~""  ;-4:. t  ~-(l  ,  ...  ~  thoiJ  ....  4Jaet~~  <!O!IIIt 
.,._,  ''  I"'.;;'  -1:'-'t.~ll't.  ~··"'~/l 
1'hta  poWI'.l.l""  ('!  ~·.1lll!:~'  i~  -::.·  :.?'.'f'l"·.:'l.'·  .c~t.:~t<H'  wnu:.l-j  be  re:ta,;iv"Jl~  low 
(aLntlr~""  t.;;  ~J.n  .. .-.•  =-.::'1...'  f',..;s~cr  ::"'·"!Ut~ter.  ~~~th-e  M3.&nox  ri:''"\Ctor,  but 
m•lch  lr·tUJ  t~'&.n  e-.  t~J~·'<.!I·.:  rt  ...  ~':  4!  •.v  ~  t  1t•  ~- ...  !•~·  ~,,,  ......  (  PWH)).  'i"l"-e  O!:MO 
d~eia:n  i;:·:t'e.jl::t.~  a  t-or.:-:.  r;.-.-,,;...;.; .. •  ~1';  •. ·1t:~·  '-'~  ~->~N/m:
3 ,  ~'."!iMtla~  to 
';he  A.dv.-.n,·:.d-'1  ·).t.~..tJ  r·:;.,.).._c  ...  l."f':#f~("(J:.I"  :.t,.:~:.~.·.:)~  0"'1.  Q!i"J1!t;"l  pl!~.•ata 
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iili Chapter Seven  The  Coat  Sensitivitv ot Puaion  Power 
aeeumptiona,  etc,  &lthoush  there ia aoae dieacreeaent whether 
this  ~isure would  be  poaaible.  There  are several reaaona  WhV  it 
is hard  to  improve  the  power  deneitv in  a  fusion  reactor.  The 
thickness  ot  the blanket ia determined  bV  the  need  to_capture the 
neutrons  and  to maximise  the breedinc ot tritium.  Then  there ia 
a  shield  (approximatelv 80-100ca)  needed  to protect the aacneta 
~rom heatins and  radiation etfacta.  It the tirat wall  power 
loadin~ (MW/m2)  could  be  increased  throuch better plaama 
performance  there would  be  trade-ott• concerninc macnetic 
confinement  power  and  tir•t wall eroaion ratea. 
7.2.5  RD&O  Rovaltie8. 
The  coat  of  RD&D  aav  be treated  bV  the nuclear induatr.v aa  a 
aocial cost.  But  the  normal  practice ia that  RD&D  ahould  be 
re~overed.  One  wav  ia  to  add  a  rovaltv.  paid per unit of 
electrieit~ produced.  We  take  the  $20 billion tor R&D  coata  aa 
central estimate  to  the end  of the Development,  and  a  load factor 
of  5000  hours  for  the Starfire aeries.  Followinc the ticurea 
~iven in  the table above  (Table 7.2.3)  we  eatiaate the rovaltv to 
be  ao~ addition  to  the  total cost.  At  6,600 hour•  thi• would 
t~l to  25~ of  unit  coata.  Aa  RD&D  is  a  aunk  cost,  committed 
before  commercial  operation haa  been  determined,  we  do  not 
disco•."nt  it  ~orwa.rd,  &~thou~h it  cou~d be  Al:'~ued  that  the 
oppcrtunitv  coat ot  RD&D  should  be  treated the  •ame  as  &IU'  other 
investment  expenditure.  and  that  •ome  private companiee  do  follow 
auch  a  practice.  The  hicher the eventual  coat  o~ tuaion  power 
the  lower,  relativel~.  the  RD&D  cost will  become.  We  have 
~6aYmed however  th&t  the rovaltv  ou~ht to  be  recovered  in  the 
~~cade  ~tter the  tirat ten  reactors  have  becun  operation. 
7.2.6  Oeeommi•sionl.nc~ 
Aaaumine  that  tnls  ia  20~ of  the  Direct Coat.  it would  add  10%  to 
the  tot&~  c~•~ of St&rtire  10 at  5000  hours  J.oad  factor,  and  6.8~ 
a-c  6. 600  t,ourll.  We  do  not  di  !!lCCI'.Jut  the  decommia•ioninc  cost 
torward.  from  the  commi  .  .s•iC"r.ine  ~G.te.  To  do  eo  reduce• it to 
zero.  Decommiaaioninc  1.a  a  :t.•eal.  cost.  and  bV  no  meana  an 
1n•1.cnitieant  on~ ziven  the verv  lar~e  a1~• ot tuaion reactor•. 
It oucht  not  to  be  to  bo  m&de  to disappear ••  a  reault  o~ an 
accountina  ~avie•. 
RD&D  and  d•commiaaioninc  tosether  ~dd apprcximatelv  50~ to the 
coet ot  the  lowe•t  Star~ire ticure  o~ 29.2 mille/kWh,  but  aa  a 
proportion  ~t total co•t it tall• •• the price of  tueion  power 
riaea.  At  a  unit co•t ot 100 milla/kWh,  the••  two  costa would  be 
15" ot total cost.  (Notal  1  mill  ..  1,/1000th ot a  US  dollar and 
the  d~chance rate asaumed  is  1  ECU•$0.822). 
1.2.1  Plant  R•:t.ated  Variables. 
The  bi~~eat  impact  on  capital co•t•  however will be  the  combined 
7-9 Chapter  Seven  The  Coat Sensitivitv  o~ Fueion  Power 
et!'ect ot  the plant related variable•  ,_  eapeciall¥ the diacount 
rate  and  the construction  time.  Theae  incre&8ea  are more  than 
proportionate to  the  time  taken.  Time-coat  overrun•  on  nuc·1ear 
atat1ona  have  frequently  doubled  and  trebled  the capital coat. 
The  co•t ot  the Startire reactor would  almoat  double to •&588• 
from  the  $2400m  ••timated in  COM(87)  302,  ( ..  eua~nc 10 veara 
construction  time  and  a  10~ 41ecount  rate).  Tbia  1•  bv  no ••an• 
the tull co•t even  tor the  lower  and  of tbe reactor co•t ranee. 
IT  IS  UNLIKELY  THAT  A  FUSION  PLANT,  IN  THR  PIRST  SERIES  AT  LEAST, 
COULD  BE  BUILT  ~OR LESS  THAN  *5  BILLION. 
Table  7.2.7  Sen•itivitie• •ttached to  Star~ire and  Mar•  (10th of 
seriea). 
-------------------~--------------------------------------------- DISCOUNT  CONSTRUCTION  DIRECT  CAPITAL  TOTAL  COST 
.RAT§  IIMlt  COST  !M  tM 
STARl'IR:S  5:'(  6:~re  1729  2&40 
10"  10~ra  3808  ~588 
:1.'RS  5%  6~r•  2365  3266 
10%  10vr•  t\836  5895 
-------------··,d--W~G~-----------~---·-------------------------- Nctet  ~:.1  ....  ..,~  these  •dn•it1vit~ atudiea  aaeume  ~onatant monev 
prices. 
1.2.3  Av~il&bi!1t~. 
f',Jg ion  re&c-to:"fi  .. ~~"-c  ~lWe..¥8  con•ide.~.  ... .ac  to  be  I.Ju~pl.~iilC  baae-load 
eleetricitv.  ~hat ic,  thev will  au~ply electrieitv whenever  thev 
can.  The:.r  wil..l  '::e  the  last to  "c off-l.ina.  Such  an  aaauaaption 
la  neceasarv  t~r  t~aion aa  1t  haa  au~h  his~  ~apital co•t• 
~3lA"t.iva  ~o  l!iJ~i!l  .!.ad  ,:)per~-r.":.rA'::  cco-c;a  1c~.kins  ·.:-:(?Jta..aration  co•"t• 
-.:!XC:c·~:ru!.;  .  .v  ::S·i.tL:I.'~~t~'i"f't  >-:  (~va.l 1~o1li<ci~ita..  To  r.t$-Xi;ri•e  ttevenue it 
3hou1<.1  h&VIG  &  J-.:~~~"  .~v'~"::.~.~.:Ab:~ 11  t~  e.J"d  a  n.i.Ctl  •!4\&.Jr&ai t¥ !'actor. 
'fHE  CC:-"¥-~SS!.Ctf' -S  z\~:~.Hi~f·1'ICN  ~  ::.~:·1. LT  Itf·ro  flti!IR  TOTAL  COSTS  IS 
'l.5%-J3v"  A-/A1l.AL1l,:'l."''l.  .IS  '!'lL~S  l!lt)Il  FIGURE  A  F.Ei\,.SONABL.l\  'l'ARGZT  OR 
!S  IT  JUST  A~  UNR~ALISTIC  AS~UM2TIO~? 
The  t'usior,  pro~rlilldllle  cpe.ratdt.»  ~~ tha  ~ore£r1'.)nt  o~ te<:bno1osv. 
Mo•t  o~ the  toohnoloz~ tor  ~  r~~~tor ha~ to  b~ dceicned,  built 
and  teete~ bator• its  tea2i~ilit~ 1•  ~ro~en.  A  ~uaion reactor 
will  be  &n  ex~rem~l~  ~om~l•Y. ctcvice,  tar  ~or• complex  than  anv 
power  p1•oducini:  pl..r.  .  .'"lt  •"•:"  tul~~.  ~ueh ot the  eQuipment will be 
expeotad  to  ..;)per&tt:~  in  ~Oct';..iJ •  'H";rhi~l,tion•.  under h1"h  enerD' 
neutron  bomt.ht.z-:uAe.nt  4Ul;t''11!"'1't.C  -~~~  ..  r)t.ion~.~  ::nermel  and  au•.cnetic 
atreset!aiJ  with  the  <.;o-exi•t:~iU\s!·ll!  o~  extr~~11qa ot  temparf't.ture  and 
:;resaure.  Sh.;:,u.ld  one  ot  "::t,u  ~~bt~~.,vs.tema  L-a11  in  the  roactor. 
a.ccesa  and  nandl1r4st  ·.-1ould  L\J  c~:'r.·t.i."'-<).-n~lv  c.<itticult.  Maintenance 
req,uir<es  tho!~  c ...... .:l<!t'1on.  r:Ji!  r:>.Jo;·,tn.  G~.ven  tha  ver~  lar~e number  ot 
•ub-•var.eme.  e...-r:::-"'i~1in:t~t  ~  r··.i~n  ~·.-~.11-:..bility  !:..s  ..:..J.klev  to prove 
very  d~f!ficult,  .:?.n<j  t.r.€l~"e  J..F  :.o  ~;<~~hr,l.cbl.i  infC'Irmation  to auaceat 
tnat  lt wtll  be  r-,  .~.h.f•n..•,  it ..e.a  Q;ocd  .:1~  :~.r-.:;~"'111&~  rea.ctors. 
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The  tir•t wall/blanket will  have  to be  replaced  ~requent1V 
involvins  the  remote  diamantlinc  and  replacement  o~ the  power 
core  poaaibl~ •• o1ten Js everv  two veare.  The  DEMO  team  adopted  a 
tarcet  o~  onl~ replacinc the  b~anket module•  ever.v  ten v•ar••  but 
thia wa•  not  achievable in the deaicn tor variou• reaaon•,  •uob 
as  the  Lithium burn-up rate.  We  have  alreadv mentioned  the 
environmental  coat  aaaociated with  ahort  firat wall/blanket 
replacement  time•~  The  potentiallv most  ooatlv aspect  o~ •hort 
tirat wall/blanket  replacement  ia the  amount  of down-time  thatmay 
be- associated with  thia.  The  DEMO  team  adopted  a  60  dav ever.v 
two  ~ear• maintenance period  in  accordance with  AGR  tisure•,  but 
thi•  ~1cure cannot  be  juati~ied in  anv  wav  at thia •tase.  A 
bene~it on  the other hand  mav  be  that  the requirement• of hish 
reliabilitv of  the reactor component•  mav  be  relaxed alishtlv, 
but  in relation to the coata,  thia benefit ia like1v to be •mall. 
The  coats  aa•ociated with  down-time will obvioualv varv accordinc 
to  the  trequenc~ and  lencth ot the wall  replacement  procedure•, 
and  one  would  expect  that  here  aca1n  the encineerinc problea• 
a•aociated with  the rapid  and  ••~• replacement  ot the tirat wall 
~nd breadins blanket will be  severe. 
In  th•  li~ht  o~ experience we  are aurpri••d that  the  Co~aaion 
can  Dt&n  on  a  75-80~ availabilitv.  We  doubt it anv expert bod¥ 
would  recard thia aa  a  prudent  dec~aion.  WE  ARB  OF  THE  VIEW  THAT 
THE  COMMISSION  SHOULD  NOT  CONTINUE  WITH  THIS  ASSUMPTION  AND  THAT 
THEY  SHOULD  BEGIN  SERIOUS  STUDIES  ON  A  FULL-RANGE  SCENARIO  STUDY 
¥ROM  WH!CH  A  CENTRAL  ESTIMATE  CAH  B~ DERIVED. 
What  ia  nevertheleaa  apparent,  ia  the dramatic effect that 
availab~lit~ na•  on  unit  eo•ts.  Becauae  o~ the  coat atructure, 
t''.1aion  with  1 t a  extremel~ beavv  eapi  tal load  inc  (see  the coat 
stereotvpe  below),  the rise in  eoata  when  power output talla ia 
•Jery  sharp.  't'he  coat  curve  ia  heavilv non-linear,  but  a.a  we  have 
no  w~ of  expreeain~ coat  aa  ~  ~unction ot availabilitv (throuch 
lac~  o~  ~&ta),  and  in order  to  not  over•tata the effect,  we  have 
used  a  line~ cAlculation.  The  aen•itivitv-atudV  ahowa 
availability  -eo  b8  the moat  voJ.a.tile  ot  &l.l  the  coet  components. 
It would  be  more  ac~urate to calculate load tactor•  (electrical 
output  aa  a  percentace ot  de•i~n capacitv).  The•e  are norma1l¥ 
low$~ than  ava~l•bilitiea and  thev are  a  better suida to the coat 
ettieiencv of  th• reactor.  The  expert  croup  have  in fact  tAken 
them  to  be  the  •ame.  Th&V  appear  to •••um•  t~at the reactor will 
operate at  100~ ot deaicn  capacitv.  Ano~her caae  o~  un~u•titied 
optimism?  It indicate• that  no  evetem  anal~••• have  been done 
nor  has  thoue£ht  been  eiven to  eh.ow  how  the  tu•i.on  ree.ctor 1d.l1 
attect  ~yst~~ lo&dinc  and  G~etem coat•.  Nor  has  eonaideration 
been  ~ivon to  the  poeaibi~ity  o~  d~ratins.  It.  however.  we 
follow  the eatimate• eiven  but  u•e  llOOO  and  5000  houra  aa  the 
c~ntrally  e•ti~~ted band.  the  e~~act on  reactor output coata ia 
that  the~ rise very  rapidly  (see  tie 7). 
WE  ARE  0~ THE  VIEW  THAT  FUSION  POWER  COST  SENSITIVITIES  SHOULD  BE 
RE-~PPRAISED.  ESPECIALLY  !N  THE  LIGHT  OP  THE  DOWN-TIME  ESTIMATES 
ASSOCIATZD  wrTH  FlFST  WALL  AND  BLAN~ET REPLACEMENT  TIMES. 
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Fi~ure 7.1  shows  the ettecta ot the sensitivities we  have  uaed  on 
the  levellieed  ~eneration costa ot  tuaion  power.  The  crapha  are 
based  on  the  data  ~or the Startire and  Mara  aeries,  plua  the 
prototype  PCSR-E  (which  is  a  one-o~t that precedes  the aerie• 
production).  The  onl~ •enaitivitiea used  bV  the expert  croup 
belon~ to reactor encineerinc and  reactor acalinc. 
It will  be  aeen  in ticure 7.1  that  the  tarcet area ia occupied  bV 
the  low  eoat  coal  and  LWR  eatimatea.  It ia in•tructive to 
remember  that  the  PWR  ticure  (the  lower ticure used  in  COM(87) 
302,  will understate  the real coat  o~ nuclear,  but ia neverthle•• 
a  settled  down  ticuro ot todav  arrived a•  the result ot a  riae, 
and  not  a  tall,  in reactor coats world  wide.  TO  ASSUMB  THAT 
FUSION  CONSTRUCTION  WILL  REVERSE  THE  COST  TREND  OP  FISSION  AND 
FALL  BY  AT  LEAST  AS  MUCH  AS  THE  OTHER  ROSE  CAN  ONLY  BE  DESCRIBED 
AS  HEROIC.  IT  CAN  ONLY  BE  TREATED  AS  EVIDENCE  OF  BLIND 
DETE&~INATION TO  MAKE  THE  CASE  POR  FUSION  BY  ASSERTIHG  WHAT 
CANNOT  BE  REASONABLY  DEMONSTRATED. 
The  re~erence caaa  (Star~ire 10)  is aeen  to  be  movinc elo•• to 
th~ current  PWR  ti~urea - but  the  Star~ire eatimatea in COM(87) 
302  are  not  central eetimatea.  Indeed  the aeneit·ivitie• which 
the  ex~ert  ~roup have  used,  (the encineerinc parameters)  in  &11 
ca~es  brin~ the  eoeta  down.  Thav  ~ind onl~ aeneitivitie• that 
lower  !:'u.sion  cost  and  none  that raise it. 
'Th~  underl~in~ reason  ~or thia one-aided  appraiaal.  ia  a  belie~ 
that  a~l co•ta are driven  by  encineerinc.  Thia  ia  a  locical 
result ot  the  choice  ot  ener~ accountinc .. a  methodolocv. 
Which  .:.!lt.me  t'ir11t,  'Che  methodoloCY  or  the  eoncluaiona  that it cave 
-ri!l.a  tr.-.  ia  a.  mattar ot speculation.  But  neither the reaulta, 
nor  :::~te  ,,..,~  in  which  thel!  have  daen  derived can  inapire 
~o~·~id~nce in  the  tuaion  industry's  eapacitv to measure ita own 
o~r  to.t~e.nce  .. 
w~  ::-ecomr:u!nd  that  &  ~utura  atud~ take  a  different approach.  The 
!l'Hti;"'..oe·rir:~  ~'"lt..t.  .. a.mete~:~.t  important  in coat ••  timate• will require 
~ar  hreste~ studY.  and  thev wtll require  independent  asaeaament. 
!he  hs&vy  dGpenden~o en  the  cout  a~~ecta or  acalin~ cannot  be 
Quraued  uncritically.  Tt1e  tactora wbieh will  in~luence marcin~ 
~oats will  need  far  mo~e  att~ntion.  THE  NOTION  THAT  A  TECHNOLOGY 
~AN  BE  BROUGHT  TO  ~H~ MARKET  SOLELY  BY  TECHHICAL  IMPROVEMENT, 
CAPABLE  OJ."  B'!:ING  MEASURED  ~EVERAL D!:CAD.!S  AH!:.AD  IN  FRACTIONS  OP  A 
CENT  (per  kWh),  AGAINST  AN  ASSUMED  BACKGROUND  OF  CONSTANT  REAL 
PRICES  AND  T3AT  ON  T~IS BASIS  PORECASTKRS  CAN  CLAIM  THAT  IT  WILL 
BE  COMPET!.ITIVE,  CA\N  CfiLY  lH£  OESCRlBED  AS  A  TRIUMPH  OF  MATTER 
CVKR  MISO. 
The  "~xr;~rt  ~rou.;>' a  t·r·oa.t!nefl~  o.f  .fuel  co•ts,  ia central to the 
their  -::ase.  ?•!el  coat11  for  tusion  are  low  and  thus  ot'~eet the 
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cap1tal coats reiative to  tiaaion,  which  1•  aeen  aa  the near 
rival.  In all exiatinc power ceneration the lifetime fuel  coeta 
are  the most  important.  In  the case ot tuaion  the aituation 1a 
different.  The  capital coat• are verv hich  both  abao~utelv and 
relatively.  In Starfire 10,  where  capital coat• have  b•en 
optimiaed,  the tuel  coete· are  ahown  to ranee  t'rom  zero  to· ·o. &· 
mills/kWh.  For Mara  thev are  a  little hicher.  If we  treat the 
zero  ~isure aa  an  aberration,  then fuel  coata  are •••n to be 
around  one  aeven  hundredth of capita1 coata.  OVer  the lifetime 
o~ the  plant this  ia  aeen  to cive it a  deciaive advantace over 
t1aaion.  The  work  of  Bunde  ia  commended  bV  the expert croup.  It 
showa  that  ~uaion has  an  enercv cain over reactor lifetiae which 
1•  twice  that of fiaaion.  Hie  reaulta are  •hown  below. 
Table  7.3.1  Knercv  Input  and  Output  over  30  veara lite  (MW 
thermal/MW  alectrica1). 
-----·-----------------------------------------------------------
Capital  construction 
Construction of  tue~ installation• 
Puel  for  tirat operation 
Fuel  for  lifetime operation 
Tot~l  ener~y input 
Enerw  ~enerated 
~neri::,- g:~in 
tution 
4082 
16 
3 
87 
ll188 
6. 3x1CP 
l.50 
fisaion 
2160 
789 
399 
5554 
8902 
6. 3X1c:P 
75 
MW  thermal  ~lw&¥• meana  thermal  aner~ and/or primarv enercv 
e-Qui  val.~u1  t  oe  .alec  ·cr ical  ener~~,  and  MW  electrical  re~ere to 
@l3e~r1ca~  ~ower santout. 
«•••A-Maa••·-~---R·---~------------------------------------------ (Annex  to  COM(87)  302  pace  66) 
7. 3. 2  ·~·ha  U »~ Ot  Ener~ Account i.nc. 
We  have  ~on$ulted the  paper  b~ Bunde  which  explains  hia  treatment 
ot  aner~v accountin~.  and  we  can  find  no  adeQuate explanation  aa 
to  how  th••• calculAtion•  are made,  or what  re~iabilitv can  be 
~laced upon  them.  It is not  made  clear,  tor exampla,  i~ thev are 
pr1mar~ enerZ#  unita  and it ao,  whether  the  ener~ loaaee  in the 
aner~ production,  dia~ribution or in end  uae  are allowed tor in 
a  conaiatent manner.  Neither  do  we  see ~  wav  in which  this 
method  can  allow tor the constant  chance  in the enercv content  o~ 
commoditiea. 
However,  leavin~ aaide  the lack  o~  credibilit~ attached to the 
data.  what  purpose  do  thev  aerve?  Clearl~ the¥ have  nothinc  to 
do  with  rational deciaion-makinc.  Decisions  to choose one 
tachnoloc~ aa  comDared  with  another are  not  taken  on  auch 
•rounds.  Equ&ll~  clear!~ the  enercv content doe•  not  in  itael~ 
tell us  i~  a  p&rtieul&r proce••  ia  economical!~ atttractive.  It 
m1•ht,  (or example.  be  the  case  that  uranium enrichment  bv 
diffua1cn  1a  &  much  more  expensive method  (in enercv  te~•> than 
enrichmen~  bV  ~ontri~u~ea.  But  it doss  not  follow  that enriched 
7-13 Chapter  Seven  The  Coat  Senaitivit~ o~ Fuaion  Power 
fuel  from  the latter will be  cheaper  ~o bUV  on  the market. 
Indeed  it ia  not  difficult to postulate conditions where  the 
reverse  mav  hold. 
En~re¥ coata  oannot  there~ore be  uaed  in  pre~errina one 
technolocv  to  another,  except  perhapa  in makina verv broad 
hiatorical  judcementa.  It become•  ver~ ~aleadina when it ia 
applied  to  makinc  micro-economic  deciaiona. 
The  manner  in which  Bunde  present• hia  c&8e  civea  ua  cauae  ~or 
eoncern.  The  ricurea  ~iven above  bV  him tor the relative enercv 
tuaion  and  ~1es1on  ~uel cvcle should  not  be  taken  aa  even 
approximatinc  to realitv.  Thev  appear  to  u•  to be  unconvincina. 
There  ia  no  aupportinc evidence that  the relative enercv coata 
are what  he  states  them  to  be.  The  coat ot the total tuel cvcle, 
~rom the extraction  o~ deuterium,  minins,  or extraction  o~ 
lithium  (trom  larce quantitiea ot sea  water~).  the enrichaent ot 
lithium,  the  reproeeaainc  o~ lithium and  tritium,  the diapoaa1 ot 
lar~e quantitiea ot waate,  the monitorinc and  environmental 
activitv that must  surround  the waate  manacement  procramme 
su~~eet to  ua  that  the  burden  ot  the  tuel  c~cle coat 1a 
understated.  But  our  pr1ncipa1  reason  tor concern ia that we  do 
not  see  how  any weicbt  can  be  put  on  tiaur••  o~ enercv coat  ~or 
product•  that  have  not  ~et even  be  deaicned.  Thia  point 1• 
at~irmed in  a  recent  paper  trom  the  Max  Planck Institute,  were 
~he  au~hors  ·~ bluntlY& 
uThe  conatruction  ener~ ca.lculatione  (in  (Bunde 
1985)]  w4re  done  on  the basis ot uncheckable  maaa 
t:a.blee  and  are  consequent!~ worthleee." 
(P~irach et  &1  1987) 
T~-.~.:1  conclude  bv  characteriainc- the enerw accountinc as  an 
~x~rci2e .. con~ucte4 with  false  logic  by  unsuitable methoda  uainc 
false  or  uncneckable  data". 
?1ndlly.  we  turn  to  ~he  atratee~c role aaeicned  to tuel  c~cle 
coste.  In  the  eoet  •ter~otvpEUI that are produced  (baaed  on 
~onceptual deaicns).  the  balance of coat  advantaee  ta1la  to 
fu•ion  becauae  o~ its relative1v  low  tuel coate. 
The  relevant  compari•on  ia made  with  nuclear tiaDion.  However, 
t~  h&a  alway•  ~een und•r•tood  that  the competitive  power  o~ 
ticsion  haa  lain in ita  o~' low  ~uel  c~ole ooeta.  relative to 
thcee  o~ foaail  lu•l  powe~ atationa.  The  eaaent1&l  locic 1• 
exactly  the  3&me  •• thAt  at  tuaion~  nam6l~ that eompetitiveneea 
exi•ta  because  the hich  capita~ coat ia oompenaated  ~or bv  the 
1ow  fuel  co~~.  Over  the  lifetime  o~ the reactor this produces  a 
net  eavin~e.  Hence  tuaion  ia  aeen  to  be  appe&linc  to  the  same 
advan~a~e over  fiacion.  that  the  latter ia claimine over toaail 
fuels.  T~e  ~oat uterotypea  tor tiseion  and  ~uaion ae  ueed  bV  the 
industry  are  a•  Zollcwaa 
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Table  7.3.3A 
-----------------------------------------------------
C~pital coat 
Operation  & Maintenance 
P'uel 
P'isaion 
"  6S 
10 
25 
100 
Fusion 
"  86 
13 
1 
100 
-----------------------------------------------------
Now,  i~ we  •••ume  that  in  monev  terms,  the coat difference on  the 
capita~ account  between  the  two  i• 2r1  in fission'• tavour,  then 
it ia apparent  that it tia•ion ia to lose it• advantaae,  its tue1 
coat  would  have  to rise  bV  a  verv 1ars• amount. 
To  show  this in  a  i1luatrative examp1e  we  put  ticures to the 
table  above,  what  mi~ht be  taken  to be marcina1  tiaaion and 
tuaion  reac~or coats.  Adherin~ to the  proportion ot costs civen 
in  the  table  above  we  have  the  tollowinca-
Table  7.3.3B 
-----------------------------------------------------
Capit&l  co•t• 
O&M  -coat• 
t?uof§l  costa 
Total  coat 
tiaeion 
50 
7.7 
19-2 
{mill•/k!h} tuaion 
100 
15.1 
1.2 
116.3 
w•-••••••••••••••*••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
io achieve  ~qual coste,  the  required rise in tisaion  ~uel costs 
(~eterua paribus)  w111  be  39.4 mills,  to  58.6 mills/kWh,  ie.  a 
r~ae ot  205~.  Fission  ~ue~ costa  as  a  proportion ot tota1 coat 
~i~e to  51.2%  and  capital  ~oats  ~all to  43%.  Thia  ia  an  inversion 
o~ fineion  ccata,  and  why  it should  take  place ia inexplicable, 
1.tnlesa  1 t  ia  a .  .ssumed  that  uraniu~u prices rise rapidlV  to 
~x~aptionally  hi~h levela  while  fusion  costa remain  constant or 
·'!q.ll. 
Fiiture 7.2  (pa~& 7-17)  looka  at  a  simple  tuel.  price break even 
model,  and it aueseets  that  uranium price• muat  riae to levels 
tive  to  ~i~ht time•  their  ~resent  lev~l.  Thus  the fuel  coat 
~reak-even point.  which  tt1e  expert croup' •  model  tor competitive 
fuaion  power  implies,  could  onlv arise under exception&1 
circumatances.  Is it probable'? 
Leavin~ aside  ~he lack ot realism ot aucb  a  acenario,  1~ we 
suppose  an  inver11ion  ot the coat etructure as  the result or bic 
pri~e ehansea it would  mean  not  that  tuaion coats  had  been 
reduced  (t~ the  bene~it ot  consumers)  but  that  the cost ot 
fission  power  had  risen,  bY  at least  a  factor ot  two  in real 
terme.  If tni•  w~re to  happen,  two  thine•  are evident  - one 
c&uae.  and  the other  e~~ect.  The  cause or oricin  o~ aueh  a  ahitt 
in  relative economics  could  onl~ arise ae  a  result  o~ a  verv 
lar~e rise in  tha  coat  ot  uranium.  We  wou~d require  a  model  o~ 
world  uranium  price•.  the  ou~-turn  o~ which  would  ahow  an 
increase  .wevaral  times  the  present  price~  Thia  in  turn would 
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onl~ happen it the  demand  tor uranium rose rapidlv ae  the result 
ot  rapid  ~rowth in nuclear tieeion construction or alternative 
uaea.  As  the  role ot tueion is seen  to be  one ot diaplacinc 
tiseion there  ia  an  apparent  contradiction here.  However it does 
not  appear  likel~ that  tieaion power will expand  rapid1Vt  and  the 
other scenarios will have  to be  found it the entrance  o~  ~Uaion· 
into  the  power market  ie to cain conviction. 
The  ditticult~ that  confound•  the attempt  to deviae  a  credible 
scenario  tor  co~etitive tueion  power  ie that  a  kev -assumption  1a 
a  hich rise in  enerc~ coetw.  Without  auch  a  riae the  hich 
capital coat ot tuaion  prevents it from  becominc competitive. 
Secondl~.  even it the  above  conditione were all met,  and  ~ieeion 
costa  rose  consequent  upon  a  larce crowth  in world  demand  ~or 
nuclear  power,  the ettect would  be,  ae  a  result  o~ this price 
rise,  that  the marcinal  coat ot nuclear ceneration would rise 
relative to that of toaail tuel atationa.  In particular the coat 
Artvanta~e ot coal  ceneration over nuclear,  which  ia •ubetantial 
in  aome  EEC  countries  (in  the  UK  it ia  around  15~) would  increaae 
d~amaticallv.  As  a  result  nuclear  power,  both  tiseion and  ~uaion 
would  lose their market  share,  or never  come  to  the market. 
P~rnaps in  anticipation  o~ such  a  problem in economic  lo.~c.  the 
~uaion caae  haa  arbitrari1v atated that the coat ot coal  ~ired 
·leneration "ia  up  to  60"  than  thermal  tiaeion plants".  It "ie 
e~<cected  to maintain,  or even  increase thia coat  diaadvantace" 
thue  worsenin~ ita competitive  power.  What  doea  the expert 
~rcup mean  when  it  ·~• "up  to  60""'?  It applies  to base  load 
pl~nt  onl~ it  s~ema.  Coal-~ired atatione  however  would  not  be 
plac~d on  baaeload it the~ were  60%  more  coetl~ than  nuclear 
~,.:,w.gr.  In  the  UK.  which ha~  unuaualll'  larce proportion  o~ 
·:':)al-f:tr-ed  :;>lant.  old  and  ine:tticient  coal.-tired plant ia  rare~. 
~.:!  f-":J'·Ier,  -.,11aced  on  baseload.  Modf!rn  baaeload  coal plant ie leas 
~~a~l¥  ~~an nuclear. 
LcoK!n~ to  the  ~1Jture.  There  ia not  one  co~ price,  but  manv.  It 
dependa  ~n what  market  coal  is  boucht  in  and  to where it has  to 
::e  ::3-Y.en. Thf!  tx•&napo~t costa  tor  international~ traded coal.  can 
he  :~!ce the  ~i~h~ad price  when  it has  to be  delivered  to  inland 
aitas.  ~oreover,  coa1  prices  have  tallen rather  than risen. 
Modele  tor  tiaaj.on  power  built on  coa~ price riaee  have  co1lapaed 
(CEGB  1983/7)  recentl~.  The~ ara  not  11kel~ to  suata~n tueion. 
THE  CONCLUSIO~~ THAT  WE  ARE  LEP'T  WITH  IS  THAT  THE  CAPITAL  COST  OP 
~USION RKPRESZNTS  A  NEAR  INTRACTABLE  PROBLEM.  ONlY  A  VERY  HIGH 
RATE  OF  RETURN  WILL  ATTRACT  INVESTORS  TO  FUSION.  OPTIMISM  ABOUT 
FUSION  MEANS  EX~REME PESSIMISM  ABOUT  OTHER  EHERGY  PRICKS. 
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/ 
..e<=------ PW' R  )t<  F~~io~ 
(p~s& o"t  P\JR) 
11,«  J"cl:~eJ  J~s"fl.fl/  l• .. «- sL.ows  t~  ..  1  ..  c:,..e.,_.s ..  ;,._  P\JR f .. c I  c.oif$ "cc.c.ss•  ... :J 
fo.- PI..IA Tot"!  powe.~ c~,fs to rc•c."  "  poJ,;f- w~c.,.~  f..siOt-t  pow•.- ,oit's 
~o~ beco'"&  c:.o""'pjdlva  witl.  PwR  powc  ...  eosts  ~  .10l.O. 
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CHAPTER  EIGHT.  DECISION-MAKING  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY. 
8.1  Reviewing  the  Fusion  Procramme. 
The  European  Fusion  Procramme  is more  than  ten years old,  and  we 
looked  tor evidence  o~ Appraiaala  in  that  time,  and  what  criteria 
were  used.  In  1981,  the  Fueion  Review  Panel  reported.  Thia  waa 
tol1owed  b~ an  update  three  ~ears later.  The~ confined 
themselvee  larcelv to  the  technical  aspects ot the  procramme. 
There  is  re~erenee in their reports,  to  the  need  ~or  'continuous 
assessment',  and  various  'in depth'  atudiee.  As  the report• 
raised  no  critical issues  these  recommendations  went  larcelv 
unnoticed.  There  is the  intention  bv  the  Commiseion  to  have 
another  major  Panel  Review  in  two/three years  time,  in order to 
assess  technical  pro~resa and  look at  the  next  atace. 
is  that  a  more  searchin~ appraisal  is required. 
Our  view 
WE  RECOMMEND  THAT  THE  COMMUNITY  SHOULD  BEGIN  THE  PROCESS  OF 
BRINGING  FUSION  RESEARCH  INTO  A  RECOGNISABLE  FRAMEWORK  OF 
ASSESSMENT,  CONSISTENT  WITH  COMMUNITY  POLICY  AND  PRACTICE  WITHOUT 
DELAY. 
~e make  this  recommendation  for  the  tol1owin~ reasons.  Firstly, 
because  before  the  next  stace ot  tundinc  (into the  NET  procramme} 
there  is  an  evident  need  tor  somethin~ more  than  a  Review  ot 
pro~reaa.  There  ahould,  we  au~zeat be  a  ~ull  Feasibilit~ Study. 
This  would  subject  the  fusion  pro~ramme to  a  searchinc  polic~ 
Bxamin&tion,  aa  well  aa  a  hi~h  qualit~ technical  appraisal.  The 
result  should  be  more  than  a  short-term  ~o ahead  for  the  next  tew 
~~are of  tundin~.  The  report  which  follows  a  Full Feasibility 
Stud~ should  be  one  that  can  bear  the  wei~ht ot the  decisions 
that  have  to  be  made  into  the  medium  and  lone  term. 
s~condlv~  ~~e  ask  the  Question.  should  not  a  Full  Feasibility 
Studv  involve all  the  relevant  interests  and  expertise within  the 
Co~~unitv?  For  example.  the Office ot Project  Evaluation within 
tho  Re•earch  Directorate General  ot  the  Commission;  the  Science 
and  Technical  Options  Assessment  Project ot  the  Parliament;,  the 
Directorateo General  tor  Ener~v.  Environment,  Finance  and 
Economics,  Social Attaire  and  Emplovment:  and  the  relevant 
Committee•  ot  the  Parliament.  Do  not  all ot these bodies  have  an 
interest in  the  fusion  procramme  and  ita impact  on  the 
Community's  future? 
Thirdlv.  the Appraisal  ou~ht to  be  independent.  B~ which  is 
mo&nt  ind~pendent  o~ the  bodies  involved  in  the  European  Fusion 
Pro~ramma.  One  reason  is  that  the  specialists  involved  oucht  to 
~oese•a  a  r~n~e  o~ experience  tar wider  than  nuclear  power,  and 
there  should  be  persona  with  reco~nised expertise in  enerCY 
economics.  in  environment  assessment,  in project  manacement  in 
different  induetries. 
?ourthly.  all aections  of  the  Fusion  Procramme,  includinc ot 
course  the  Directorate.  should  be  requested  to  take  part  in  the 
appraioal.  ~nd eapecially  in  its preparation.  We  auscest  that 
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this  should  include  papers  coverinc  the  technical,  economic  and 
ether  aspects  of  the  procramme.  and  projections  tor the  tuture. 
The~ should  be  encour&~ed to  present  their own  distinct view ot 
the  f'!J'ture.  and  to  use  their knowledse  and  int'ormation  to the 
beat effect.  Di~rerent pointe  o~ view  ahould  be  welcome. 
Fifthl~.  the  appraisal  itael~ should  seek to  be  coat  e~tective. 
We  understand  that  the  1981  Panel  Review coat  150,000  ECU  (we  do 
not  know it this  ti~ure includes  the  Commission'•  ata~t coats). 
The  results  hardl~ juetitied the  coat,  as  the expertise ot the 
Panel  was  too  close  to  that  o~ the  Pueion  induatr~.  We  susceet 
that  the  appraisal  process  involves at least one  team  ot' 
mana~ement consultants with  a  hich  profile in public  sector 
investment  appraisal.  The  result•  ahould  be  accessible 
throu~hout the  institutions  o~ the  Communit~ and within  the 
member  states.  It should  produce  a  document  which  will enhance 
the  understandin~ of  tusion  power.  and  of  the  importance ot 
ener~¥  colic~ in  the  Community  ~enerally.  It should  brin~ about 
&  major  step  forward  in  evaluation  techniques  ~or the tuture  and 
im~rove the  qualit~ ot  deciaion-makin~. 
Sixthl¥.  we  au~~est that  a  Full  Feaaibilit~ Stud¥  would  be  an 
~oen ended  appraisal  ot  the  costa  and  bene~its ot all aspects  oe 
fusion  - touchin~ the  environment,  ener~ ~utures,  safet~.  social 
accevtabilit¥.  as  well  as  the  technical  and  economic  aspects.  It 
is  ~enerall~ understood  that  the  next  major  sta~e in 
dec~~ion-makin~ will  take  place  in  the  earl~ 1990's.  The  next 
few  ~ears are  therefore  crucial.  ~usion will  be  enterinc the 
t~ansiti~n erom  the  Research  to  the  Development  stace.  Mo-one 
knows  with  an~ accuracy  how  lon~ that  will  be,  and  be~ond that 
1.:...~s  •:he  :)emonstration  sta.sce.  and  be~ond that  the  Commercial 
ate~e.  ~hich  in  our  view.  will  ~robably necessitate one or more 
;n:·<;;tc.,t~/oe  at;11.~es  before  commercial  viablity is reached. 
T~IE  QUESTION  0F  uHOW  P'EASIBLi:  IS  THE  FUSION  OPTION  "  NEEDS  TO  BE 
~,~-:;t-~ED  AND  ANSWf!RED  IN  A  FULL  AND  OPEN  MANNER.  SUCH  MAJOR 
~  .. \.)NG-'l"ERM  DECISIONS  SHOULD  BE  BACKED  BY  A  BROAD  CONSENSUS  OF 
COMMUNITY  OPINION.  THIS  IS  NECESSARY  TO  SUSTAIN  THOSE  WORKING  IN 
THE  FUSION  PROGRAMME. 
~OR THIS  REASON  WE  BELEIVE  THAT  A  REPETITION  OF  THE  PORM  OP  THE 
?REVIWS  REVIEWS  WOULD  NOT  BE  ADEQUATE.  THE  EXERCISE  THAT  WE 
ENVISAGE  WOULD  BE  RIGOROUS,  SETTING  OUT  ALL  THE  COMPLEX  OP 
FACTORS  OE~INING THE  OBJECTIVES  AND  THE  OPTIONS  THAT  ARE  AVALABLE 
FOR  REALISING  THEM.  AND  INCLUDING  THE  LEVELS  OP  EXPENDITURE  THAT 
EACH  OPTION  WOULD  DICTATE. 
·:'HE  OVERALL  AIM  SHOULD  BE  TO  MAKE  IT  POSSIBLE  P'OR  CLEAR  DECISIONS 
TO  BE  TAKEN  AT  THE  POLITICAL  LEVEL. 
The  OTA  etud~ provides  use~ul scuidanee.  While it is  primaril~ 
technolo~ical in  ita  ran~e.  within  that  ranee it meets  the 
t"ec4uirements  ot  a  !'eas1b111t~ studv.  The  European  procramme  haa 
not  had  the  benefit  ot  a  stud~ ot  comparable  ca~ibre.  Comparison 
between  the  OTA  stud~ and  collection ot uncoordinated  reports  in 
COM  (87)  302  is  instructive.  The  former  eon~ronta a  number  o~ 
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major  problems.  includinil:  the  coat  and  it otters tour options 
baaed  on  the  level of  apendin~.  We  summarise  them  in Appendix  2. 
The  US  Department  ot  Zner~~ makes  clear ita own  inclination. 
which  is  to enter into  an  international  procramme,  (ec  ITER),  but 
the  document  remains  open  ended.  The deciaion  ia  clearl~ lett as 
one  for  the politicians  to  make.  Notwithatandinc  the 
differences  ot political structure,  the distinction between  the 
role ot specia1iat.  and  that ot  ~he politician is implicit to the 
OTA  report,  and  it is  a  distinction which  remains  cardinal  to the 
deciaion-makinc  process  - in  Europe .. in other democratic 
atates. 
We  have  differed  on  one  major matter with  the  OTA  reporta  namel~ 
ita  treatment  o~ resource allocation.  It aideatepa thia problem 
tor reasons with  which  we  tull~  e~mpathise.  We  accept  that  the 
value  of  cost/benefit  studies  applied  to  a  technolocv which  ia 
still in  the  research  ataae.  must  be  questionable.  Nevertheless 
we  have  ~elt it neceesarv  to  make  an  economic  appraisal,  and  to 
offer at  least  a  ran~e ot options,  based  not  on  tiacal 
~onsi~eratione (as  in  the  OTA  report)  but  on  what  we  understand 
to  be  the  beat  use  ot  resources.  Deapite  the  di~ticulties,  we 
f~lt  that it was  neceeaar~ to  make  a  first  &Seau1t  on  this 
Droblem  principallv  becauae  we  do  not  see  how  politicians  can  be 
.~sked  to  decide  on  a  pro~r~e ot  such  vaat  expenditure without 
the  oenefit  of  economic  jud~ements,  even  if  those  judaementa  are 
~o  more  than  teat  estimates. 
wg  THERE?ORE  ASK  THE  QUESTION,  "CAN  WE  WAIT  UNTIL  $20  BILLION 
HAVE  BEEN  SPENT  BEFORE  WE  DECIDE  IF  THE  MONEY  HAS  BEEN  WELL 
SPENT.  OR  WHETHER  IT  SHOULD  BE  ABANDONED?"  WE  ARE  AWARE  THAT 
C~NCELLATION  AT  A  LATE  STAGE  HAS  BEEN  DONE  BEFORE  IN  THE  NUCLEAR 
rfCGRAMME  (a~  the  US  decision  to  cancel  the  Clinch  River tast 
~~actor croject).  BUT  WE  FELT  THAT  THE  ANSWER  TO  THE  QUESTION  IS 
11:40".  AND  'l'HEREFORI!:  A  FULL  APPRAISAL  INCLUDING  A  LOOK  AT  THE 
?ROPOS~O ECONOMIC  BENEFITS  IS  ONE  THAT  OUGHT  TO  BE  UNDERTAKEN. 
8.2  Options  and  Decision-makin;. 
8.2.1  Introduction. 
In  the  discussion  above  we  have  con~ined our•e1vea  to  the  to~ 
and  structure ot  the  next  appraisal.  But  what  o~ the objective• 
that  should  Q:Uide  it?  In  our view,  there is  a  ver~ stronc caae 
tor  a~inc that it ahould  a1m  to  produce  options.  Each  option 
should  be  8een  in principle to  have  eQual  validit~.  in that each 
ia  technicallv  •ound.  Thev  wi~l ditfer in  that  the~ otter 
d1!terent  aolutiona.  dapendin~ on  how  the  authors  read  the 
t'uture.  tn  thi•  W&Jt  the  aaaumptiona  and  the  vaJ.ua  judsementtt 
that  underpin  the  options  can  be  made  plain.  The  deciaiona  that 
have  to  made  are  seen  to  be  the reeponaib.tlitv ot the  politi·~ia.Ha 
who  have  had  the  benetit  ot  bein~ exposed  to ditterins solutluns. 
each  advanced  with  the de•irable level of  expertise. 
We  do  not  au~~eat that  the  importance  o~ such  an  approach  to 
decision-m&kin~ is not  understood  and  accepted within  thft 
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communit¥  - only  that it has  not  been  puraued  in  practice in 
fusion  research.  To  pursue  such  a  path,  rather than  one  which 
amounts  to  a  process  ot  se1~-val1dation bV  the  tuaion  reaearch 
directorate  and  ita aaaociationa,  is an  appropriate  chance that 
could  now  be  made  to  b~inc deciaion-makinc in thia tield into 
line with  the  Communitv  polic~.  Expert  panels  can  be  ver~ 
ettective when  technical matters  have  to  be  decided  (althoush\ 
even  then it is  impo~tant that  the¥  do  not  weaken  the ultimate 
reaponsibilitv ot  the 4eciaion-makera).  But  to~ major deciaiona, 
such  as  the  future  procramme  ot  the  fusion  procramme,  the  Expert 
Panel  is  too  narrow,  both  in  composition  and  conception. 
InevitablV it is  technoloc1ca1lv driven.  and  understandablv  aeeka 
to arrive at  ainc~e minded  decisions  when  more  flexible open 
ended  judcementa  are  required which  take into account  the  :~ 
uncertainties  of  ener~ futures  and  the  complex  socio-economic  ~ 
issues  that  are  involved  in  lone  term deciaion-makinc.  Providinc 
options  as  the  result ot  open  ended  teaaibilitv studies ia also  a 
useful  ~~&V  ot  introducinc the specialists within  the  research 
~ro~ramme to  the  thinkin~  o~ those  outside  and  causinc  a 
crosa-fertili•ation ot  ideaa. 
8.2.2  Independent  Appraisal. 
One  of  the  reasons  why  external  and  independent  specialists are 
necessary  to  major  appraisals  arises  trom  the ditticultv tor 
those  workinc within  a  project,  in  distin~uishin~ their 
perceptions  o~ ita future  tram their  own  individual or collective 
commit~nt  to it.  Usin~ external consultants is,  we  recocnise 
onl¥  a  ~art ot  the  answer.  It may  be  only  palliative unleas 
~ho3e  ~~ho  eventuall¥  ~ave to  take  the  decisions  accept  their 
~~sponsibility to  lay  down  the  ~round rules  at  the outset. 
In  this  atudv  we  have  found  that  l&¥inc  down  ~round rules  tor 
~v~l~atin~ tuaion  is  more  than  usually difficult.  because ot  the 
nature  ot  the  technolo~v.  but  aleo  because ot  the strencth ot the 
inatitutional  interests  involved.  It is  tor this  reason  that  we 
have  included  in  thia  report  discussions  devoted  to critical 
issues  in  the  task of  tuaion  appraisal. 
The  objective of establiehinc  a  conceptual  framework  is not  onl~ 
that  a  dia~o~ue can  take  place between  thoae  within  the project. 
but  also  betwe~n those within,  and  those outside  the project. 
Fuaion  research  has  ao  tar  larcel~ been  eva~uated throuch  peer 
review  avatema.  Thia  is appropriate when  onlv question• ot 
plasma  p~aica are  under  consideration.  But  not  when  economic 
and  social criteria are ot major  importance. 
8.2.3  Mana~ement Stratecv  and  Manacement  Structure. 
In  our view  thia  topic  needa  to  be  brou~ht within  anv  teaai~~l.~t~ 
atudy  ~r review  process.  We  consider that it wou~d be  a  p&rt  of 
the  broadeninc  procesa  neceaaarv  as  fusion  makes  the  tranaition 
from  a  acience  research  project  to  a  deve~opment project.  We 
~h!nk that  the  need  ~or this  ia  re~lected in  the  Commission'• 
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document  COM(87)  302.  This  encapsulates  the  conceptual  problema 
that  we  have  identi~ied above. 
Because  the  ~uaion procramme  is  funded  entirel~ from  the  ~ublic 
sector it is· not  subject  to  anv  coMpetitive or market  conatraint. 
This  makes  it all the more  important  that  the  proceaaea ot 
internal  assessment  should  be  rizoroua  and  set acainat  a 
reco~nisable set of criteria.  The  criteria that  are  uaed  in 
COM((87)  302  do  not  meet  thia requirement.  Thev  are not  alwava 
transparent.  and  except  on  •trictl~ technical matters  thev are 
not  well  supported either with data or  b~ reference  to accredit•d 
sources  (ec.  the  research  document•  of the  Communitv  on  enercv 
~uturea).  We  have  made  a  small  number  of  apecitic aucceationa 
for  chan~es in  the  proposed  articles ot  the  Proposal  to  co  be~ore 
r~  the  Parliament  and  Council  in  order to  brine  them  into line with 
~enerallY accepted  perceptions ot  enercY  futures.  We  aucseat 
that  studies  b~ expert  croups  are desirable but  thev  should  ~ 
rB~arded as  inputs  into  the  co-ordinated  Feasibilit~ StudV.  that 
we  ~ave recommended.  We  recommend  that  the  atudv ot the  expert 
~roup  on  tusion  economics  should  be  set  aside  or referred to 
&nother  exte~nal consultancy  tor  a  second  opin~on. 
·,•, 
One  ot  the  reasons  for  the  shortcomin~a we  have  drawn  attention 
to  in  r:--:.~  Commission • e  report  lies in  the  unduly  restricted ranee 
ot  mana~ement Bkills  that  they  appear  to  have  at their disposal. 
So  t~r  as  we  could  discover  the  mana~ement is  undertaken  entirel~ 
b¥  ~cientiata $nd  en~ineers.  and  lar~ely drawn  trom within  t~ 
t'!.eld  of  fusion  research.  We  do  not  doubt  that  thev are 
oxt~emelev able  people.  But  we  tind it a  little  incon~ruous,  tor 
..  ~xa..mp1e.  that  ~he eKpert  ~roup on  economics  and  the  environment 
·-:-ontaind  no  t.t"'I!Lined  e~!onomist or  seasoned  environmental.ist. 
The  force  ce  ~h~  ~oint  we  are  makin~ will  we  hope.  not  be  seen  as 
~ein~  hcs~ile to  the  fusion  mana~ement.  WE  ARE  SOLELY  CONCERNED 
ro  DRAW  ATTENTION  TO  THE  MISMATCH  BETWEEN  THE  VERY  COMPLEX  ISSUES 
"!'HAT  ¥USIC:N  AS  A  TECHNOLOGY  OP'  THE  P'UTURE  INVOLVES,  AND  THE 
P~l.SENT  MANAGEMENT  STRUCTURE.  WE  BELIEVE  THAT  TO  GET  THE  RIGHT 
BALANCE  HERE,  IS  EVERY  BIT  AS  IMPORTANT  AS  THE  MORE  TECHNICAL 
ASPECTS  0~ THE  APPRAISAL  EXERCISE. 
The  deve1opment  of  a  mana~ement  strata~~ to till the  space  that 
now  exiate w111  take  time,  but  we  envisace  that it w111  becin at 
different  levele.  One  level..  the  creation ot  an  acceptable 
conceptual.  framework,  we  have  alread~ canvassed at  aome  lencth. 
With  thia  we  link the  need  ~o develop  the  manacement  structure. 
with  the  human  and  material  resources  to  be  able  to  co-ordinat~ 
the  fusion  pro~ramme in all ita aspects.  With  re~ard to  tho 
strate~y that  zuidea  the  day  to  d~ operation ot the  tueion 
Qro~ramme.  wa  can  say little because  we  have  not  had  the 
opportunit¥  to  observe it in  operation.  We  understand  that  ther9 
ai  .. e  apecial  problems  in  ~uidinfr  an  international.  procramme.  1JUt 
our  ~eneral impreeaion  1s  chat  while  the  co-ordination  mav  be 
T;~ainet:a.l·.t.ir"'~ •. it m~ not  be  sutficientl.:~  t'orward-lookln"  in  t1h! 
leaderahip  that  its  ~ivea.  and  that it doesn't  alwava  su<.:.:ec.d  in 
brin~in~ all  the  parts ot  the  pro~r~e and  the  Aaaocia~iuns 
to~ether to  addrese  ke:,.r  iaaues  - particularly  the  no~'l-t<-S~iln..lc.:  ... d. 
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issues. 
Strate~y,  structure~  and  conceptual  tramework  are all  important. 
We  jud~e that  the  tuaion  procramme  is in  need  ot  chance•  in all 
three ar•••·  coupled with  better reaoureinc.  in  terma  ot expert 
research atatt,  espeeiallV  in  the  non-technical  tielde.  WE 
SUGGEST  THAT  IT  WOULD  BK  DESIRABLE  TO  STRENGTHEN  THE  CONSULTATIVE 
COMMITTEE  OP  THE  PUSION  PROGRAMME,  AND  TO  CREATE  MORE  EFFECTIVE 
LIAISON  WITH  OTHER  DIRECTORATES  WITH  AN  INTEREST  IN  THE  FUSION 
PROGRAMME  IN  ADVISING  THE  COUNCIL  AND  THE  PARLIAMENT.  WE  ALSO 
SUGGEST  THAT  STRONGER  LINKS  ARE  ESTABLISHED  WITH  THE  PARLIAMENT 
AND  ITS  ENERGY  AND  RESEARCH  COMMITTEE  IN  ORDER  TO  BRING  POLICY  OP 
FUSION  INTO  LINE  WITH  THAT  ON  ENERGY. 
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CHAPTER  NINE.  PUBLIC  ACCEPTABILITY. 
9.1  Risk  As•e••ment  and  the  Learnin~ Process. 
It is  possible that  the  moat  problematical ot  the  testa that 
~uaion  technolo~iea will  tace,  will  be  that  o~ public 
acceptability.  As  the  successor  deai~nate to nuclear fission,  it 
will  inherit  a  complex  situation.  It cannot  be  •ure what  the 
social  environment  will  be  in  the  next  centur~.  Perceptions 
about  tuaion will  be  in~luenced bV  the  ~actors bevond ita 
control.  Public  attitudes  to  hi~h  technolo~ are  now  becinnin~ 
to  under~o critical formation,  and  these will  &~teet the approach 
to  tuaion  power. 
The  technical  complexit~ of  a  tuaion  reactor will make  ~ormidable 
demands  on  risk analvsia.  Risk  aesesament  of  the claa•ic kind, 
puttin~ numbers  to  each  part  of  the  "event  sequence"  leadin~ to  a 
release  o~ radioactivity,  will  be  speculative until  a  reactor has 
been  desi~ned,  and  it will  only  ~ain  credibilit~ with  operatin~ 
ex~erience.  An¥  statement  about  sa~ety,  must  therefore  be 
heavilY  Qualified,  not  onlY  by  the  level  of  available 
information.  but  also  by  the critical attitude that  has  developed 
with  ~espect to  risk  anal~sis. 
Riak  aaeaament  is  concerned  to  ~roject  the  tuture possibility of 
an  accident.  It  arose  because  of  public  concern  of  accidents 
l¥in~  be~ond the  bounds  allowed  for  in  the  deaisn  and  the  normal 
ooeration  ot  the  plant.  Initiall~ it became  a  'contract' 
~~tweeen tha  o~erator and  the  re~ulator.  This  comfortable 
relationship  was  disturbed  b~  the  appearance  of  a  third set  of 
actors  - interest  ~roups of various  kinds,  and  members  of  the 
~ublic not  associated with  an~ interest  ~roup.  Their  appearance 
has  ~reatly complicated  the validation  ot  a  plant  tor the 
licenain~ authorities,  and  the  planned  benefits ot  the  power 
utilities.  Risk  asses•ment  has  been  moved  into  the area of 
public  acceptability.  What  we  have  now  is the  assessment  of  risk 
assessment.  The  experts  themselves  are  a  part ot  the  process; 
involved,  committed.  and  not  without  self interest.  A  widespread 
vie~ amon~at those  en~a~ed in  this  dialo~ue,  includins those 
with  experti•e  in  the  risk field,  is "that despite an  appearance 
ot objectivitv.  risk assessment  is  inherentl~ subjective" 
(Pischoff et al  1980).  One  ana1yst  has  described it "as  a  kind 
ot  seienee ot  shootin~ in  the dark"  (Cannell,  1986). 
The  broadenin~ out  which  has  taken  reactor validation  trom 
technical  acceptablity  to  public  acceptabilit~ has  happened 
rapidly.  It is  formalised  throu~h public  inquiry procedures, 
referendums,  etc.  Many  technical  experts  have  b~en  4XDO~ed to 
social  and  ps~cholo~ical forces.  that  are  mot  only  novel,  but 
which  appear  to  challen~e their professional  1nte~r1tv.  Whor~ 
.1ud~1uente  .and,  very  often.  decisions  were  taken  on  te'Chil:i  .. c~r 
~rounds,  this  te  bein~  check~d.  it not  challe~~e~  b~ thoee  who 
believe  that  they  have  a  rii:ht  to  be  consulted.  a.nd  l! n,-J,.:t.t"~clr~ 
to  assert  their  ri~ht  to  decide.  even  thou~h they  m~  onl~ havG  ~ 
rudimentary  knowled~e ot  the  technical  irJsuea  i.nvolv~!!!td.  Tl\e 
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result  is  a  complex  interaction between  aocial  ~roupa.  involvin~ 
political institutions,  the  media.  induatr~ and  specialised 
interest•.  Within  that  interaction.  chan~ea are  takinc place 
which  a~~ect the distribution  o~ power  in  the  decision-makin~ 
process.  It would  be  a  ~alae aimplication  to  present eith•r the 
'auppl~ aide'  intere•t• or the wider public  as  beinc monolithic. 
It is  apparent  that  ~oinc up  the  learninc curve  in eatabliahinc 
socio-economic  ~easibilit~ ia.  1~ anvthinc.  more  dif~icult than 
in  achievinc  technical  teaaibilit~. 
Some  eacets of  this  learninc proce••  can  be  identified •• 
tallows; 
(1)  Interest  ~roups.  and  even  more  80  the wider  public, 
f'ound  themselves  ill-informed  about  the  nature  ot 
technolo~ that  faces  them.  There~  ore  the~ t'ind  that 
have  to  tr~ to  close  the  'underatandins'  ~ap.  Thev 
more  information.  The~ insist on  more  'openneae' 
S~;ovarnment.  research  and  industr~. 
have 
the 
the.v 
seek 
trom 
(2}  Risk  aaaeaament  aa  a  w~  ot  determinin~ technical risk. 
has  not  proved  to  be  the  anawer.  It  has  led  to  the 
development  of  another  specialism exerciains  technicall~ 
based  expertise.  But it  has  not  ~one  unchallen~ed and  is 
subject  to  considerable  scepticism.  The  attempts  to use 
it to create  a  'riak assurance'  meeaace  to  the  public,  has 
led  to  the opposite ot what  wae  intended.  It has  created 
a  widespread  distru•t  o~ experts  and  expertiae.  As  a 
~esu~t  there  is  widespread  demand  tor  'independent' 
jud~ement. 
e 
(3)  The  public  discussion  that  takes  place  about  new 
technolo~ies and  their impacts  on  the  environment  and  on 
economic  and  socia~  li~e.  is not  susceptible to  the  lo~ie 
or  the  ri~our that scientists are  accustomed  to.  It  is  rfr 
too  political to  meet  those requirements.  HOWEVER.  THERE  I 
IS  AS  YET,  NO  BODY  OF  CRITERIA  BY  WHICH  JUDGEMENTS  CAN  BE 
MADE  ~OR THE  LONGER  TERM  AND  WHICH  COMMANDS  WIDE  SOCIAL 
ACCEPTANCE.  Hence  the debate  mav  make  no  headwav  bectt'-'~~' 
there  are  what  appear  to  be  tundamenta~ diae.s;rt:..!me/'  ~·,.... 
These  are  not  however written in tablets ot stone  and  the~  { 
can  chance  quicklV  in  the  licht ot experience. 
(4)  In  the  interplav between  larce  technolocies.  and  those  w~o 
resist  the  consequent  impacts.  there  is  no  ob;1 <.:.·.:  ~- -t ,.e 
source  o~ apprai•al or  ot  deciaion-makinc.  Deciriune  "'n 
hi~h technoloc:t are  po~itical deciaione.  That  this is nut 
vet  understood  or  accepted 1• obvious.  and  it  cauo~e 
understandable  ~ruetration. 
( 5) 
( 6) 
Public  opinion  is itaelt 
acQuiescence  to  extensive 
enlar~ed  upon  sometimes 
perceptions  ver~ quickl~. 
volatile.  It 
hostilit~. 
bV  the  media 
~an  ranw;<1  11 
Drama1.1e  e·r~·'!· 
can  ct.o.r..~<!  ... - . ·  __  :.I  .: 
Public  attitudes  are  shaped  b~  belie~ 
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D&radisma,  which  di~ter widely  from  each  other,  and  if 
these  are  not  reco~nised  and  taken  into account,  the 
issues  which  more  directly  e~tect new  technolosiea will 
not  be  resolved  either. 
(7)  THE  EVOLUTION  OP'  LARGE  INSTITUTIONAL  INTERESTS  IS 
ASSOCIATED  WITH  THE  GROWTH  OF  NEW  TECHNOLOGIES.  THE 
INSTITUTIONS  HAVE  BEEN  A  FACTOR  IN  POLARISING  THE  DEBATE 
BY  TH~ MANNER  IN  WHICH  THEY  HAVE  WIELDED  THEIR  POWER. 
Counterva11ins  torcee  in  the  public  domain,  mav  be  the 
answer,  but  are  not  con•picuoue,  only  bv  the  small  amount 
o~ power  that  they wield.  Reculatorv  bodies  with  lecal 
powers  are  now  extensive,  but  they  have  powers  which 
norma~lY  fall  short  of  what  consumer  and  environmental 
pressure  ~roupe are  eeekin~. 
9.2  Aaaeeain~ Ssfety. 
Asaessm~nt ot  ~afety,  tor  some  ot  the  reasons  we  have  explored, 
ia  now  ~arcsived by  many  ap~cialists aa  aomethin~ which  can  only 
have  meanins it placed  in  a  social  and  economic  cQntext.  Some 
would  add  a  politica1 context  as  we11. 
Oeapita  ~he  ~reat  chan~es  brou~nt about  bV  the  emer~ence ot  a 
l·:~rze •..  -,cti·.!e  a~·1ct  freQuently  disor~anised public· opinion  the 
re~~!a~~~~  ~odies  and  the  ind,Jstry  continue  to  talk to  each  other 
~s  thoush  ~isk assessment  is  a  Dree1se  science.  It is as  thoush 
:hev  ~~n  ~o no  other  than  wait  to  be  disproved  by  sisniticant 
a.~c~;!ents.  '!.'~  ....  #~  ~luelear Rea:ulatorv  Committee  in  the  USA  abandoned 
~:~e  1: 1, coo, :~)UO  t"'eactor  years  a~ndrome as  a  method  of  public 
~sas;~rance  ~n nuclear  power,  after  the  Three  Mile  Island 
acc~~ent.  r:,e  UK  Nuclear  Insta1lations  Inspectorate  stil~ repeat 
~t  ~s  ~hou~n it had  some  meanin~.  The  result  can  onlv  be  a 
publi~  ~t~~~~de that  ran~es from  scepticism to  outri~ht 
iJ1-A~6li:::~-:. 
The  9robl~m for  the  fusion  proa:ramme  should  be  defined  in  the 
eonteMt  of  the  unresolved  problem  o~ how  public  acceptabilit~ is 
to  b~  ~xoreased and  reco~niaed.  The  solution  ~as to  besin  by 
abandonin~ a  rationa1e which  1•  skewed  b~ an  assessment  process 
whose  t1I•st  taaK  is  to detend  the  industry  by  reasaurins its 
critics  tna~ risk is minimal.  The  responeibility tor asseasinc 
risk  haa  to  be  pla~ed on  a  broader  basis.  with  reculator~ bodiea 
stron~ enou~h to  respond  to  the  concerns ot  those  who  feel 
thre&tened  by  nuclear  power.  This  implies  a  research capacity to 
aake  ~valu~tiona separatelv  trom  those  made  by  the  industry. 
What  we  ~~4ve  read  about  aatet~ and  public  acceptabilit~ in  the 
ovus1~:1  ;.:.:·:':l~J:";lo.Q1'.ft8  sa  it is  ~rejected trom ita present 
i~a~ltu~ional bases.  is  eut~ieient to tell us  that  the  leeaone ot 
ch~  l~dt  ~~cade have  not  vet  been  full~ interpreted  bV  the  tuaion 
tnduatry.  Perhaps  this is  becaueft  it is so  tar from  the 
c~~ration  ata~e ••  a  power  producer,  that it is felt  to  be 
~remacure to  come  to  terms  with  what  is  happenin~ at  the 
lntAr'sce  botween  the  nuclear  and  other advanced  technolo~ies and 
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the  public. 
The  treatment  ot  waste  disposal  - ever  a  sensitive barometer ot 
public  attitudes  - confirms  this.  The  assumption  that waste 
disposal will  be  easily manased  b~ low  level  disposal  haa  beeh 
contradicted  b~ recent  reaearch ot  the  UK  NRPB.  It ia not 
difficult  to  see  the wider implication• ot this tailure to  be 
sensitive about  the waste  problem.  To  a  aceptieal public,  it is 
su~ticient that  the~e is  onl~ the  appearance ot trvinc to cover 
over  the  problem,  tor the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  that this could 
be  ~ymptomatic ot  an  attitude to the  environmental ettecta ot 
fusion  aa  a  whole. 
The  environmental  control ot  tusion will mesh  with  cost.  For 
example,  reducin~ tritium releases  b~  50~ on  1980  costs  amounts 
~o around  $170,000  per  man  rem.  (Otw~ et al 1980).  The  actual 
coet  to  a  utilit¥ would  be  a  combination ot clean-up  coat  and  the 
lav~ls 1aid  down  bY  re~ulatory bodies.  Sitin~ plants in remote 
areaa  would  relax  the  clean  up  problem,  but  the  trade-ott between 
clitin~  and  transmission  costs  rules it out  as  a  solution.  A 
~aximum  rel~ase of  tritium could  amount  to  man~ tens ot millions 
ot  curies.  Risk  assesament  studies  that  conc1ude  that  such  a 
~Al~ase is  eo  improb&ble  as  to  offe~ no  threat  to  populations 
-::'ctentiallY  3.t  ri.Elk,  is  not  only  not  likely to reassure  - it m~ 
~ave the  o~poeita effect. 
~;·'!cause  ~e~(.':ect ion  ot  riak is  now  central  to  the determinins ot 
~v.blic  att.it•.Jdes  (.indeed  it may  be  the  moat  sin~le  impo~tant 
factor),  ~~~n study ot  what  attects public attitudes would  seem 
to  be  ~lementar¥  ~esearch exeretse  fo~ the  tusion  industrv.  It 
is  a  matter of  self  interest. 
:n  ~rinciple,  regearchers  now  start  from  an  a~reement that 
?erceptione  ot  -ri.esk  .1o  not  neceaaaril~ have  a.n~thins to  do  with 
'lc tual  ritJk.  T!H!  blame  ~or this  is  something:  that  the industrv 
1taelf  ough~  to  ~hare because  the  assessment  ot risk for  which it 
has  been  responsibl~ has  had  to  be  f~equently revised.  Belief 
dVsterns,  tear,  media dramatisation.  alarmist statements, 
diabeliet in  nxperta,  self-interest,  - these  and  others w111 
brin~ about  the  formation  ot attitudes.  causin~ some  to  be 
totall~ in  favour  of  nuclear  powe~ and  others  to  totallV reject 
it.  Most  attitudes will lie somewhere  between.  Once  attitudes 
~arden  dialo~ue becomes  ditricult  to develop,  especiallv  1~  th~ 
attitudes start  from  different  underl~ins premises  that are 
strons:lv felt. 
In  very  brie~ly  lookin~ how  those  who  are  taken  up  with  recG&~cr 
in  tuaion  power  are  appraisin~ these sort ot acceptabilitv 
;>rob lema,  we  have  ·-.  bean  ae1 aed  bV  a  teelinc of deja vu.  The 
f;Jaion  experi;a  be~in by  insietinc that  tuaion  is  envir\ll'lment.&.:-.:!.~1 
benl~n.  The  reason  - ~ecause it does  not  produce  rission 
or~ducta  And  actinid~s.  They  offer their assurances  to  thQ 
0'-t'::)li~  ()n  t'~~  basis  of  this  kev  tact.  Ot  course.  this is  a 
j.i.f'~er.ence  '!~t  substance.  between  f'isaion  and  f'ua:Lon.  B·it  !&c.·~ 
::r~at  that  dif'.terence  is  in  practice.  is  an  open  ~ueation  't'r-:  .~  - .... 
to  ~~ke it into  a  Drotective  technolog:ical  wall  &3~aratl~=  !··~t~~ 
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trom its more  ria~ near  neichboure  is more  an  atavistic  re•~onae 
that  an  objective  tact.  It auccesta  that  the first instinct ot 
the  nuclear apecia1iat  is still to reassure  the  public without 
confrontinc the  problem. 
We  aucceat  that  the tirat taak ia not  to reassure the public ot 
tod~,  but  to discus•  how  to  a~proach the  problem of eatablishinc 
credibilit~ tomorrow.  If  the. ,,1lnawer  to this question is, 
implicitl~ or  explicitl~.  to  proceed  on  the  same  institutional 
and  political manner  that  haa  cuided  fission  into the  present 
state of  public  scepticism,  then  the  future  tor fusion  could  co 
b~  de~ault.  THERE  IS  NO  REASON  WHY  FUSION  SHOULD  BE  PUMDED  IF  IT 
CANNOT  MEET  CLOSE  SCRUTINY  ON  SAFETY  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  GROUNDS. 
SECURING  ACCEPTANCE  ON  THESE  GROUNDS  MAY  BE  MORE  DIFFICULT  THAN 
ATTAINING  TECHNICAL  OR  ECONOMIC  FEASIBILITY.  ACCEPTANCE  OF 
~SION ON  ENVIRONMENTAL  GROUNDS  COULD  BE  THE  INDUSTRY'S  BOTTOM 
LINE. 
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APPENDIX  1.  THE  US  FUSION  PROGRAMME. 
1.1  A  Brie~ Histor¥• 
This  section is  based  heavily  on  "Fusion  Power.  Science, 
Politics  and  the Search  tor a  New  ~nerCY Source"  (Bromber~ 
{1981}}  for ita history,  and  on  the  OTA  report  "Starpower"  t'or 
more  recent material,  and  upon  diacueaiona  with Gerald  Epatein 
from  the  OTA.  Needlesa  to  aav,  neither authors  are responsible 
for  anv  errore  o~ tact or  jud~ement in  this  appendix. 
Since it's be~innin~s in  the  earl~ 1950s  as  some  part-time 
calculations  o~ mili  tar~ nuclear  ph~aiciata,  the  American  P'usir>'• 
Pro~ramme has  sone  throu~h tour  broad  phases. 
The  tirst phase  from  1952  till 1958,  could  be  called the  'A~e ot 
Optimism'.  Born  as  a  combination  of  cold war  militar~ politics 
and  a  hi~h belief  and  confidence  in  the  abilit~ of  scien~i~~s to 
harness  nature  tor  societ~•a benefit.  the  developin~ centres tor 
(secret)  fusion  research  were  provided with  ample  to  finance  a 
rapid  expansion  {1954:  $2m,  1958:  $29m}.  The  Chairman  of  th~ 
Atomic  Ener~~ Commission,  Lewis  L  Strauss,  was  a  tvpical  'cold 
war warrior',  who  teared defeat  bv  the  USSR  in  the  e~es ot  the 
r~st of  the world,  was  ideal  for  this  hi~hl¥ speculative and 
empirically  baaed  phase. 
Pressure  for  declassification  developin~ within  the  fusion 
pro~ramme coupled  with  political pressures  led  to 
ceclassification  on  the  eve  of  2nd  International Conference  on 
~h~ Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Ener~v.  The  Sherwood  team  had  been 
furiousl~  attemptin~ to  stase  a  spectacular demonstration  of  a 
Controlled  Thermonuclear  Reaction  at  the Geneva  Conference. 
!natead thev  found  previouel~ untheorised  plasma 
'~1cro-instabilities'.  To~ether with  the  discover~ that  the  USSR 
had  not  1n  tact  eucceeded  in  the coal  of  producin~ thermonuclear 
neutrons,  the  'A~e of  Pessimism'  was  ushered  in.  Althouch 
declassitication did  1.1 ttl.e  to  dampen  the spirit of  internil:fl:!.vr'."J.1 
competition.  particularl.~ at  mana~oment lavel.  ;.. '1o  a"'"t)..~o·":!1't4!  ... :it  "~·"·A.,_~­
other  powers  were  not  an~ further  towards  a  tusJ.ou  c:.:~  a:tn.ka  -~b·n 
emphaaia  on  short-term reactor development  seem  a  littla 
inappropriate.  In  the  next  period,  the  scientists would  b~  i~r 
more  concerned  with  underatandinc  plasma properties  th&u  'W.i..,;u 
reactor development.  Scientific  teasibilit~ took  on  ~he m~anl~ ~ 
ot  plaama  confinement  time,  den•1t.l  ~nd  tem~ar~ture  r4t:"lo~·  t:- \'·· 
producinc  'thermoneutrons •.  The  increasin;:l~ lens- te~'m  ~J 
"normal."  appearance  ot  the  fusion  research  pr\l~re..mme  ~--:,,_,.,:~.J·  u1  ~1 · 
&n  interest  arould  the  P'BR  meant  a  tishtenin~ ot  btH1a.."l;.':  ,__,\  '~~~.i~:r 
to  competition  between  the  research  ~entree. 
r.n  1970,  the  audden  con~reasicnal and  P'lbli'-:  a\o-.,.s.:r·t..:~.~r  .••  :;;.~· 
env 1ronn:enta.l  ie!'uea  combined  w! th  the  dtecove'!":l  ot  .:;.  Pl.,•)~dlS .._,..( 
confinement  concept.  the  tokamak,  rea~cr-ed  t~,--.  rl.ai'IJ).-r\  ~r.-~:~;·t.·e._:"·n!t ... 
:>cr:-tunea.  and  1 t  re-entered  a  period  of'  expansion.  r.-.  :  ..  ~ 12. 
the  politicall¥ astute Robert  Hirsch  bee~~ Directo~  o~  tn--
D iviaion ot  Con trolled  Thermo-N•.1cle~r  Rea~ti.,:,n  { CTR).  K!.-'tnel\ . ,, 
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period  ot ottice  can  be  characterised  b~: 
1.  A  stron~  determination  to  move 
awav  from  the  project  leaders 
Washincton Oftice. 
decision  makins 
and  into  th• 
2.  Skilful  lobbVinc ot  Concress,  etc,  and  uae ot the 
press  to  obtain  publie  •upport. 
3.  An  emphasis  on  larce  machine•  {particularly  the 
Tokamak)  and  reaetor development  and  on  industry 
involvement. 
In  1971.  the  Fast  Breeder Reactor  (PBR),  previously seen  as 
environmentallY  benelovent  waa  runninc  into trouble with the 
environmental  lobb~.  consequently  (with  a  little help  trom  the 
fusion  lobby)  tusion  be~an to  be  seen  as  an  environmentallV clean 
alternative.  The  1973  Ener~ Crisis  spurred  the search tor 
lon~-term non-fossil  tuel  ener~~  supplies.  Manasement  ot the 
Controlled  Thermo-nuclear  Reaction  (CTR)  procramme  was  movinc 
under  more  centralised manacement  with  correapondinclv broader 
areas  ot  reeponsibility.  As  a  consequence,  fusion  would  in  future. 
~e saen  aa  a  competitor with  fission. 
Finall~.  in  1977.  the political context  shifted  ~ain.  Hirsch 
de~arted in  diesatisfac~ion with  the  Carter chances.  CTR  was 
~oved into  the  newly  created  Department  ot !nercv.  further 
shiftin~ it into  the  area ot  just  another  lons-term  research 
pro~ramme.  The  first  Secretar~ ot  Enercy,  Schlesinser,  shifted 
his  interest  trom  fusion  to  solar,  coal  and  conservation.  The 
prosramme  leaders  insisted that  the  emphasis  on  tokamaka  be 
~aduced as  it was  no  lon~er  thou~ht to  be  necesaarilV  a  cood 
candidate  for  commercialisation.  Pundinc  started  a  slow decline 
in  real  terms  to  the  present,  cauainc  alippace  in  the  procramme•a 
timetable.  ·rhe  American  fusion  prosramme  was  movinc  into  a 
situation where  it was  in dancer  of  beinc causht  between wantinc 
more  mone~ for  a  full  procramme  but  not  wantinc  to  aak  tor too 
much  in  case  Con~reas save  its  too  expensive.  It waa  also 
realised that  international  cooperation is one  way  of  cuttir.~ 
expenditure  but  there was  an  unwillincneas  to  commit  the 
Adminstration  to  a  full  international  procramme  because  there are 
stronc  Detenee  Deoartment  pressures  acainst  such  a  move  even 
Con~reea could  accept  that  a  World  Fusion Teat  Reactor would  not 
be  built  in  the  us.  Today it aeems  unlikel~ that  the  US  Pusion 
community will cet  the monev  it needs  to reach  ita tarcet 
decision  date of  2005,  but it 1a  also  unlikel~ that Concreas  w~t~ 
shelve  the  procramme.  Similarly,  while full cooperation witt\  ':.~:~ ...  'J 
Soviet  Union  is unlikelv,  there will  probablv  be  some  1ncreaae  in 
US  cooperation with  the reat ot the  tuaion  powers. 
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1.2  The  Present  Context 
The  application  tor tundinc  in  the  USA  comes  ~rom the.Department 
ot  Enercy.  The  "Puaion  Enercv  Research.  Development  and 
Demonstration  Act"  aent  to  the  US  Concreaa  in  1980  from  the 
Committee  on  Science  and  Technoloc~.  described  the objective very 
clearly  t 
"to  provide  tor  an  accelerated  procramme  tor 
reaearch,  development  and  demonstration  ot 
macnetic  tuaion  enercy  leadinc  to  the  early 
comme~cia~isation of  this  technolocy  to  be  carried 
out  b~ the  Department  o~ Enercy". 
By  "commercial",  the  dra~ters ot  the  Bill meant: 
,.utilised  tor  the  t>roduction  ot  electricit~. 
hvdrocen  s~nthetic fuels,  heat  and  other important 
applications,  before  the  end  of  this  eentur~." 
(US  DOE  1980) 
This  wordinc  is specific.  Indeed  so  specific as  to indicate that 
the  Congress  Committee  did  not  have  any  realistic assessments 
before  it.  The  future  ot  hvdro~en synthetic  fuels  waa  (and 
remains)  a  questionable  objective,  and  the stipulation ot 
&cheivinc reaults  in  fusion  research  capable  o~  bein~ applied  to 
~ommerica~  enterpr~se.  su~~ests that  Con~ress had  been  persuaded 
to  pre-~mpt the  8Cientitic eva:uatton.  and  to  jump  the  ~un.  The 
too  specific definition ot  objectives  both  in  terms  of material 
potential of  fusion  and  in  term~ of  the  time  taken  to  reach  the 
commerical  atace.  su~gests that  there  were  lobbies  at  work,  and 
~hat the¥  were  able  to call  upon  the  concern ot  le~islators that 
tney  should  be  at  the  ahead  of  international  research  in  bic 
science  and  could  no~  tol~r~te the  possibility that  some  other 
state or states would  ~ake the  lead.  The  possibilit~ that  the 
exercise  mi~ht be  non  productive,  or  be  a  sub  optimal  use  of 
resources  does  not  appea~  co  have  been  seriously explored.  To 
le~islate for  the  conversion  of  an  exceptionally complex  and 
therefore  lon~ term  R&D  pro~ramme.  to  be  moved  trom  that  sta~e to 
s  commercial  sta~e.  before  the  scientific feasibility of  the 
project  haa  been  demon•trated  ia  a  contradiction in  terms. 
The  followin~  ~eneral pointe  can  be  made  about  the  US  Fusion 
Pro6tramme; 
0  The  initiation 
pro~ramme  in  the 
political.. 
and 
'50s 
development 
and  '60s  was 
o~  the 
intensely 
o  Althou~h control  of  the  pro~ramme  waa  moved  aw~ 
from  the  laboratory  leaders  relatively early in 
the  pro~ra.mma.  this  did  not  in  1tsel~ lead  to more 
r~tional formu  of  assessment.  For  example.  the 
emphasis  on  lar~e machines  durin~ the  mid  '60s  and 
~arlY  '70s  onwards  was  a  ceans  of  tne  pro~ramme 
leaders maintaining their centres  rather than  the 
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best  means  establishin~ a  set  ot  scientific  and 
en~ineerin~ objectives1 • 
o  Similarlv,  the  procramme  was  not  correctl~  loca~ed 
within  a  more  broad  aet  of  •ocial objectives ot 
aecurin~  a  cheap  and  clean  lone-term  ener~ 
supply.  For  example,  the  project  head  trom  1957 
to  1965,  Arthur  Ruark,  throu~h his  impartialitv 
and  honesty  tailed to  secure  hi~h tundins  that  his 
successors,  Amosa  Bishop  and  Robert  Hirsch,  were 
able  to  do  so  by  promisin~  what  the  pro~ramme was 
supposed  to  tound  out  - scientific,  en~ineerinc 
feasibilit~ &nd  even  economic  compet1tiveness2. 
0 
0 
0 
The  advent  of  environmental  concern  led  to  the 
fusion  communit~  expoundin~ a  form  ot scientific 
journalism that  certainlv  was  not  within  their 
realm  ot  expertise  to  offe~. 
The  pro~ramme suttered  an  abnormal  level ot severe 
fluctuations  in  direction  due  to  heavy  political 
~resaures  and  inadequate  mana~ement 
st~ucture/cro~ramme appraisal 
Despite  the  willin~ness of  the  fusion  community, 
attempts  to  involve  industry  in  investment  in 
tuaion  ener~y  have  been  unsuccessful,  industry's 
involvement  bein~  both  mar~inal  and 
short-lived4 • 
For  example,  James  Tuck,  head  of  the  Los  Alamos 
Laboratory.  said  in  196U.,  "We  resisted  the  temptation  to 
build  hu~e machine  or hire  lar~e staffs ...  This  sound  very 
virtuous.  but  I  have  now  come  to  realize  that it was  f' 
suicidal"  t 
Ruark  stated  the  objective  of'  the  pro~ramme as  bein~ to: 
"determine  the  possibility  or  impoasibilitv  of  fusion 
machines  producin~ net  power •...  statements  concerning  the 
probability  of  attainin~  net  power  production,  or 
concernin~ the  production  of  economical  power,  lie beyond 
the  limits or our  pre•ent  knowled~e."  In  contrast,  Bishop 
declared  himselt  to  be  "convinced  of  (the  CTR 
pro~ramme's]  eventual  success." 
For  example.  two  A~C  staff,  BI  Eastlund  and  we  Gough,  in 
1971,  told  the  preaa  ot  the  physics  and  techolo~y of  a 
"fusion  torch"  with  the  "viaion  of  lr~e cities,  operated  1 
electrically by  clean,  safe  fusion  reactors  that  eliminate  L 
the  citv•s waste  products  and  ~enerate  the  city's  raw 
materials."  Similarly.  and  not  untvpically,  the  New  York 
Times  told its  readers  in  the  same  year  that  fusion 
"produces  little  or  no  radioactive  by-products  and  (is] 
virtually  foolproof'  a~ainst runaway  reactions." 
Westin~house and  Alli~-Chalmers were  involved  from  a  early 
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date  (195U  and  1957)  in  sponsorins  a  couple  o~  thei~ 
scientists  to  work  on  fusion,  but  this was  little more 
than  payins expert  conau~tants to  keep  them  inro~med.  In 
1957.  Genera~ Atomic  and  the Texas  Atomic  Enercv  Research 
Poundation  put  $5m  each  into joint research,  but  in  1967 
TAERP  withdrew  and  GA  persuaded  the  covernment  to pick  up 
the  tab  tor  their  continued  project.  General  Electric 
were  the  only  private utility with  a  larce  interest  in 
fusion,  havins  been  involved  since  dec~asaitication.  In 
1965,  the  GE  Cook  Committee  carried  a  detailed assessment 
ot  the potential ot various  reactor concepts  and  concluded 
that  "The  liklihood ot  an  economically  successi'ul.  fusion 
electricit~  station  bein~  developed  in  the  foreseeable 
future  is  small"  and  the  pro~ramme was  terminated  in  1967. 
St&ndin~  Committe  member  Keith  Brueckner  caused  a 
sensation  when  he  joined  KMS  in  1969,  sayinc  he  would 
demonstrate  scientific  feasibility  tor  an  ICF  concept 
within  18  months,  later  KMS  was  only  able  to  continue 
under  Dept  of  Ener~y contract. 
Possible  Futures. 
It may  be  expected  that  the  US  decision  about  fusion  will  be 
taken  at  two  levels.  One  is  the  cost,  and  past  Administrations 
have  emphaised  that  fundio~ must  depend  upon  resu~ta.  and  as  the 
1980  Act  makes  clear,  they  see  fusion  operatinc in  a  competitive 
market  context.  That  criteria will  be  impossible  to  meet  within 
the  time  laid  down,  and  the  fusion  pro~ramme will  be  hard  pressed 
to  ~et  the  fundin~ it needs.  On  the  other hand  the  strate~ic 
lmplications  for  the  US  of  not  ~oin~ ahead  with  the  fusion 
pro~rarnmee.  if  the  other  powers  do.  are  not  difficu~t to  see. 
The  comoromi3e  solution will  be  to  suport  the  proposed 
International  c>ro~rarume  - ITER.  That,  however,  brin~s to  the 
surface fresh  complexities,  b~  brin~in~ the  ~reat powers  to~ether 
(except  China)  to  collaborate  to~ether in  a  aens~~ive  technolo~y. 
To  do  that  thev  have  to  sink  their differences.  The  implications 
~o wider  than  the  tuture of  fusion.  and  it  wi~l be  one  indication 
such  a  possibilit~ 11!  the  US  ~overnment  a~rees to  put its 
resources  into it. 
In  J  anuar~ 1987,  the  $1. 5m  "Technical.  Plannin~  Activit~·· was 
published,  a  temarkabl~ detailed document.  outlininc the  tundin~ 
required  to  reach  a  decision  on  buildin~ the  IFF  b~ 2005. 
This  report  w&s  criticallV discussed  in  the  OTA  Report 
~staroower"  (OTA  1987)  p~blished later in  the year  (see  Appendix 
2).  The  omissions  pg~hape sav  more  than all the detail.  For 
example,  t20b  between  now  and  2005  is  an  extremelv  lar~e level or 
inve11  trrH~111t  in  an  unknown  teehnolo~y b~fore one  is  ~oins to  look 
at  economic  conaictera~ions  o~ various  reactor  coneepts  and  supply 
scenarios.  Th~re is  also  absolutely  no  mech&nism  involved  in  the 
Plannin~ Activity  f'or  termination  o~ the  pro"ramme,  be  it expense 
or  en"ineert.nit/scienti~ic infea.s!.bility or possible environmental 
ctarne~e.  Decisions  are  only  acceptable  when  they  involve  choosin~ 
between  alternative  paths  forward  not  between  carrvin~ on  or 
atoppin~.  e~ "the  ~ositive E3  (decision]  is appropriate,  because 
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some  type  o~  lon~-burn  demon•tration  MUST  occur tor fusion  to 
advance."  (our  emphasis]. 
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APPENDIX  2.  THE  OTA  STARPOWER  REPORT. 
The  Potential  Role  or  ~uaion. 
"Research  aimed  at  developin"  f'uaion  as  an  enercy 
source.  has  been  vi~orouslv  pursued  since  the 
1950s,  and,  despite  considerable  procresa  in 
recent  years,  it  appears  that  at  least three 
decades  ot  additional  reeearch  and  development 
will  be  required  bef'ore  a  prototype  commercial 
tusion  reactor  can  be  demonstrated." 
The  Polio¥ Context. 
Th9  US  Department  of  Ener~Y.  who  are  the manacers 
of  the  ~usion  pro~r&mme are  responsible  for  makin~ 
a  positive evaluation  to  determine  if it will  be 
feasible  in  the  21st  century.  "However  this 
schedule  cannot  be  met  under  existinc  tusion 
bud~ets.  The  DOE  plan  requires  that either the  US 
bu~s:ets 
world 
be  incr~ased  substantiallY 
fusion  pro~rams  collaborate 
closel~ on  fusion  research." 
P'indin;s. 
or  that  the 
much  more 
o  "Even  if  no  major  aurprises  are  uncovered  in 
reactor  en~ineerin~.  "It  will  take  at  least  20 
years  under  the  beat  circumstances  to  determine 
whethGr  conatru~tion  of  a  ~rototy9e  commercial 
:rua:icn  reactox~ wi.ll  be  poaaibla  or desirable." 
o  "It  is  new  ~oo  earl~'  to  tell  whether  f'usion 
reactors.  once  developed,  can  be  economically 
competitive  with  other  ener~~  technolo~ies." 
o  "Even  under  the  moat  favourable  circumstances.  it 
does  not  appear  likely  that  fusion will  be  able  to 
eatisfy  a  si~ni~icant  fraction  of  the  Nation's 
electricity demand  before  the  middle  o~  the  next 
centur:a;." 
o  '•Thft  onl~  resourc~s possibly  constrainin~ fusion's 
development  mi~ht be  the materials  n~eded to  build 
fusion  reactor.s.n 
o  nwith  aop~opiatc  desi~n.  fusion  reactors  could  be 
environmentally  superior  to  other  nuclear  and 
fosail  fuel  production  technolo~ies." 
o  "If fusion  technolo~y  is developed  succeeafull:,r, 
it should  be  possible  to  desi~n fusion  reactors  to 
a  hi~her  de~ree of  sa~ety  assurance  than  fission 
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reactors." 
o  "There is little to  be  sained  and  a  ~reat deal  to 
be  lost,  in  introducinc  fusion  before  ita 
potentia~  economic,  environmen~a~  and  sa~et~ 
capabilities  are  attained." 
o  "It  would  be  unwiae  to  emphasise  one  fusion 
feature  economics  or  satetv or environmental 
advantases  - over  the others  betore we  know.  which 
aspect  will  be  the  moat  important  for  fusion's 
eventual  acceptance." 
o  "Due  to  the  high  riak  and  lens  lead  time  before 
an~ return  can  be  expected,  private  industry has 
not  invested  appreciably  in  fusion  research  and 
cannot  be  expected  to  do  so." 
o  "If'  the  international  cooperation  "can  be 
extrapolated  in  the  tuture  to  an  unprecedented 
level  level  of  collaboaration,  much  ot  the 
remainin~ cost  ot  deve~opin~ fusion  power  can  be 
ar,a.red  amon~ the  world's major  fusion  pro~rama." 
o  "International  collaboration  cannot  substitute tor 
a  stron~ domestic  research  proQ:ram." 
o  "A  variety  of  DOtential  ditticulties  associated 
with  lar~e  scale collaborative projects will  have 
to  be  resolved,  and  Presidentia~ support  will  be 
reQuired." 
Future  Paths. 
The  Report  identifies  four  options  for  the  future. 
fundin~ decreases  trom  Option  I  to  O~tion IV. 
Option  I.  'The  Independent  Path. • 
The  level of 
"To  .s.~sreseively  establish  the  scienti~ic  and 
technolo~ical  bases  necessary  to  evaluate 
fusions's  potential...  "On  avera~e between  $500 
million  and  $1  billion per year would  be  reQuired 
over  the  next  20  ~ea~s.  with  peak  annual  tundin~ 
possibly  exceedine  $1  billion." 
Option  II.  'The  Collaborative  Path.' 
collaborative 
technical  ~asks  as 
similar  time  seal~--:." 
would  acccmolish 
the  Incteoendent 
.Ap2--2 
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Option  III.  'The  Limited  Path.' 
" .•• tuaion  research  would  continue but  would-not 
be  supported at  the  level  neceaear~ to evaluate 
tuaion'a  potential domesticallY  in  the  earl~ 21st 
centur~." 
Option  IV.  'The  Mothballed  Path.' 
" .•. the masnetic  tuaion  research  procram would  be 
shut  down ..• it  would  be  implemented  in  a  manner 
that preserved  the exiatinc state  ot knowledce  in 
the tield." 
"CURRENT  DEPARTMENT  OF  ENERGY  LONG  RANGE  PLANS  FOR 
THE  FUSION  PROGRAM  ARE  AIMED  AT  THE  'COLLABORATIVE 
PATH'.  IF  RECENT  FUNDING  DECLINES  CONTINUES. 
HOWEVER,  OR  IP  THE  UNITED  STATES  DOES  NOT 
SUCCESSFULLY  ARRANGE  ITS  PARTICIPATION  IN  MAJOR 
COLLABORATIVE  ACTIVITIES,  THE  U.S.  FUSION  PROGRAM 
WILL  EVOLVE  ALONG  THE  'LIMITED'  PATH." 
Ap2-3 Appendix  Three  FBR  and  Fusion  Comparisons 
APPENDIX  3.  FAST  BREEDER  REACTOR  AND  FUSION  COMPARISONS. 
The  closest  technolo~ical  (and  historical)  relative of  Ma~netic 
Continement  Fusion  (MCF)  is the  Fast  Breeder Reactor  (F9R),  and 
~iven the  level  of  uncertaintv  o~ fusion  power  at  this  time  one 
ot  the most  useful  wava  ot  foreaeeinc  the  kind  o~ problema  that 
mav  be  experienced  in  a  fusion  reactor  procramme  is  bV  analocv 
withthe  P'BR  procramme.  In  their  earl~ R&D  phases  thev  both 
shared  a  common  vision ot clean,  cheap,  and virtuallv unlimited 
supply ot enercv.  The  PBR  travelled down  the road  to 
demonstration  much  faster  and  thus  came  under public acrutinv ae 
many  ot  the  proposed  cains  to  aocietv  turned out  to be  illusorv. 
Electricity produced  by  the  FBR  h~a proved  to  be  more  expensive 
than  fission  or fossil  fuelled  ceneration  and  has  caused  a 
recourse  to  non-economic  or speculative arcuments.  These  varv 
from  the  crude  arcumenta  that essentially that  there is no  choice 
because  ener~Y will  simply  run  out  as  tosail tuels  are  depleted 
to  the  point  ot  extinction.  An  alternative arcument  is that 
fossil  fuels  will  become  more  expensive,  as  will  Uranium  Oxide 
for  thermal  reactors  and  at  some  point  in  the  21st  centur~.  Fast 
Breeders  will  become  cheaper  and/or  more  secure.  Atter nearlY 
four  decades  of  fusion  R&D  when  en~ineerin~ concepts  are  becomin~ 
concretised.  the  vision  of  the  fusion  communit~ is also  ahiftinc 
more  towards  the  kinds  of  ar~ument used  b~ proponants  of  the  FBR, 
for  example.  the  statement  from  the  ESECOM  Report  summar~ that; 
"Neither  the  economic  competitiveness  nor  the 
environmental  and  safety  advanta~ea of  fusion will 
materialize  automatically...  Research  is  needed 
to  clarifY  these  possibilities,  and  a  commitment 
to  pursuinc  fusion's  hi~hest potential  is  needed 
to  ensure  that  the  results  ot  aueh  research  are 
embodied  in  the  mainstream  of  tusion  development." 
(Holdren et  a~ 1987) 
Statamenta  su~h as  these  certainlY present  a  picture of  an 
unknown  technolo~y  tryin~ to  find  a  place  for  itself in  an 
uncertain  !uture,  rather  than  the earlier impression  that  tusion 
WAS  the  future.  f.fany  now  see it as  rep lac  in~ the  FBR  as  the 
dominant  technolo~y sometime  durinc  the  second  half ot  the  21st 
century  as  a  backstop  a~ainat risinc  PBR  ~eneratinc costa. 
Others  see it replacinc  the  FBR  ae  international  concern with 
dama~e to  the  environment  makes  the  FBR  politically and  sociallY 
unacceptable.  The  FBR • a  promise ot  be inc able  to  burn  · · _ 
radiactive waste  and  thus  'close  the  tuel cvcle'  was  indeed  a 
tantalisin~ prospect.  Howeve~.  the  environmental  prospects of 
the  FBR  pro~ramme have  been  tarnished  both  by  tear of  nuc~ear 
accident~.  radioactive  pollution  and  the  realiaation that 
reprocesein~ actually  increase  the  volume  ot  low  level  and 
lntermediate  radioactive waste.  As  a  result  the  fusion  community 
has  become  more  vocal  in  expresein~ it's advanta~e over  the  FBR. 
In  1980,  John  Clarke,  then  Oeputv  Asaoci&te  Director tor Fuaion 
Ener~~ in  the  US,  summarised  the  main  'potential'  advanta~es ot 
fusion  as= 
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[1)  "  their intrinsic  safet~ and  low  environmental 
impact  should  allow  sitin~ closer  to  their points 
of  application." 
[2]  "  a  much  smaller  radioactivit~  and  waste 
disposal  problem  than  fission  reactors." 
(3]  "  the  tlexibilit~ of  desi~n inherent  in  fusion 
reactors,  wherein  the  ener~y  recovery  re~ion is 
external  to  the  reactor  re~ion,  such  reactors mav 
be  used  tor other purposes,  such  as  the  production 
of  h~dro~en  and  nuclear  fuel,  as  well  as 
electricit~ production." 
(Clarke  1980) 
The  last of  these  points  is neither here  nor  there.  The  onl~ 
other  purpose  ~iven any  serious  attention is hvbrid  fusion, 
creatin~ figsion  fuels  in  the  breedin~ blanket  of  a  fusion 
reactor.  which  is  ~enerall~ accepted  as  incorporatin~ the  least 
attractive features  of  both  systems.  Also,  a.s  we  shall see,  a 
fusion  pro~ramme may  well  be  hard  pushed  to  breed it's own  tuel 
let  alone  addin~ to  the  Pu  stock. 
One  of  the  unexpected  problems  which  promises  to  do~ the 
development  of  the  Fast  Br~eder is  located within  the  lo~istics 
of  the  fuel  c~cle and  criticallY.  the  Pu  balance.  To  develop  a 
Fast  Breeder  ~ro~~Bnmo,  i~puta  to  the  Pu  stock must  increase  such 
that  the  stock  can  meet  the  demands  of  the  existin~ reactors.  and 
any  new  ones  comin~ on  line.  The  critical variables are  the 
Breeding  Gain  (BG),  the  out-cf.-~eactor-time  (ORT)  while  the  spent 
fuel  is  reprocessed,  the  Pu  loss  associated with  reprocessin~. 
the intitial size ot  the  Pu  stock,  and  the  timin~ of  the 
pro~ramme.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe similar constraints 
v-1ould  appl~ to  a  fusion  pro~raro.me.  F'i~ure  Ap3. 1  and  P'i~ure  AP3. 2 
shew  the  fu~l  cy~le tor tte ¥aet  Breeder  &nd  fusion  respectivel~. 
Bo~h fuel  cycles  ~re  oubj~~t  to  four  m~jor contraints: 
Constraint  1.  l~Duts to  ini~i&l stock. 
Initially,  ~he  FBR's  Pu  sto~K  is  obtained  by 
reprocesain~  the  waste  0f  the  thermal  reactor 
pro~ramme.  It was  thcu~ht that  the  ~hasin~ out  ot 
the  thermal  r-eactor  pro-:(t'a.'1lme  wou~d  be  posaib~e 
a~ter a  while  as  th~  ~BR  programme  became  able  to 
breed  i~s  own  tue~ irorn  Uraniumz~e.  However,  it 
would  aopear that  ~iven other fuel  parameters  this 
would  severely  constrain  ~~e  apeed  of  the  FBR 
pro~ramme  so  for  tt\e  t !me  be  in&:  at  least  the  t~o 
t¥pes  or  r.e~ctor  ar~ seen  as 
1 com~lementar~'. 
The  stock  of  Tritium  av~ilable  for  a  fusion 
prog:r61.l!"l.me  must be  seen  as  limited.  Tritium currently 
costa  eround  currently  £10000/~.  This  would 
involve  a  prchlbitively  h1~h  fuel  bil1  tor  a 
fusion  reactor.  Co~aoquently.  the  substitution of 
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such  supplies  b~  Tritium  bred 
blanket  must  be  a  priorit~ of  a 
pro~ramme. 
Constraint  2.  Reproceeain~ loss. 
in  the reactor 
commercial  MCP'. 
Estimates  for  the  Pu  loss  in  reprocessins  FBR 
blanket  material  ~enerally vary  between  2~ and  6%. 
For  tho  proposed  British prosramme with  the  most 
tavourable  parameter values  (ORTa  9  months,  BG: 
1.2),  an  increase  in  Pu  loss  ~rom 2%  to  6%  results 
in  an  increasin~ in  the  Doublinc  Time  (DT)  from  30 
to  86  ~ears  (Sweet  1982). 
There  has  been  ver~  little work  done  on  the 
Tritium  reproceasine  concepts.  Current  conceptual 
desi~ns tor  a  protot~pe commercial  fusion  reactor 
involvin~  eith~r  liquid  Lithium  and  Lead  (Li/Pb) 
breedinc elements  or  solid  Lithium  metasilicate 
involve  oxidisin~  the  Tritium  into  T=O·  This 
will  be  neceesar~ as  Tritium is  hi~hlY mobile  and 
diffuses  readil~  throu~h  structures.  In  the 
absence  of  anY  detailed  studies  into Tritium  loss 
involved  in  reproceasin~ and  storace.  one  can  only 
assUf"'t>  that  it  is  likel~ to  be  creater  than  loss 
aaaociated  with  Pu  reproceseins.  In  absence  of 
any  estimates  on  Tritium  loss,  values  between  4% 
~nd  12%  ml~ht be  reasonable. 
Constraint  3.  Out-of-Reactor-Time. 
T~e time  spent  reprocessin~  emer~es  as  a  crucial 
constraint  in  the  fuel  c~cle equation.  For  the  UK 
p~o~rwnme  with  most  tavourable  parameters  (Pu 
loss:  2%,  BG;  1.2),  the  doublin~ o~ the  ORT  from 
~he most  favourable  9  months  to  18  months  would 
result  in  a  Ooublins  Time  inerease  from  30  years 
to  53  ~ears  (Sweet  1982).  The  nine  month  ORT  is 
reco~nised  as 
(at  least  20 
because  the 
not  being  achievable for  some  time 
~ears)  and  is  onlv  beins pursued 
penalt~  ~or doinc  ao  would  be  rapid 
expansion  of  the  thermal  pro~rammet 
We  can  find  no  estimates  tor  the  possible  ORT  tor 
Tritium  reprocessin~  as  the discussion  ot  the 
t6chnolo~¥  is  at  such  a  rudimentar~  stace. 
However,  it  is  possible  to  predict  that  an 
unf'avour.:~.ble  O.RT  tor  a.  f'usion  prosra.mme  would 
assume  a  far  more  critical  role due  to  the  very 
ahcrt  half-life  of'  Tritium.  The  short  half-life 
o?  Tritium  (12.36  ~e~rs)  is usallV presented  as  an 
un.•.rnbt~uoue  J;>lua  f'or  eusion  C">ver  fission,  as  it 
~restl~'  reduces  the  environmental  risk  trom  fuel 
leaks.  ~nd  the  stora~e of'  lon~-term nuclear waste. Appendix  Three  FBR  and  Fusion  Comparisons 
However,  the  decay  rate  is so  fast  that it makes 
the  reprocessin~ and  stor&ge  of  Tritium extremely 
unfavourable  for  maintaining  a  positive Tritium 
balance.  For  example,  an  ORT  of  1  ¥ear  would 
result  in  Tritium  loss  through  decay  of  5.U5%,  an 
ORT  o~  3  years  would  mean  a  Tritium  loss ot 
15.~8%.  This,  compounded  with  an  as  vet  unknown 
reprocessing  loss,  could  prove  fatal  to  the 
Tritium  ba1ance  and  the  timin~ ot  the  programme. 
The  Question  of  dec~ in  the  Pu  fuel  cycle  is 
simply  insi~niticant  due  the  very  lon~ hal~-lite 
of  Pu.  It  was  thought  that  Lithium  would  be 
suitable  to  circulate  throu~h the  breedin~ area 
with  "online extraction".  However,  this  approach 
was  deemed  unworkable  due  the  high  tire risk and 
hi•h  stoced  ener~y  content  involved,  so  present 
ctesizns  use  Helium  as  the  coolant  with  a  Copper 
Oxide  bed  to  oxidise  the  Tritium  content  into 
T-;: o  ( IAEA  1985A).  I.t'  this  process  is  as 
strai~htforward as  people  hope,  then  the  ORT  may 
indeed  be  ver~ short,  but  there ~  be  unforeseen 
~roblems  in  this  infant  technolo~~  such  ae 
impurity  control  and  coolin~ problema.  It would 
not  be  wise  at  this  sta~e  to  ASSUME  there will  be 
no  problema  ..,.,i th  ~eproceasin~ Tritium  which  may 
lead  to  deca~  time  becomin~ an  important  factor  in 
a  fusion  po~·er  ~ro~ram.me'  s  f'l!el  C~lcle  lo~istics. 
Constraint  4..  The  Breedin~  Gai~. 
The  !:·r~ea  l  n~  ~a.in  ia  t  ll  ~  ratio of  fuel  out  to  tuel 
ln.  For·  a.n  f'BR  eritimdt~s  var:,.r  between  the 
opti~iAtic value  of  1.2  to  the  perhaps  more  likely 
v&lue  or  arcund  1.1.  Hiz;her  ratios  are 
t: l-:. e u r  -~ t  t c  :_~.J.l ~  C.' b  t..~, 1 n a b 1 e  b u t  1 t  has  to  be 
~emember~d  th~t  there  is  &  hi~h1V  constrained 
tr~cte-o?f  between  breedin~  end  power  output. 
Simply,  the  more  neutrons  used  to  breed  the  less 
~r~  avail~ble tor  conversion  into  electricity. 
Current  BG  estimates  for  fusion  ~re  ~re~ter than 
or  equal  to  1.35  and  1.5  tor  solid  and  liquid 
breed9rs  respectively  {!AEA  1985A).  At  this stage 
nt  desi~n  it  ie  unwise  to  att&ch  too  much 
im{.)orte..'1  ~-e  to  these  t iguras  except  as  upt;>er  11m1 ts 
on  bre~d~n~  gain.  The  reactor concepts  involved 
may  be  ee~n  as  an  e;.H~.t·cise  in  tr:ting  to  2;et  the 
moaT  ta~ourable  resulta  bV  running  other 
param~tore  at  their  limits.  It  would  be 
suror1.ain~  if  -+-ni~  e;~e~ciae  could  be  translated 
•nco  ~ealit~ without  the  relaxation  of  at  least 
oome  ot  ~heee  QSSumpticr~  ~iven  the  extremel:t 
im.ma•.:urn  nature  of  theJ  9ro.1ect. 
Feaaibilitv of  f~sion aa  a  source  of  enerzy  cannot  be 
demonAtrated  b~  ~eference to  a  ain2;le  reactor  desi~n and 
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operation.  The  essential  requirement  ia  a  a~stem model  which 
will display  the  lo~iatical requirements  in  the  tuel cvcle, 
reactor operation.  supply ot essential materials.  etc.  From  this 
modal  a  realistic idel ot the scale  and  cost  trade-otts of  a 
fusion  prosramme  mi~ht be  derived.  The  Fast Reactor  a~stem 
provides  a  useful  startinc point  because ot the aimilaritiee 
between  the  two  s~stema. 
Ficure  Ap3.1.  FBR  Fuel  C¥cle. 
Plutonium 
Decommissionin~ 
'-----~------1  Waste 
Fi~ure Ap3.2  Ma~netic Confinement  Fusion  Fuel  Cycle. 
I_T_r  __  1t_1_u_m  ______  ~~-~-
Lithium 
Reprocess  in~  Waste 
Decommiasionins 
~------~--------~waste 
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**  *  ** 
The  STOA  Project  <Scientific and  Technological  Options 
Assessment)  is the Technology  Assessment  unit of the 
European  Parliament.  Set up  in 1987,  its function is to 
provide background  information to the European  Parliament on 
the scientific and  technological aspects of political issues 
and  to facilitate access  to  technical expertise outside the 
European  Community  institutions. 
STOA  is run  by  a  Supervisory Panel  of Members  of the 
European  Parliament assisted by  a  Project Team  of officials 
from  the Secretariat-General of the Parliament.  It maintains 
a  Network  of contacts with outside experts and  publishes a 
Newsletter.  Requests  for further  information are welcome  and 
should be  sent  to:  The  STOA  Project,  European  Parliament, 
Room  II-5/50,  Luxembourg  L-2929  (Telephone  Luxembourg 
4300-2511). 